

Long Live the Emperor!
Legitimizing Infrastructural Expansion in Meiji Japan

A THESIS

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By

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On my honor, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Signed,
Dominic Jose Alvarado

READER APPROVAL

This thesis project, written by Dominic Alvarado, meets the required guidelines for partial completion of the degree of Bachelor of the Arts in Asian Studies.

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Dedicated to my mother, Gina Arms, my father, Jose Alvarado, and my brother, Gabe Alvarado whose constant love, support, and advice has carried me throughout life.

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Introduction

As I walked through the streets of Hamamatsu, Japan in February of 2010, I couldn't help but notice the small Shintō shrines tucked away between towering buildings on either side, or next to a dilapidated factory (See Appendix, Image 1), a stark contrast of tradition and modernity. It seemed that every other block, a similar sight met my eyes, a paradox that couldn't be avoided. Such apparent displays of old and new coexisting with one another were foreign to me; I had certainly been to the historic districts of various cities throughout the United States, but these areas always seemed to occupy their own little corner of the city - never had they been so blatantly coexistent. The resultant intrigue from this experience led me to examining the dichotomy of old and new in the course of Japanese history. More specifically, I became interested in the role of Shintōism, Japan's oldest religion, and Japan's path of modernization following the opening of Japan's borders in 1853. What relationship, if any, exists between modern Japanese infrastructure and Japan's oldest religion? Did Japan represent a unique model of development and modernization different from other nations because of the interactions between Shintōism and establishment of an infrastructural power system?

I knew from previous research that in the formation of 19th-century nation-states, there has been an emerging pattern of expansion of infrastructural power. In the course of this expansion, Machiavellian despots have largely been displaced in favor of infrastructural systems which offer governments greater control over larger areas. Such

state transformations generally resulted as an alternative to religious backing by a singular ruler, and are a favored means of decentralizing the power structure while expanding government influence over larger landmasses. Likewise, the move to an infrastructural power system cements the presence of a centralized government in the minds of its citizens. Japan, as with various other modern nation-states, was not immune to a restructuring of its governmental system. The coexistence of Shintōism in modern Japan, however, appeared to indicate that there was a greater intervention of religion in the expansion of infrastructural power than was present in that of other nations.

To cover such a large question wholly could span a series of books and lifetime's work and still not be fully resolved. Therefore, it became important to narrow my focus to more completely address a thesis-appropriate topic. Knowing that I wanted to incorporate Shintōism and that I am interested in the modernization of Japan as a nation, I limited my timeframe from 1853 to 1945, recognizing these to be pivotal years where the Japanese were able to devise their own path of modernization without direct interference from other nations, as would be done in the wake of World War II.

My initial research was largely concerned with determining three things: the history Japan, the history of Shintōism, and theories of modernization as they apply to Japan. This research consisted of historical and historiographical research, as well as drawing from previous interviews I had conducted while in Japan.

There are extensive resources available in researching Shintōism, and of these resources, it is interesting to note that there were a great number of American publications in the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's. While these resources would provide a comprehensive look at Shintōism from the end of World War II to the 1970's, I

discovered that many of them seemed to harbor negative stigmas as a result of Japanese actions taken during the war, and found it hard to truly take the words of some scholars, such as Yoshiya Abe¹, seriously in analyzing the Japanese condition. A new wave of interest on Shintōism seemed to emerge in the early 2000's and has continued to the present. I found that many of these resources, including those of Susumu Shimazono and Felicia Bock, were much more objective in their interpretations, and were thus more credible in exploring the historical ramifications of Shintōism.

Shintōism, considered to be the native religion of Japan, has played a rich role in the development in the unification of Japan. Initially a conglomeration of local folk beliefs that acted as a binding agent for a divided Japan, Shintōism has played a large part in the cultural evolution of Japan. Since its modest beginnings, Shintōism has played a significant role in everything from birth and marriage rites to maintaining traditional building methods (Bock, 56). Likewise, Shintōism was also used a means of legitimizing the supreme authority of the Emperor, and by extension, a large amount of the infrastructural expansion that took place leading up to, and during, World War II-era Japan.

My next stage of research began focusing on Japanese history and the different ways in which Japan and other states have navigated waves of foreign influence. To that end, Peter Lutum's *Japanization* was very important in developing an idea of the different courses of action available to the Japanese people. Furthermore, Andrew Gordon's *The Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* provided

¹ For the purpose of this thesis, Japanese names will generally be presented as is traditionally done in Japan (family name, first name). The only instances where this does not hold true is in the case of a Japanese author publishing in English under English publication practices (first name, family name).

me with a more comprehensive history of Japan post-1853, and added context to some of the ideas presented by Lutum. Likewise, James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State : How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* described the rationale used by state governments in determining which foreign elements to incorporate into the development of a state. In addition, Scott's *The Art of Not Being Governed* describes how people might avoid the various systems employed by state governments that intervene in the lives of citizens.

Approaching this literature, however, I found that there are myriad ways in which a state can expand and develop in times of modernization. From the infrastructural expansion of communication and transportation, to the structure of the central government, any number of systems can be examined with relation to the development of a modern nation-state. Therefore, it became important to begin examining different governmental structures more thoroughly and determining which structures were more directly codified in a specific pattern of modernization.

I further narrowed my topic to the influence of Shintōism on the education system, as this was one of the facets in Japan to undergo the most sweeping changes. Exploring the Japanese education system requires some level of examination of the work Duke provides. Benjamin Duke's *The History of Modern Japanese Education* has been a key resource of exploring the history of the Japanese education system, particularly under the reforms of the Meiji government. While this history provides perhaps more detail across greater periods of time than is relevant to the current paper, it certainly provides a deeper level of insight into the education system and the level of involvement that the Emperor showed prior to the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890). Further, the Imperial

Rescript on Education displays a direct intervention of the Emperor and the government on the education system, which is integral in determining the role of Shintōism in the education system.

In exploring these histories, I began to see that there was a relationship between the development of Japan's education system and the intervention of Shintōism. Where previous research had shown me that Shintōism had been prevalent in Japanese history, my current research indicated that Shintōism has been far more relevant in modern times than I had expected. Rather than simply indicating coexistence between traditional Japan and modern Japan, it showed that the two may in fact have tempered and complemented one another in arriving to the modern day.

Through an exploration of the history of Shintoism, theories concerning Japanese modernization, and the changes effected in the education system between 1853 and 1945, I intend to show that Japan represents an exception to previously-established notions concerning religion and movement from despotic to infrastructural power systems within a given nation. While other nations have shown a removal of the religious or supernatural systems that legitimized despotic power structures in moving to an infrastructural power structure, Japan has represented quite the opposite, maintaining and exalting those such religious systems in structuring its new government.

1
A Brief History

Modern Japanese history has been studied at length in topics ranging from State Shintōism to social implications of rapid modernization. Included in these studies has been research regarding the degree of infrastructural change that Japan underwent since the introduction of the Meiji Constitution in 1869 (See Appendix, Image 2). While Tokugawa Period Japan relied on systems such as Alternate Attendance² to enforce the power of the central Japanese government, the Meiji reforms brought with them the knowledge and technology of foreign nations that would allow them to more effectively structure the government. These technologies became most integral in the time surrounding World War II, when the Japanese government poised itself to act as a legitimate power on the global level.

Recognized as having been formally established sometime around the early 8th century, Shintōism has been a driving force in the cultural and religious development of Japan. Since this time, Shintōism has continued to grow in unpredictable ways, even solidifying its ideals and teachings in the midst of the importation of Buddhism from China. In more recent times, Shintōism has been used to many ends, including the fostering of ultra-nationalism under the Meiji Constitution, and has grown into something

² This is the system by which regional rulers were made to maintain residences in the capital, Edo, and their respective domains and alternate time spent in each location during the Edo Period.

that is nearly unrecognizable from early forms of the religion. It is through these changes and the ultimate shift to State Shintō that I will show that Shintōism became a driving force in legitimizing infrastructural change post-1859.

Where many religions stemming from European nations, such as Judaism or Christianity, emphasize a polarized yes or no stance on belonging to a religion, Shintōism was built upon a basis of converging multiple folk beliefs and smaller religions to create a unified structure. It is in this formation of the religion that we can begin to understand how Japanese views on religion differ from those adhering to the religions that rose out of Europe. Rather than dealing in absolute terms, religion in Japan tends to be more “para-religious,” or without a central body, and takes on a fluid notion of how one can practice and what is considered as belonging to a religion (Shimazono, 1081). In acting more as a belief system rather than a religion in the American sense of the word, it becomes harder to find a specific structure or value that could change and therefore delegitimize its cultural significance. This difference in religious ideology can be seen in a number of ways, namely in how the centralized religions of foreign nations have failed to effectively take root in Japan, and further, in how Shintōism has changed over time, yet retained deep ties to its origins. Moreover, we can see that Shintōism has been used to different ends throughout history, largely in part because of this lack of a truly central body.

Shintōism, by all accounts, is barely recognizable when compared to its historical origins. With its earliest written records traced to the *Kojiki* (古事記, Record of Ancient Matters), believed to have been written between 711 CE and 712 CE, and archaeological evidence dating back even further, Shintōism coexisted with Buddhism for a millennia

before contending with ideologically disparate systems from the Western world. Perhaps because of its maturation being concurrent with that of Buddhism in Japan, Shintōism has developed in such a fashion that it can be considered more of a “para-religious” system that has been woven into different facets of society, rather than a religious system that is more grounded in a specific time and means for worship. While ways in which the religions has been practiced have been changed, the core beliefs of the *kami* (gods or spirits) and the creation story of Shintōism remained unchanged, which is important in recognizing the resilience of Shintōism in the development of Japan.

Over the years, a number of primary forms of Shintōism have been recognized by scholars. The first of these forms, and perhaps most true to the origins of Shintōism, is Folk Shintō. Arguably first described in the *Kojiki*, Folk Shintō represents a highly decentralized version of the religion largely concerned with things such as spirit possession, shamanic healing, and a greater reverence of all kinds of *kami*, and is practiced even in the modern age. This type of Shintōism is perhaps most congruous with the Japanese ideals of religion in representing a very individual, very personal, form of religion. Each person will likely practice this type of Shintōism in their own way, with practices ranging from placing a small shrine of good fortune, or *kamidana*, somewhere within a business district, to placing a small shrine within the kitchen to protect from kitchen fires. Much in the way that Shintōism was meant to unify different types of religion in ancient Japan, this practice exemplifies the varied roots of the religion (Swanson, 15).

The second of these forms, and perhaps the most prevalent through historical and modern times, is Shrine Shintō. This type of Shintōism largely involves different festivals

and ceremonies celebrated by the people at various large shrines, or *jinja*, throughout the country. Likewise, Shrine Shintō encompasses some folk beliefs and superstitions regarding luck that are often practiced in an individual capacity. The major differentiation here, however, is the role that the shrines play in worship. Where Folk Shintō is largely practiced individually, in absence of a shrine, Shrine Shintō incorporates the central shrines as an integral part to participating in various traditions. Per its namesake, shrines are integral to this sect of Shintōism and manifest in a number of ways, whether through donations made at shrines, participating in festivals celebrated at shrines, or undertaking in certain ceremonies at a shrine.

While shrines were initially without a central institution, they were often attached to a given Buddhist temple, and they operated as complementary parts to one another for the communities they served. This likely has a large part to do with the fact that Shintōism and Buddhism developed in Japan during the same period, and, in keeping its roots as being an inclusive religion, Shintōism and Buddhism developed in such a way that they could coexist with one another. Indeed, the idea of Shintōism being able to coexist with other religions is still recognizable in modern times.

The final of these forms to take shape, and most crucial to the current paper, was State Shintō. While State Shintō is often associated with negative connotations due to its use in World War II, it represents an important step in the transformation of Shintōism. Where Shintōism had previously been highly decentralized, State Shintō was the first instance of Shintōism being highly centralized, and was moreover used as a stepping stone in the modernization of Japan. Although the Emperor had previously been recognized as a figurehead within the nation, the outright declaration of the Emperor's

power in the Meiji Constitution was the first time that the Imperial Line had held any absolute power of the nation. As the Emperor was said to be a direct descendant of Amaterasu Ōmikami (天照大神), the Sun Goddess and central Shintō deity, this marked a key change for Shintōism under the Meiji government. Certainly, in times such as the Heian Period (794-1185), the Imperial Household had held a prominent position in court life, but the true political power ultimately lay in the hands of court advisors and confidants. Because of the level of involvement of Shintōism already found in the everyday lives of the people, this move to a central organization gave the Meiji government a greater levels of influence in the daily lives of many Japanese citizens.

While these forms of Shintōism are the most recognized in scholarly publications, “Shintō and the Discovery of the History of Japan” by Robert Ellwood reveals an often-overlooked aspect of Shintōism that reveals greater significance within the context of Japan’s history. In this publication, Ellwood discusses the codification of Shintōism as a means of recording Japanese history under the Taihō Code (710), which established the Jingi-kan (神祇官), or the Ministry of Official Shintō. Comprehending this role is integral in understanding how using Shintōism as a facet of the state was the key to success for the Meiji government. While the key point of “Shintō and the Discovery of the History of Japan” is the use of Shintō writings as a means of exploring and interpreting the history of Japan, the message to be taken from this reading is the role of Shintōism in preserving and recording the cultural history of Japan.

Part of realizing how such sweeping differences can be present among different types of Shintōism comes in realizing the connotation of the word “religion” within the Japanese context. “State Shintō and the Religious Structure of Modern Japan” by

Shimazono lends credence to this idea, and argues that we cannot really separate the different types of Shintōism from one another. Shimazono elaborates that our designations describe unique facets of the same Shintō religion simply because Japanese do not think of religion in the same terms as most Western societies. Conversely, they tend to think of religion as we would think of as a “para-religious” system that has at times been “placed under the control of the state” (Shimazono, 1081). I tend to agree with Shimazono in this idea, and prefer to think of Shintōism not as a fragmented religion or one that has been proliferated through state control, but rather as one that has been tucked into many corners of Japanese culture, and thus seems fragmented, when reality may prove that this “fragmentation” was more of a defense mechanism than any real splintering of the religion.

Certainly, State Shintō, Shrine Shintō, and Folk Shintō all had their own unique means of practice and implications in the historical context, but these labels are not descriptions of different sects of Shintōism. They are rather descriptive labels of the same Shintōism in the same way that Shimazono described Shintōism as a para-religious system that can be freely participated in through various means. That is to say, while Shintō practices changed over time, they were simply representative of the needs of the Japanese people and government over different periods.

Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, congruent with the work previously done by Shimazono, I will not be looking at Shintōism in terms of a number of separate, distinct, sects, but rather as a single entity that is multifaceted in nature. This serves a number of purposes. First, we are able to make stronger connections between the state of Shintōism during Meiji Japan and correlate those qualities with previous governmental

implementations of Shintōism, Second, it allows us to move forward with a more fluid notion of Shintōism, without which, we could not fully understand the full extent of the relationship between Shintōism and Japan's infrastructural expansion.

As a final note, we must be aware of the role that the Emperor plays in Shintōism, or perhaps more correctly, the role that Shintōism plays for the Emperor. Shintōism has played a heavy role in the politics of Japan's, with one of the most famous examples being found in the Tale of the Heike (平家物語 *Heike Monogatari*). The Tale of the Heike tells the tale of two warring clans, the Taira and Minamoto, each of which was vying for control of the Japanese government during the Heian Period (794-1185). Each of these clans claimed to be vying for control in the name of a different Shintō deity, the Taira the goddess Itsukushima, and the Minamoto the god Hachiman (De Bary, 339). These two families would represent possible establishments of an Imperial line, and their association with a given Shintō deity is important for us to realize. Coupled with the Meiji Emperor said to be descendant of Amaterasu-ōmikami, we find that in the political history of Japan, association with Shintōism is of great importance. Moreover, we realize that in talking about Shintōism and its role in infrastructural expansions, we can use Shintōism and the Emperor with increasing interchangeability.

The transformation of Shintōism ties in deeply to the history of Japan and its emergence on the global stage. While world trade began booming in the early eighteenth century, the Tokugawa Shogunate³ (1603CE - 1868CE) had adopted strict seclusion laws meant to mitigate foreign influence on the Japanese way of life. Trade was limited to China, Korea, and the Netherlands, and each of these nations had to agree to strict

³ The ruling government of Japan from 1603 - 1868 CE.

regulations on how and where they could operate within Japan (Gordon, 18). Initially established in 1653, the seclusion policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate would not be reversed until the arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry in July of 1853 (Gordon, 50). This would be the first major period of foreign influence in Japan, and forced the Japanese to negotiate foreign waves of influence over the course of the next 92 years. It would not be until the end of World War II that the policies of the Meiji government would be changed to deal with modernization in an entirely new way (Gordon, 237).

In the wake of Commodore Perry's arrival and the subsequent Meiji Restoration, the most powerful wave created for this period of modernization was the promise of a constitution for the Japanese people. Something that had been absent from Japanese government throughout its history, the new Meiji Constitution held promise for the citizens of Japan that they would be guaranteed rights that had not been expressly offered in the past. Thus, the Meiji Constitution played a number of roles in the modernization of Japan. First, the Constitution reorganized the Japanese government in such a way that, by all appearances, gave common people more say in the political processes of Japan. Second, it instituted certain infrastructural changes that would allow for economic and industrial development of the country. Third, it restructured a number of components, including Shintōism, which would guarantee Imperial power in the nation and inspire nationalism amongst its people. The Meiji Constitution was eventually handed down as a gift from the Emperor to the people on February 11, 1889; little more than 25 years after Japan had been opened to the world.

While institutional changes within the fabric of Japan were certainly a significant component of the Meiji Constitution, what is perhaps more important is the gateway that

they opened for cultural change. Rather than simply bowing to the decrees of the elite class as had been done in Tokugawa Japan, the people now had the chance to participate in government and proceedings themselves. No longer a society that was bound by the fabric of a social hierarchy, but one that ushered in opportunity, the social and infrastructural landscapes of Japan were forever changed. The Meiji Constitution, while important to recognizing the infrastructural change within Japanese government, is critical to recognizing change in the social structure, and thus culture, of Japan as a whole. We must recognize, however, that the Meiji Constitution was not absolute in its changing of the Japanese landscape. Many of the provisions outlined in the Meiji Constitution were made conditional per “limits established by law,” and was considered to be largely disappointing for those that had hoped more drastic and permanent social change would be a result of a Constitution (Gordon, 91). This is not to say that the existence of the Meiji Constitution is insignificant to the resulting modernization within Japan, but rather represents a more incremental step in eliciting more sweeping change to come, albeit under the direct influence of foreign powers.

Indeed, the Meiji Constitution marks the first point in time during which Japan was forced to go through rapid modernization and substantial change at the beckoning of outside powers. While many of the changes seem superficial in comparison to what they could have been, these changes ultimately showed significant deviations from established Japanese policy and indicated a serious move into new territory.

Studying this history is integral to understanding how and why certain changes took place within Japan post-1853. First, we must recognize that Shintōism itself is a very flexible and adaptable part of Japanese cultural history. Not only have certain facets of

Shintōism been changed throughout the course of Japanese history to fit the needs of a maturing country, but these changes are so varied and influential that one might make the mistake of designating each iteration as its own entity. This is pivotal in realizing why Shintōism would play a major role throughout the Meiji Period. Given the vast cultural and industrial influence flowing into the country, Shintōism would act as a familiar concept for the Japanese people. Moreover, understanding how references to Shintōism, via the Emperor, were woven into various documents of great importance is essential in establishing that Shintōism played a large role in handling infrastructural changes within Japan.

Of course, the changes that occurred in Japanese society from 1853 to 1945 did not come without considerable debate and discourse on how Japan should deal with the influence of other nations. Where cultural influence was previously mitigated through careful selection of whom, when and where foreign nations could conduct their business during the Tokugawa Period, the opening of Japanese borders to all nations provided considerable question as to how preservation of Japanese culture would continue to take place (Lutum, 3). Each of these standpoints acknowledged that Japan and the Japanese people needed to find a way to maintain Japanese cultural identity among copious amounts of foreign influence. What remained debated, however, was exactly how this preservation would take place.

“In the shift from barbarism to the creation of an ordered world, two approaches are possible. One is to regard the core race with respect and the other races as inferior... The other is to treat each racial lineage with equal respect... [The latter] is what we find in Japanese Shintō.”

- Takamura Itsue (Morris-Suzuki, 94)

In order to best determine how Shintōism was integrated in the expansion of infrastructural power in Meiji Japan, and how this resulted in a remarkable deviation from previously established models of infrastructural expansion, we must understand how infrastructural changes were handled in other nations. James C. Scott’s publications become integral to understanding these changes, even if his publications seem pessimistic in regards to the projected success of such transformations. Particularly when traditional methods and cultural history are challenged by the influx of foreign methods and ideas, nations other than Japan have faced considerable challenge in incorporating the best of both foreign influence and cultural history. Realistically, there have been a number of instances where plans to expand the influence of the state and implement “improved” programs have failed due to incompatibility between traditional values and systems with the incoming changes.

Many such examples are outlined in Scott’s *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, but one that is perhaps most

similar to the Japanese situation was the villagization of Tanzania. Where Tanzania had previously consisted of a great number of smaller tribes that thrived as family-like communities, villagization mandated the relocation of some five million Tanzanians into larger villages (Scott, 223). The government goal of creating these larger communities was twofold: 1) regulating and exerting government influence over fewer, larger settlements was easier than doing the same with more numerous, smaller communities, and 2) access to government services such as transportation, communication, and social welfare programs would be increased. Likewise, the Tanzanian government wished to implement new agricultural techniques, such as ridging, as opposed to traditional crop-cycling techniques. Such changes would have idealistically resulted in greater crop yields as had been done in other parts of the world, and bettered the economic conditions of the country.

A great number of these changes were implemented as a result of increased global contact, primarily with Chinese and Russian cultural contacts, and were thus highly foreign to many Tanzanians. With this in mind, these changes failed for a number of reasons. The most glaring problem is that these changes were never adequately explained to the Tanzanian people. Rather than being told the rationale, they were simply expected to relocate and adopt new agricultural techniques because someone, somewhere, had decided that it was a good idea. The ideas were completely foreign to them with no cultural or historical context, and made little sense to the common person (Scott, 257). Furthermore, certain agricultural techniques, such as ridging, were ineffective because these techniques were not meant to be used in the relatively loose soil that is abundant in Tanzania. Therefore, Tanzania's attempt at modernization was unsuccessful for lack of

logical explanation to the people it affected most and mistaken use of foreign technologies. Such a failure ultimately worked against the Tanzanian government; with many citizens opting to remain in small communities outside of the reach of a government they did not understand (Scott, 261).

Legitimization of such far-reaching changes has proven difficult, especially when they are coming as top-down mandates from centralized government figures. Historically, despotic power structures⁴ had relied on the power of organized religion and its influence in the daily lives of the people, to legitimize any top-down decisions. While use of these despotic systems was relatively successful in the smaller domains, attempting to exert governmental influence from a distant central body proved ineffective across large areas, and this deficiency gave rise to infrastructural power structures⁵. In moving from a more despotic system to a more infrastructural system, educating the populous and communicating with them concerning changes in the system therefore becomes more important. Likewise, infrastructural systems have made it the norm to create a disassociation of religion and the state in moving away from despotic power structures.

While despotic power systems were the predominant form of government up to the early 19th century, a new wave of infrastructural power structures began arising starting as early as the late 18th century. The most famous example of this would be the American Revolution. Where the Christian-backed King of England allowed American colonists to be taxed without representation, there was an adverse effect leading to an

⁴ Power structures generally consisting of a single ruler or ruling family, often legitimized through religious means.

⁵ Power structures that have been established through a series of government agencies, with a central agency to report to, but a more even dispersal of power throughout its various agencies in different locales (Foucault, 204).

American desire to create a new form of government: one free from the despots of England, with government ruled, not by the elite few, but by an expanded network of offices built for the people, by the people (Bailyn, 14). Creating such a system that absolutely separated religious functions from state functions would ultimately lead to similar changes taking place in previously despotic power structures.

Nations such as England would eventually come to keep their Kings and Queens as figureheads while moving to a much more democratic system in the form of an infrastructural power structure. It is particularly important to note that the removal of the despotic monarchies was an emerging trend in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, spanning from the construction of a constitutional monarchy in England, to the French Revolution that caused the collapse of the French monarchy, separation of church and state became increasingly important. Even though the separation of church and state marked a vast departure from the systems of old, these were more successful than the Tanzanian model because they were not a top-down mandate, but rather one from the bottom up.

Though the opening of Japan's borders in 1853, the Japanese government was faced with a very similar situation as Tanzania. The government realized that value could be found in importing foreign ideals and technologies, but special steps needed to be taken if the importation of these items was to be completed successfully. Particularly because there was such heated discourse among everyday Japanese citizens and intellectuals alike on how Japanese should maintain its cultural identity, it was particularly important for the government to proceed cautiously. In this sense, there was also a certain bottom-up aspect to the changes that were to take place in the Japanese

government, albeit minimal in nature. The decision still remained in the hands of higher-ranking Japanese officials in determining a path forward.

Among this discourse, there were three major schools of thought to arise. The first, and certainly would be popular among ultra-nationalists such as Kita Ikki, was to find a way to expel the foreigners and their influence from Japan, and let the nation develop individually as had been done in the previous centuries (Gordon 167; Lutum, 7). While the notions of this movement were not completely lost to many Japanese citizens, the popularity and practicality of this solution was minimal at best. In the early years of modernization, the Japanese simply did not have the technology or the infrastructure to test the validity of Commodore Perry's threat of United States military action. By the time these components were developed enough, the foreign influence that they so desired to expel had already taken root. This did not completely upend to this train of thought - ultra-nationalists still believed Japanese spirit could prevail - but the appeal and practicality of this idea certainly diminished as a result (Lutum, 13).

The second train of thought to emerge was one of bringing in foreign elements and assimilating them into Japanese culture as a means of benefitting Japan. This train of thought is better recognized as *wakon-yōsai* (和魂洋才 Western technology and Japanese ethos), and would be favored amongst progressive nationalists such as Ōsugi Sakae (1885-1923), that believed there was some value to be found in Western ideals and technology, yet were adamant about maintaining a Japanese national identity. For many nationalists, this was a more amiable ideal, as this standpoint recognized the benefits to be offered by adapting some foreign influences in the development of Japan. Nationalists further supported this ideal in arguing that by asserting Japanese ethos on foreign

influences, Japan not only took advantage of foreign ideals, but also displayed Japanese dominance on the global stage. Therefore, not only could the Japanese imitate and use the technology and wisdom of other nations, but could also do so without compromising Japanese values (Gordon, 167; Lutum, 15).

The third major argument was for the hybridization of Japanese ideals and foreign ones. Recognized in Japan as *wayō-setchū* (和洋折衷 progressive synthesis of Japanese and Western), this argument was favored by those that thought the best facets of each culture could be brought together to create something better. While this train of thought was not favored by many nationalists, feeling that it compromised Japanese values too much, it does not imply that the movement was unconcerned with maintaining Japanese values amongst foreign influence. Thinkers such as Yamagawa Hitoshi would have endorsed this train of thought argued that these ideals could strengthen Japanese values and create something new: this approach showed the world that Japan could be *imitative*, but could also be *innovative* (Gordon, 168; Lutum, 20). It also showed strength and fearlessness in displaying that the Japanese people were not afraid of what the world had to offer them, but would embrace their knowledge without compromising their culture.

The latter two, both being more compromising and long-lasting than the ultra-nationalist point of view, have been the most extensively researched in attempting to determine a Japanese path of modernization. In the course of my research, previous academics seem to have independently researched changes within Japanese society in relation to modernization. While they acknowledge that varied discourse was had during these times, they have not focused on the legitimization of the changes taking place. A large part of this is due to the implied path of modernization found through simple

observation of the changes that took place. It is easy to see that Japan has managed to maintain a unique, if not sometimes sensationalized, culture through its pattern of development.

In its various transformations throughout time, Shintōism had shown itself to be a recurring and particularly resilient facet in times of modernization within Japan. From its beginnings as a means of unifying a fragmented Japan, to maintaining national identity and pride via the Emperor, Shintōism has continued to be malleable congruent with the needs of the Japanese nation. Through my research, however, I came to realize that continuing to categorize Shintōism into the many labels that had been bestowed upon it by other scholars was inadequate; lumped into different classifications largely reliant on specific periods in Japan's history, I find it inadequate to attempt to define Shintōism through overly-specific terms that ignore the fluid nature of religion within Japan. Rather, it becomes appropriate to recognize Shintōism as a fluid belief system that has been appropriated to different causes throughout Japanese history.

The Meiji Restoration was not exempt from this, and what I quickly found to be interesting was the way in which the movement from despotic power to infrastructural power within Japan was sculpted by religious backing. Previous state-building efforts by various governments had shown a much different path than that taken by Japan. Where most governments instituted infrastructural power as a means of usurping the religion-backed despots and creating stability through technology, it appeared that the Japanese used religion and a despotic figure to legitimize the infrastructural changes within the country. Where previous attempts at incorporating various foreign elements into the social, political, or economic systems of a country failed for various reasons, a great

number of these systems implemented by the Japanese government were met with comparatively little resistance and greater success. This success can be largely attributed to the way in which the systems were legitimized.

Perhaps most prevalent among the systems affected was the education system, which faced substantial change from 1853 through 1945. By mandating primary education for all Japanese citizens, the education system became a key means of explaining to the Japanese populous the reasoning behind certain changes and making the Japanese government more pervasive in the lives of everyday citizens.

Shintōism had already shown itself to be integral in maintaining an appreciation for and knowledge of the practices of ancient Japan. For example, the Rites of Renewal at Ise had been a long-established means of retaining knowledge of traditional building methods (Bock, 57). Likewise, certain academics believed that Shintōism was a historically significant facet of Japan, and felt that returning to “true Japanese-ness” would entail embodying the traditions of Heian Japan, as well as those of Shintōism (Duke, 117).

In the times preceding the Meiji Constitution, Shintōism had already begun to take on characteristics of State Shintō, with Folk Shintō and Shrine Shintō still being largely prevalent. Shintō shrines and Buddhist temples within a given area acted as registration centers for all residents, which increased the infrastructural power of the Tokugawa Shogunate (Gordon, 16). For the most part, however, shrines were used as locations for individual worship and celebration of regional festivals. Thus, in this instance, Shintō shrines had become a tool of the state but had not reached the levels of State Shintō that became realized in World War II. Upon the delivery of the Meiji Constitution, Shintōism was even more rigidly brought under the control of the Japanese government and fundamentally changed the view of Shintōism within Japan.

The Meiji government expanded the influence of the state in Shintōism by declaring the Emperor's will and divine lineage absolute, thus giving them a means of inspiring loyalty and controlling Japanese people through one of Japan's oldest traditions (Meiji Constitution, 1889). This comes contrary to the government taking on characteristics of the English constitutional monarchy, which essentially stripped the power of the monarch and emphasized the importance of a non-religious bicameral system.

Certain shrines were given particular importance to the Meiji Government, including the Grand Shrine of Ise and the Imperial Shrine in Tokyo, but these were just the beginnings of government appropriation of Shintōism. Shrines throughout Japan were now used to generate income for the government through donations from the people (Gordon, 108). This was a somewhat logical progression from the use of shrines as a registration point for local residents during the Tokugawa period, as these expanded the economic and social control that could be enforced through the central government. Likewise, the establishment of the Emperor as the primary body of power over an otherwise English-inspired constitutional monarchy displays how Shintōism was worked into a new government structure. In this instance, we see that a form of hybridization had taken place between Shintōism (which represented tradition) and the Meiji government (which increasingly represented modernization).

Therefore, looking at the progression of Shintōism from the Tokugawa Period into the Meiji Period, and, further, the transformations made as Japan entered the era of World War II, we can see that vast changes were made to the infrastructural system under the guise of Shintōism. At this juncture, differentiating *wakon-yōsai* or *wayō-setchū* as

components of Japanese development becomes important, as it indicates the level of intervention between religion and infrastructural expansion within the nation. At the highest levels, the declaration of the Emperor's divine lineage and absolute power at the head of the government displayed components of *wakon-yōsai*. In this instance, the use of Shintōism and the Imperial throne represented an exertion of Japanese dominance over the foreign influences that were incorporated into the Japanese government. Despite the incorporation of foreign ideals into the Japanese political system, there was a very clear message that a traditional Japanese element was at the top, and that everything else, Japanese or foreign, fell below it.

It can also be argued, however, that the transmogrification of Shintōism under the Meiji Constitution also represented *wayō-setchū* in showing that there could be a successful merger of the best foreign ideals and the best Japanese ideals. As a traditional facet of Japanese culture, there was great importance in preserving the Imperial throne as a component of the new government while beginning the implementation of exogenous factors. Therefore, the mandates to remain loyal to the Emperor as found in the Imperial Rescript on Education marked a very radical departure from Tokugawa Japan. While the Emperor's importance was acknowledged in Tokugawa Japan, it was not directly codified, yet still managed to exert a heavy top-down power structure from the central government (Gordon, 77). Despite the Japanese government being reorganized into, for all intents and purposes, a constitutional monarchy, systems were implemented that increased pressure to comply with the wishes of the Emperor, which indicated that personal freedom was limited insofar as to serve the desires of the imperial throne.

These systems were implemented largely through the education system, which is an ideal starting point for creating loyal citizens: using the impressionable nature of children, loyalty could be commanded. To this end, the education system underwent significant changes in the wake of the Meiji Restoration. The education system saw significant reform following the establishment of the Meiji government, and although many of these changes were made at a legislative level as opposed to a constitutional one, the Meiji Constitution helped to legitimize these legislative changes. Unlike the education system during the Tokugawa Period, primary education was made mandatory in 1892 for all Japanese children where it had previously been reserved for the wealthy within society. This in itself marked a significant change in the Japanese education and the literacy of Japanese people, but actual changes within the education system revealed a unique way of legitimizing sweeping changes in the development of Japan.

In order to increase the efficiency of the Japanese education system, and likewise display Japanese ability to compete with foreign nations, the Meiji government implemented a number of reforms in the education system. Initially, they adapted a form of the French education system, and attempted to make this system work within the Japanese traditions and history. Ideologically, the French system seemed like the perfect match: emphasizing a highly centralized and standardized schooling system, the Meiji government felt that this would behoove their mission of creating a stronger central government of Japan. The major downfall of having a French model early in the process, however, was finding and distributing the resources of an already taxed government. It quickly became unrealistic to have a highly centralized educational model without an effective means to get centralized funding (Lutum, 6).

With this in mind, the Japanese moved to an American-based system that removed much of the central body from the education system. While standards and expectations were upheld at the national level, there was far less direct institution from the central government, and much more power was given to individual municipalities to fund regions of schools. This was a more practical solution from the standpoint of funding, but further steps were taken, such as cutting school lunches in favor of children being sent with lunches from home, much as American children did (Duke, 82). Costs were further reduced by the implementation of co-educational classrooms as opposed to separate classes for boys and girls.

In the course of experimenting with different educational models, the Meiji government ultimately decided upon the Prussian model, which resulted in more fruitful results (Lutum, 7). The Prussian system emphasized greater efficiency of learning within the classroom through strict regulations and an unforgiving pace. Upon the adaptation of a Prussian system and finding its values more congruous with the intents of the Meiji government, modifications were made to make it fall more in place with their goals. One of the major changes made was an emphasis on Japanese nationalism, particularly during World War II, and loyalty to the Emperor as the supreme ruler of Japan. This trial-and-error process is more akin to *wakon-yōsai* when considered in the context of Japanese modernization purely through the fact that this was an attempt to bring in exogenous influences and institutions and assert Japanese dominance over them (Nagai in Shively, 39).

While the changes to the educational system certainly indicated a growing amount of foreign influence within Japan, the presentation of the changes as the will of the

Emperor was important in reinforcing that the Japanese government was not simply bowing to foreign influence; rather, the highest powers had made a determination that adopting foreign systems was in the best interest of the nation. What makes this different from the Tanzanian example is that the Japanese were not trying to be controlled through a system that they did not understand; rather, the Emperor, as one of Japan's oldest and most cherished traditions, was something with which they could easily identify. As such, it was not the wish of the people to rid themselves of the Emperor in the political system, making the Japanese example differ greatly from the American and French Revolutions.

With the delivery of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 (See Appendix, Image 3), the government made clear that the changes in the education system were not simply transplants of foreign systems. Moreover, this move was a display that foreign influences would not be allowed to override the traditional values of Japan (Pyle, 120). Changes made to the education system would be done in the name of the Emperor, and any overt drowning of Japanese culture in foreign culture would not be tolerated. Intriguingly, rather than directly addressing issues of achievement or structure in the education system, the Imperial Rescript focused on the role of the Emperor, but it is in this focus that we can begin to make correlations between the sweeping changes to come in the education system and how they were legitimized through Emperor, and therefore, Shintōism.

As previously noted, the Imperial Rescript on Education focused on loyalty to the Emperor and duty to the country rather than key academic concepts. Likewise, the implementation of primary education as mandatory for all Japanese citizens marked a hallmark change for the way the Japanese would be educated. In coupling compulsory

education and an Imperial Rescript reinforcing loyalty to the Emperor, we are forced to notice that Shintōism had found its way into a key area for impressing on future generations.

We must especially pay attention to the wording of the Imperial Rescript on Education if we are to understand why the combination of the Imperial Rescript and a change to compulsory primary education indicates a strong play by the Japanese government to establish Imperial backing of infrastructural changes within the nation. The Imperial Rescript on Education itself had strong neo-Confucian influences, stating that Japanese “subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety” should make it their care to “guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne”. Likewise, Japanese citizens were to “always respect the Constitution and observe the laws” and be willing to “offer yourselves courageously to the state” should an emergency rise (Imperial Rescript on Education, 1890). Such wording seems more appropriate for an Imperial mandate on loyalty of citizens, rather than as a mandate on the state of the education system.

This does, however, indicate to us that learning in the several arts and sciences was not the primary concern of the education system under the Meiji government. Rather, they seem to be minimalized, while education on what it means to be an upright and loyal citizen to the nation of Japan is emphasized. This is a very significant aspect of the document to consider. If we take the Rescript to be an announcement on what the education system is supposed to be, and consider this with the change to a compulsory primary education system, we are made to ponder what the ultimate goal was of the Meiji government. With this in mind, I believe that the education system was intended to be a primary means of ensuring loyalty to the Japanese nation. While this education would

have only directly impacted young children, we find that learning often spreads outside of the classroom and follows the student home. Therefore, the education system is not only a means of relaying this information to the younger generation, which would ideally become a network of loyal subjects on their later years, but is a way of disseminating it to the older generation as well.

Therefore, through the education system, the Meiji government was able to inspire continued loyalty to the Emperor, thereby using Shintōism and Japanese traditional values as a means of maintaining a cultural hybrid of old and new in the implementation of new systems. Not only was the new educational system tempered with the traditional structure of the Emperor, but it was also a means of communicating that other changes in the landscape of the Japan served to meet the will of the Emperor, and that Japanese citizens should be mindful of this in upholding their loyalty to the Emperor.

Although the Imperial Rescript on Education acted as a passive means of establishing the Emperor within the education system, the Emperor also took on an active role in establishing himself as integral to the education system. Through a series of visits to area schools, the Emperor himself took an active role in exploring ways in which the education system was being reformed (Duke, 127). Thus, he was not seen as making uninformed decisions that did not affect him or that he did not understand. Indeed, the Emperor played an active role in the development of the education system leading up to the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education. Furthermore, he took special interest in foreign teachers that played important roles in the development of the education system. Dutch scholar Guido Verbeck was formally recognized in 1871 for his

contribution to the development of the academic curriculum of Kaiseijo,⁶ and American teacher Marion Scott was given the distinguished honor of making a short speech to Emperor Meiji in May of 1874 (Duke, 128). What is interesting about the distinctions that he bestowed on foreign teachers is that he did not seem to dignify Japanese teachers with similar honors.

In the course of my research, I could not find particular mentions of Japanese teachers being praised in the way that was done with Verbeck or Scott. This once again speaks to the interaction between the Shintōism and the development of a foreign education system within Japan. While Japanese teachers were relegated to a position of relative unimportance, the Emperor himself was responsible for bestowing distinguished honors upon foreign nationals that were responsible for helping make substantial change within the education system. Thus, the influence of foreign ideals on the internal systems of Japan were once again legitimized through the Emperor, and were portrayed as integral to carrying out the will of the Imperial Throne.

Beyond this, the Emperor became an integral part of the school system through a system of symbolic institutions. The most apparent of these changes was the enshrinement of the Emperor in all public schools (Gordon, 118). This enshrinement, an obvious deployment of Shintō tradition in the school system, elevated the status of the Emperor in the lives of Japanese citizens, and established a definite link between Shintōism and the state. In this system, a picture of the Emperor was to be placed in every school in Japan, and so doing, cement the idea that the Emperor's will was to be carried out via the education system. In addition, the picture of the Emperor was to be

⁶ One of the 3 core schools for higher education at the end of the Tokugawa Period. (Duke, 51)

placed in its own individual room, which mirrored the presence of family shrines in private residences. As a mirroring of personal religious practice of a religious figure within the education system, it becomes very clear that there is an intervention between religion and state function in the development of a modern education system in Japan.

Such an intervention even made its way into Japanese literature, going as far as to be one of the more poignant images of the novel. In Sakae Tsuboi's *Twenty-Four Eyes*, we are told the story of a school teacher and her students. In the opening chapters of the novel, we introduced to a short description of the schoolhouse where she teaches first-grade students, and of the important features that Tsuboi saw fit to include was a mention of the room dedicated to the Emperor. In actuality a broom closet, the room chosen for the enshrinement of the Emperor is borne out of necessity: the school is simply too small to afford anything larger. Such an image is poignant in displaying how even the most modest and impoverished schools in Japan were made to comply with national regulations. Moreover, it is the witty joke of one of the students and the swift punishment that is laid upon him that allows us to interpret how seriously the enshrinement was to be taken.

This intervention is very important in realizing both how Japan developed and how state control continues to be exerted through different state institutions in infrastructural power systems. First, by using a distinct cultural facet, the Japanese government was able to relate any changes back to familiar Japanese concepts, and furthermore, display that any changes that occurred were within the control of the Japanese government. The Imperial Rescript on Education inspired continued faith in the

Japanese cultural and religious traditions that had existed for centuries, and so doing, managed to avoid the issues found in the Tanzanian example.

Moreover, exerting such a high influence of the Emperor on the education system indicates that citizens could not simply ignore the state any longer. In having registered citizens that were required to attend school, the government effectively guaranteed that people in Japan would acknowledge the government and everything that came with it. From newly-implemented social services, to taxes, a citizen would not have a way of avoiding the state.

Even in deviating from established means of developing an infrastructural power system, the Japanese government had established a system that worked for them. While the French and American models indicated a desire to move away from the established, familiar monarchies, the Japanese government found that Japanese people would need something traditional to help them adapt an unfamiliar new world. Unfortunately, this method for development would lead Japan to a global war. In establishing an absolute role in the lives of its people through tradition, the Japanese government had also come up with a way to inspire ultra-nationalism in the hearts of its citizens, who feared the consequences of dissent.

Conclusion

While this thesis displays a unique course of development of the Japanese state by expanding infrastructural power with the aid of Shintōism, many questions linger on the effectiveness of such a route. Tradition was certainly integral in ensuring a smooth transition between an isolated Japanese nation and a global one, but the use of Shintōism as that traditional role is questionable. By retaining an element of a previous power system that exerted control largely through fear and coercion, a resurgence of those traits in the new system was likely. Although Shintōism is not innately fear-inspiring or coercive, in the hands of the wrong people, it was manipulated to act as much.

As a result, a second major wave of foreign influence began in 1946 upon the end of World War II, with the Allied powers constructing a new constitution, and the delivery of the Shintō Directive (Dower, 307). The Shintō Directive created an absolute separation of church and state, congruous with the United States Constitution, and forced the Emperor to denounce and repudiate his claimed divine lineage (The Shintō Directive, 85). At this junction, Shintōism was returned to a state that would resemble pre-Tokugawa Shintōism more than any other form recognized by scholars in the preceding 300 years of Japanese history. With an absolute separation of the government and Shintōism, Shintōism once again was free to be practiced as desired by the people. Once again, Shintōism was less codified and the people were able to practice in the more fluid way that we have seen was common in Japanese history.

While official government intervention or support of Shintōism had been barred, citizens still chose to undertake various rituals and festivals at Shintō shrines, followed folk beliefs in their own homes, and made donations to shrines. The Renewal Rites at the Grand Shrine of Ise (See Appendix, Image 4) continue to take place despite its previous associations with the Japanese Imperial throne, and Shintōism thrives in the modern day. Like the nations that crafted Japan's new constitution, the Japanese would have an infrastructural power structure that came without implementation of religion.

The argument can be made, however, that this represents a very large and critical step forward in the modernization of Japan. The fact remains that Shintōism had undergone one of the most significant changes it had ever seen: as of the end of 1945, the Emperor was no longer directly associated with the religion for the first time the people could remember, and represented a key component of foreign influence imposing itself on the traditional structure of Japan via the Emperor. Within the context of the Allied Constitution⁷ created for Japan and the provisions upon which Japan could continue to operate as an independent nation, a critical issue arose in how Japan could continue to modernize within the constraints of other nations; no longer left to individual growth and discovery, Japan was forced to take a path of development that was carefully monitored and scrutinized by outside powers.

By limiting how certain facets of the Japanese culture could interact with foreign influences, specifically in how Shintōism could interact with the government, the Japanese were forced to find ways that Japanese culture and foreign culture could interact

⁷ The Constitution and guidelines imposed upon the Japanese nation and crafted almost exclusively by the American Occupation of Japan following the surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces (Dower, 348)

without violating international guidelines. Therefore, it was in the best interest of the Japanese to revert Shintōism back to older, yet still recognizable forms, of the religion that could continue to operate within Japan. Rather than facing absolute dissolution of one of Japan's oldest traditions, it made sense that the religion would be reverted to a form that would not be viewed as threatening by outside nations.

Therefore, the Emperor and Shintōism were stripped from their associations with one another, but were both allowed to survive, albeit in vastly different ways than those established in the past 100 years. This change was not, however, to a disadvantage. Although the Emperor had been the catalyst for the legitimization of a new form of government, once that government was established, there was no longer a need for a continued presence. Despite having had the Emperor installed as a figurehead with no divine or religious lineage, the Japanese government did not completely fall apart in the wake of the mandates by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers. Although the Japanese government was reorganized at the will of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, which was decidedly foreign to Japan, the reorganization came at a time when Japanese people had grown used to contact with foreign nations. Likewise, the education system, although stripped of connections to the Emperor, managed to thrive. The Japanese education system continues to be lauded for its efficiency, rigor, and results in the present day, and does not seem to be a trend that will be ending any time soon.

Despite the ultimate failure of the methodology undertaken by the Meiji government at the hands of the Allied Powers in the wake of World War II, we are able to acknowledge that such collaboration between Shintōism and the Meiji government nonetheless allowed for long-term success. Despite creating a system that would

ultimately end in abuse and culminate in a World War, foundations were laid that would allow for a successful nation as time progressed. The initial legitimization of infrastructural expansion using Shintōism proved to be an intelligent move in helping the Japanese to set a solid foundation for future growth. Although the religious significance of the Emperor would eventually be stripped, the initial work had already been done. With significant systems already developed through loyalty to the Emperor, with future expansion, even without the religious backing of the Emperor, there was the potential to continue infrastructural expansion without the complications initially faced by the Meiji regime.

We are thus left to ponder if the Japanese deviation from pre-established means of infrastructural expansion was beneficial. Despite the ultimate dissolution of the religious structure at the head of the Meiji government, I would argue that this was indeed a wise decision. We find that changes to democracies or constitutional monarchies as found in the United States and other European nations often came as a result of social unrest from everyday citizens, which would contribute to the infrastructural government's long-term success. Likewise, we find that top-down transitions from despotic to infrastructural power structures were not successful because citizens did not understand how or why the changes were taking place, as in the Tanzanian example. The Japanese example, however, modeled that a top-down transformation was possible using the Emperor and Shintōism as a traditional cultural facet. Thus, it may not so much be the religious aspect that made the transformations initially successful, but rather the inclusion of familiar traditional qualities at the head of such changes. As such, Japan represents a remarkable example of how using traditional values to augment infrastructural expansion can be

beneficial, but dangerous to preserving the cultural history of the nation if not wisely and properly used.

Appendix



Image 1: Asakusa Shrine (浅草神社) sits next to an old warehouse.
Taito, Tokyo, Japan.
(Dominic Alvarado 2010)



Image 2: The Meiji Constitution.
(http://t3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcShHR-2_cEAQKiEMzVdU6AcQd3pi26OE3fbFCTktdVhD2SC-9n6Ky-_WK3lOA)



Image 3: Image of the 1892 Imperial Rescript on Education
http://media.patheos.com/Images/Confucianism/Confucianism_Anno_27.jpg



Image 4: Photograph of Emperor Meiji that was enshrined in all public schools.
 (Courtesy of T. Fujitani in Gordon, 69)



The Grand Shrine of Ise (伊勢神宮), which still undergoes its Rites of Renewal every 20 years.

(http://t3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcShHR-2_cEAQKiEMzVdU6AcQd3pi26OE3fbFCTktdVhD2SC-9n6Ky-_WK3IOA)

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