

Welfare Systems and Their Influence on Public Attitudes toward Poverty

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On my honor I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this thesis.

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Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between the type of welfare system, selective or universal, practiced by a state and the public attitudes toward the poor. How public attitudes toward the poor are formed is important because beliefs about the causes and character of poverty influence what social aid measures people will support. By comparing the welfare systems and public opinions of the United States and France I tested the hypothesis that the type of welfare system has an effect on how the public frames their beliefs about poverty and homelessness. The United States, as a selective care system, fostered a view of the poor as a differentiated group that only deserved aid when absolutely in need of assistance. The individualist tradition of the United States was reflected in its welfare system and in turn the system perpetuated the belief that poverty is most often the fault of the individual and that recipients should work as not to become dependent on the state. France represented the universal care system and was found to propagate views of the poor that were based more on structural barriers. The universal care system was based on a more egalitarian tradition and tended to view social welfare as the right of all citizens. As expected, the universal system influenced the support of more inclusive social aid that promoted solidarity among all citizens. The selective care system reinforced negative beliefs that recipients were distinct from regular citizens and that poverty was due to individual characteristics.

How a country reacts to poverty has become an increasingly poignant issue as the United States still struggles with economic stability, the European Union faces multiple debt crises, and poverty continues to rise across the globe. As of September of 2010 more than 80 percent of the world's population lived in countries where income differentials were widening and 80 percent of humanity lived on less than 10 dollars a day (Shah 2010). With an increasing number of people and families living in homelessness states must decide how to best decrease poverty and create stable futures. Comparisons of the welfare systems in the United States and Western Europe reveal diverging traditions that correspond to particular views on the role of government in alleviating poverty and homelessness. European countries such as France, which will be used as a case in this paper, have developed universal care systems that aim to provide social assistance to all citizens as a part of their right to a decent standard of living. On the other end of the welfare scale, The United States has a system dominated by selective and means-tested care. Although the United States provides aid to its most needy citizens, it emphasizes the need for individuals to provide for themselves. Public attitudes toward the role of government differ in the same manner; people in universal care states are more willing to support the role of the government in providing social assistance and insurances, while selective care states are more reluctant to allow the government to intervene in individual lives on any issue. How do we explain why the universal states view housing, healthcare, and public assistance as a right while selective systems view social aid as a privilege?

Part of the answer comes from the relationship between public attitudes towards poverty and the type of welfare system experienced in a given state. Beliefs about the

causes of poverty are products of particular ideologies. How the poor are viewed, as either deserving or undeserving of aid, influences the types of programs a person will support. This paper explains how public attitudes toward poverty are formed in the United States and France and how attitudes reflect distinct ideologies about poverty and the role of the government in providing both assistance and preventative measures. I examine the history of attitudes toward the poor and the history of the relationship between public views and welfare. Welfare systems represented a culmination of the traditional views the public had toward the poor. How a system was created was influenced by public opinion, and then the structure of the system perpetuated those beliefs. The universal care model appears to foster more egalitarian attitudes toward all citizens, including the poor and, conversely, the selective care system encourages individualistic attitudes that do not acknowledge structural barriers to success. Public attitudes can be hard to change, especially when they are rooted in a long social tradition, but once we understand what causes those beliefs we can begin to develop ways to change those ideas and better serve every member of society.

Attitudes toward Poverty and the Homeless from Early European History to its Emergence as a Global Problem in the Modern Era

Homelessness and poverty have been a part of world history for millennia. Depicted early in history by the Christian Bible, the poor and unfortunate have been characterized in different ways depending on the aims and interests of persons, groups, and legislative bodies. Definitions of who is homeless and poor reflect perceptions that are subjective and socially constructed. Public attitudes toward the poor correspond to particular beliefs about how to alleviate poverty. Beginning in the 15th century, I offer an

overview of public perceptions towards the poor and homeless that took shape after the Middle Ages when Europe was engaged in a rapid expansion of trade and began to conceive of poverty and its solutions in a light different from the sanctified poor man of the Bible.

European Attitudes toward Poverty in the 15th to 18th Centuries

Leading up to the 15th century in Europe, poverty was not so much a problem as it was a social reality. Through the spread and popularity of Christianity, the early perceptions of poverty were related to the holiness that came from living frugally and without the distractions of worldly pleasures. Poverty was a condition of piety and many followers of Christ believed that the closest path to God lay in renouncing pleasures and living a good, virtuous life of an ascetic. Wealth, itself tempting and many times an aid to sin, was to be distributed to those who needed help (a category that would change with time depending on the values and overall economic and political scene of a given society). As the Apostle Matthew recorded, Jesus Christ gave sanctity to poverty and condemned the rich man:

Jesus said to him, "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your possessions, and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; then come, follow me." When the young man heard this word, he went away grieving, for he had many possessions. Then said Jesus to his disciples, "Truly I tell you, it will be hard for a rich person to enter the kingdom of heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter into the kingdom of God. (Matthew 19.21-24)

The poor were viewed as extensions of Christ and were believed to be his representatives on earth; poverty was the condition chosen by Christ and through this preference he sanctified the life of the poor (Pullan 1994). According to this image poverty could be

construed as a positive characteristic that enabled the bearer to become closer with God. The impoverished could then look to their fellow countrymen for help during times of great need and be found deserving of that assistance because Christ himself had lived the pious life of a poor man. In this schema the poor and the wealthy lived in a symbiotic relationship in which the latter fulfilled their charitable deeds by giving and not being taken in by greed. In doing so, they allowed the poor to continue their existence as the physical representation of humility and holiness.

This idyllic view of poverty in which all community members felt impassioned by the grace of God to help those who could not fully support themselves was probably never a reality, but it did lay the groundwork for views on poverty and the obligation individuals felt to engage in charitable acts. Plagues, famine, and wars had decimated the population of Europe throughout the Middle Ages (5th to 15th century) and during this period an association of poverty with disease and crime had led to a new official attitude towards the poor that coexisted in tenuous relation with the ancient view of the sanctified poor. Views on poverty and the role of the community changed alongside a monumental, albeit slow, expansion of European markets, commodities, and a nascent capitalism. People began to question the legitimacy and deservedness of the poor, and were especially concerned with the traveling poor. During the Middle Ages the poor most often outnumbered those at the top, but as long as the basic structures of society remained firmly in place there appeared to be no contradiction between community members' religious obligations to engage in charitable good deeds and the expectations of the poor and the way in which they sought relief. Yet, as Larry Frohman points out, the 1400s and 1500s saw a "transition from feudalism to capitalism, that is, the loosening of the

constraints on personal liberty that had previously bound the peasantry to the soil and the spread of markets and capitalist social relations to the countryside” (Frohman 2008:15). These changes disrupted the traditional social relations of the Medieval period. With greater social and geographical mobility, the poor, and especially the beggars who actively sought aid, were the objects of suspicion, surveillance, and discipline for they did not fit the traditional pattern of social life; they were “masterless men” who had no firm place in the social framework. Begging in this way acquired an image as harmful to both the religious and social order.

New to the rhetoric on poverty in the Late Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance, the idea of the deserving poor reflected a fear in religious and social communities (at this time they were very much one in the same) of outsiders. Perceived as taking away resources from the local poor, they also posed a threat as unknown and possible criminal characters. As exemplified by Brian Pullan’s (1994) discussion of orphans and foundlings in Early Modern Europe (defined as a period from the Black Death to the French Revolution), the lowest rank of the poor were those persons who “lacked the identity and the minimal security afforded by known and honest, parents, by stable residence, by a good reputation among neighbors” (Pullan 1994:5). Knowing one’s parents and heritage was a form of social capital that could be redeemed for good standing within the community. As it would remain well into the 21st century, the unknown vagrant was feared as a threat to the social order because he was not harnessed by the family’s control, a burden on the rates and amount of food in the local area of which he did not belong, and a rebel against God for not accepting his role as worker and protector. Vagrants were further demonized as blasphemers and heathens, a far cry from

the piety of the poor expounded in the Bible. The deserving poor were the local poor who were known and trusted to be in actual need. In Medieval times, before the dispersion of the population from their hometowns into other towns and cities, the donors usually had personal knowledge of the recipient and giving was from individual to individual, or through a religious organization that also had a relationship to the poor in their parish.

Codifying what must have been a burgeoning social reality and change in attitudes toward the poor, the first ordinance to regulate begging in the Holy Roman Empire was enacted in Nuremburg in 1370 to ensure that the city's charity benefitted the local deserving poor. Another Nuremburg ordinance in 1478 was more specific on where begging could occur and called for the official investigation of the character and circumstances of an individual before they could be given permission to seek alms (Frohman 2008:16). Ordinances such as these displayed a heightening interest in Catholic Europe to regulate begging, but this was not yet an attack on all begging as much as it was a social creation of the deserving poor and an effort to ensure that charity was not misused. In addition to there being a category of deserving and undeserving poor, the idea that charity had a proper end was a major shift from the traditional Christian understanding of good works and a member's duty towards engaging in charitable acts. Medieval religious theory held that the merit of charity depended on the intentions of the donor whose charity would be considered good as long as his intentions were pure, regardless of whether or not the receiver was of good Christian standing. Charity was for the sake of charity and since it focused on the salvation of the donor the doctrine of good works did not include any rationale for the systematic investigation of the causes of poverty or the personal situation of the receiver. In this system the poor were a passive

group of receivers, neither good nor evil, simply the representation of the suffering endured by Christ. The first step in giving the poor a character of their own divided them into the deserving local poor and the undeserving vagrants. This demarcation between deserving and undeserving led to further delineations, for once the actual state of the soul of the poor and beggars was called into question it was an easy transition to take further interest in the poor as a project rather than a motivation to perform charitable acts.

Part of the transformation of the public image and reaction towards poverty and begging was influenced by the emergence of a new ideology that broke with the traditional views. Culminating in 1517 when Martin Luther published his Ninety-Five Theses, dissatisfaction with the spiritual and ideological operation of the Catholic Church helped produce an image of the poor that, as mentioned above, shifted focus away from the salvation of the donor to the neediness of the poor and the best way to assist them. The Protestant Reformation and, in response to the issues within the Church's hierarchy, the Catholic Counter Reformation gave voice to a growing concern over the actual effect of charitable works and if they in fact produced good. After the Reformation it was difficult for Catholic supporters to avoid and deny the "equation of salvation through works with indiscriminate, unregulated, and socially harmful charity" (Frohman 2008:14). With the invention of the deserving poor and vagrants, the Catholic doctrine of good works could no longer adhere to a philosophy in which every act of charity was good, for it could in fact be aiding sinful behavior. Distinctions among the poor meant required distinctions in charitable giving and a rationale behind who was given help and how. Instead of being a means to its own end charity was rationalized as a way to alleviate poverty and curb the "problem" of the begging class. It is important to note that

leading into the 16th and 17th centuries, poverty was constructed as a social problem that had to be dealt with and confined lest it affect the moral character of the nation as a whole.

Management of the poor became the prime interest of the political and religious organizations of the 16th century and was firmly in place by the 17th century. The expansion in the range of organized charity from beggars' hospitals in Italy, lay organizations of the confraternities in Catholic communities, and private and public organizations in both Catholic and Protestant communities depicted a new view of the poor that was actively redemptive. Religious institutions saw it as their duty to not only give aid to the poor, but also to help them find God. Charities became concerned with saving the souls of the poor from hell by reforming their behavior and character, and in doing so cure them of the evil consequences of deep, lasting poverty. Transformed into sinners, beggars and vagrants were portrayed as idle and "enmeshed in the sin of sloth," traits that led to their blasphemous, immoral behavior (Pullan 1994). Rather than excluding the vagrants, idle, and otherwise undeserving poor from the community and allowing their ungodly lifestyles to infect the rest of the population, they were to be integrated into a disciplined Christian society so that society might prosper.

Redemption was found through closed institutions whose sole purpose was to teach and impose discipline on the dependent poor. Unlike the independent poor who, although living from hand to mouth, could support themselves through regular work, the dependent poor had to be cured of their idleness through hard work and religious instruction. During the 16th and 17th centuries beggars' hospitals within Italian cities were the largest means of institutionalizing all undesirables, with similar institutions found in

the form of *dépôts* in France and workhouses in England. Beggar's hospitals were designed to confront the problems of persistent poverty, such as a nonexistent work ethic, by concentrating the poor in one place under a high degree of supervision. People could enter of their own volition, but because entering a hospital meant a loss of liberty and respect, and caused humiliation many "patients" were there involuntarily due to laws closely regulating who could beg and where. There was an increasing conviction that the largest threat to civil society was the idle, dependent poor. Closed institutions offered both a way to get the "unsightly" problem of the poor off the streets and a regimented policy to cure them of their immoral lifestyle. The goal of the new philanthropy to reclaim the souls of the undeserving and itinerant poor cemented into place the belief that poverty was a character flaw and that all the bad attributes associated with poverty (such as filth, crime and disease) were inherent in the nature of the poor. Poverty in this light was the fault of the individual and could only be remedied by reeducation in work and religious habits.

It is very likely that although many institutions were created to save the souls of the sinning poor, the actual need for such institutions came from economic forces affecting Europe:

...the new urban poor of the sixteenth century were being created through processes endogenous to the cities themselves. Although the putting-out system did provide employment to many of those forced off the land, it also weakened the foundations of the guild economy and led to the impoverishment of urban workers – masters, journeymen, and wage laborers alike. The disruptive impact of population growth and the spread of capitalism in the cities was also magnified by the great inflation of the sixteenth century, resulting from the influx of colonial silver into the European economy. (Frohman 2008:19)

Despite the belief that poverty was a character flaw of the poor themselves and that they were naturally inclined towards laziness and a lack of integration, governments across Europe were faced with the increasing reality of a growing poor population that could not be fully supported by the work of private organizations alone. At this time the State took a more coercive role in the institutionalization of the poor, for officials had the power needed to deprive the beggar of his liberty and force him to take advantage of the institutions provided. Beggar's hospitals became a mix of private and public as the state became a part of the institutional apparatus in its role as policeman, financier, and manager. The state during the 16th and 17th centuries, within the Holy Roman Empire and England, was becoming the enforcer and protector of public order and health, and this included the health and social problems the poor produced. England for example started in 1563 to charter laws that allowed the government to regulate relief to the "destitute" and punishment of the "vagabonds." Social welfare and regulations had become high interest topics within the citizenry, which culminated in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 (Slack 1984). Around this time state governments were reluctant, except in times of absolute need, to impose upon citizens a direct tax for poor relief, yet the state did act as a donor, allocating money to the support of charities using public revenues. The problem of beggars and homelessness lost its religious overtones and evolved from a religious obligation to a moral and humanistic one, but for the time being it was still seen as a religious person's duty to redeem the soul of the sinner and in doing so make sure that his charity did not support crime or evil deeds most often perpetrated by the poor. And in the end even this belief, that charity should only support good deeds, lead to the expansion of organized and bureaucratically run poor relief, for it was believed that it was much harder

for the poor in institutions to deceive their benefactors than it was for them to swindle a private individual.

Late 18th and early 19th century progressive European philosophers further expanded organized, bureaucratically, and rationally run poor relief. Influenced heavily by the incredible surge in philosophical, scientific, political, and economic thought of the Enlightenment poor relief and attitudes towards the impoverished masses were increasingly based on beliefs about the nature of man and his duty towards others. The Enlightenment emphasized empirical and rational philosophy and the role of the state in directing progress (Zeitlin 1990). A well functioning society no longer depended on moral religious values; instead it was the prerogative of the state to represent collective human self-realization and to reorder and perfect social life according to the precepts of reason. This meant that the state and not religious institutions were responsible for alleviating poverty. If man was perfectible, as both Rousseau (Zeitlan 1990) and Kant ([1784] 2007) argued, and man's true nature was balance, then perfection was possible only through the state and society. Social conditions, not individual characteristics, led to inequality so it was social conditions that needed to be improved.

Since the state was supposed to reflect the development and character of its citizens it was a national embarrassment to have visibly high numbers of beggars and people living in abject poverty. Their circumstances indicated a lack of civilization, modernity, and prosperity. Though never complete, poverty was increasingly defined in non-moral, secular terms and attributed to systematic problems such as unemployment (Himmelfarb 1985). Despite the revolution in thinking that placed responsibility on the state many people still attributed some sources of poverty to character flaws. The general

public in these societies still believed that there were deserving and undeserving poor. The undeserving included able-bodied but immoral or idle individuals who refused to work. The deserving included those who were able-bodied and would work but could not find any, and those that were either too old, sick, disabled, or young. The latter would benefit from relief and, in the case of the able-bodied deserving, would also benefit from employment measures. French controller general from 1774 to 1776, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot was among the progressively minded economists and statesmen who believed that poverty and begging arose from unfavorable economic conditions and inadequate measures of relief. However, despite his liberal perspective, Turgot and many people still saw “hardened” vagrants, who would not work even if given the opportunity, as the largest problem.

England during the 19th century and the Industrial Revolution provides an important case study of changing attitudes and practices to address poverty. Starting with the Poor Laws of the Elizabethan era (proclamations in 1563, 1572, 1575, and 1598) and the great enactment of 1601 which established a compulsory, secular, national system of relief, England became the model of social welfare in Europe. During the 19th century England had gained a reputation as a compassionate country and, “was generally thought to be in the vanguard of social philosophy and social policy, in thinking about the problem of poverty and trying to ameliorate it” (Himmelfarb 1985:5). The Industrial Revolution, capitalism and the Protestant work ethic produced a new era of mercantilism in which labor and profit were highly valued. Economists, statesmen, and philosophers voiced different views on whether the growth of the economy and industry was a sign of progress, or merely resulted in the subjugation of the masses for the benefit of the few. In

the debate over the 1834 amendment to the Poor Laws, radical Whigs and Tories (not all members agreed, thus the distinction of radical) and followers of Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo debated over what was best for the poor, whether poor relief was a right or if relief actually contributed to chronic poverty.

Malthus believed poor relief, in the form of outdoor relief and workhouses, actually worked to exacerbate poverty by offering an alternative to work and a false sense of security. He argued that the prospect of state provisions enabled and encouraged poor men to marry and have children without any chance of independently supporting their family. An increase in population without a corresponding increase in the means of subsistence would mean more dependence on the state. Contrary to embodying the Protestant work ethic, beggars and the unemployed were seen as undeserving leeches who were not fulfilling their social duty to work and support the economy or the general welfare of the state. Furthermore Malthus believed that it was the original state of man to be idle and corrupt and his only motivation to work and better his condition came from the pressures of nature. Therefore without the motivation of the pressures of poverty the poor would cease to work (Himmelfarb 1985). Though followers of Malthus's economic theories would have liked to do away with the poor laws altogether, they instead sought to regulate relief by restricting eligibility. By giving only small sums of relief and dissuading potential receivers with humiliating workhouse tests the state could make relief less appealing. Paupers were portrayed in stark contrast to the ideal productive laborer who pulled his own weight in society. Ideologies such as that of Malthus highly stigmatized the condition of the pauper and attributed poverty to lower class characteristics and not to outside forces.

On the other side of the debate over the 1834 Poor Laws the radical Whigs, Tories, and Populists thought that man had a right to relief from the state and were much more inclined to speak of poverty in terms of structural causes rather than an individual's characteristics. Radicals shared with the conservative reformers the certainty that it was man's God ordained duty to live by the fruits of his own labor; however they believed that poverty could be traced back to issues of property and entitlement. Similar to, though perhaps not as widely influential, as Marx, radical thinkers such as William Cobbett blamed landlord and capitalist exploitation for poverty. Relief, according to Cobbett, had always been a right to the poor that had originated in the Bible:

...the Bible had established a 'legal provision' for the poor in the form of the tithe, a fixed charge upon the land for the relief of the destitute. With the Reformation the tithes, together with the property of the monasteries, were transferred to the king, who parceled them out to individuals. As a partial compensation to the poor, the poor laws were enacted, not to give the poor some new right or privilege but to restore them, in some small measure, what had always been theirs by right and law. (Himmelfarb 1985:211)

In an unequal society relief was the property of the poor because they did not have the same access to private property or power over their own productive capabilities. Ideally society would not have such a large gap in opportunity and all classes would be united in a system of mutual rights and obligations, but because this was not yet true the poor were entitled to a share in the state's resources. In Cobbett's view the poor were not only members in good standing in the community; as citizens they were also entitled to the same rights enjoyed by all citizens and should not be penalized for exercising their legal and natural right to relief (Himmelfarb 1985:219). Though it was true that some were poor due to their own foolishness, most were unwitting victims of the economic system that affected people in the form of low wages, high prices, and paper money that allowed

for inflation/deflation. In earlier rhetoric the poor were afflicted by poverty; now according to the structural view, the poor were afflicted by the unequal distribution of poverty. Radicals brought forth an altogether new, structural way to look at the problem of poverty that understood capitalists as the cause instead of personal vice. Poverty was viewed as a function of property and political inequality.

The legacy of these two ideologies, produced over centuries, have shaped modern language on poverty and homelessness and whether people perceive poverty as either a burden or a matter of rights. People today tend to attribute poverty to the character of the poor, to structural social factors, or a mix of both. In general, conservatives are more willing to cut state funded relief because they believe that the individual is responsible for their own subsistence and that relief only perpetuates poverty due to the fact poor people will inherently choose relief if it is easier than finding and holding a job. Countering the conservative push to cut relief, liberals are more disposed to identify structural inequalities in access and opportunity than to place blame on the character of the individual. Whether or not relief is considered a right can be a good indicator of how a particular country will view poverty and what measures it will take to alleviate poverty and homelessness. Often states do not even acknowledge the poor and homeless as a problem until it becomes indisputably obvious that people are in need. It is clear that the idea of poverty and how to deal with its effects on the population changes with transformations in the political, economic, social, and religious landscape.

Poverty and Homelessness in the Modern Global Perspective

In the centuries since the Industrial Revolution explanations and attention to poverty have largely been shaped by the state of the economy of a given society. The status of poverty as a social problem tended to heighten only when drastic numbers of people were homeless or living below the poverty line. If the economy was in good condition it was assumed that the society was in good condition. The poor could be ignored as probable drunks, addicts, and the mentally and physically disabled who, due to their character, could not succeed. Especially in the United States individualistic theories tended to prevail. The homeless from the 1950s to the late 1970s were primarily seen as men on the outskirts of society living on skid row, without jobs because they did not have the values or sobriety to engage in good clean living (Kusmer 2002). In a society perceived to be a land of opportunity poverty is more likely to be attributed to individual traits. Lulled into a false sense of security, people assumed from the media and their own experiences (or more aptly an absence of exposure to the homeless) that they lived in a world of growing opportunity and equality. Homelessness retained its stigma and the cracks in the social safety net, such as affordable housing and childcare, were ignored.

Due to an increasingly globalized market nations shared variations on the same economic crises throughout the 20th century, but how they responded to the growing reality of homelessness in their populations differed depending on their public views about rights and obligations towards the poor. As we saw in the history of poverty in Europe, a society's image of the poor plays a large part in how the problem is viewed and what steps are taken to alleviate it. In Europe, where most nations have some form of guaranteed income as well as provisions for low-income housing (Shinn 2007), we would

expect a stronger welfare system, one that does not place blame on the individual and conceives of shelter as a right, and not a gift from the state. In contrast the United States extends relief mainly to persons with children (which is time-limited, the federal limit is 60 months and states vary¹), the disabled, and senior citizens. The focus on the most vulnerable reflects a view that only certain populations are deserving of help and the rest are trying to cheat the system or should otherwise be able to support themselves. Researchers such as Toro et al (1980) contend that Europeans share a more collectivist attitude compared to the American individualist tradition. This is one explanation for difference in programs but it is important to understand whether there are other factors that affect attitudes and approaches to poverty and homelessness.

Although the United States has the largest number of studies about homelessness, European nations are the leaders in preventative homeless measures. Their integrative family policies include allowances to cover the cost of childrearing, high quality, state run child care centers, family planning services, and maternity and health benefits (Rosenthal 1994:158). All measures are intended to strengthen the family unit to prevent homelessness rather than to only treat the symptoms. The United States' interest in homelessness as a subject of research started in the late 1980s, while interest in Europe did not rise until later in the 1990s (Toro 2007:470). Yet, it was the European nations that supported the first United Nations summit on world poverty and homelessness and recognized shelter as a human right. At the 1987 conference on homelessness and other social and economic deprivation in Limuru, Kenya the United States only participated as an observer with the World Bank, whereas the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and Canada were active participants in multiple NGOs. These

¹ Farrell et al, 2008

nations endorsed the declaration and supported the view that, “Poverty is our constant emergency. Adequate, affordable shelter with basic services is a fundamental right of all people. Governments should respect the right of all people to shelter, free from the fear of forced eviction or removal, or the threat of their home being demolished” (Limuru Declaration 1987). Housing is viewed as a foundation for exercising all human rights, including those recognized by several human rights bodies within the United Nations such as the rights to human dignity and an adequate standard of living (Hombs 2001:197).

When the image of poverty and its possible solutions were secularized in the 17th and 18th centuries and the “burden of the poor” was placed into the hands of the state, the government had a few different options on how to provide support and protection to its citizens. Some countries like the United States, hyper-sensitized the division between the deserving and undeserving by creating welfare systems with selective, targeted programs, while others such as Sweden opted to extend the right to a decent standard of living to all its inhabitants. Countries that adopted a universal care system appeared to retain an older belief from the vestiges of Christianity that all people were equally entitled to relief and that it was the duty of those with more means to share their wealth with others. Or, if not moved by religious morality, they subscribed to a social morality, advocated by Enlightenment thinkers who saw the progress of man towards a more equal state in which all were taken care of and had the means to support themselves. Selective care systems conceived of the poor as a separate group of people that had to be helped and cared for by those citizens that were proper, hard-working members of society. Societies in which capitalist productivity was the main priority treated the poor as an unproductive drain on

society. No longer interested in the salvation of all the poor as had been the case in 16th century Europe, the attitude towards the poor was one of pity yet infused with the belief that in a free market society everyone should be able to find their place in the workforce. By the 21st century it was obvious that some countries had managed to support their poor and de-stigmatize poverty at least somewhat, while others still struggled with the problem of homelessness and continued to approach poverty as a problem of the few.

Previous studies on attitudes about homelessness and poverty have focused on types of welfare systems and if those systems have an influence over public opinion (Blekesaune and Quadarno 2003). Bean and Papadakis (1998), rejecting past research that a nation's homogeneity or its egalitarian views were the main factors behind attitudes toward welfare, instead focused on welfare systems to explain attitudes toward welfare policies. The authors compared three different types of "institutional regimes" to explain variation in public support of welfare policies. With the United States and Australia representing the liberal regime, Germany and the United Kingdom the conservative, and Norway the social democratic the study found that opinions across societies did not differ as widely as they had predicted. As expected, Norway most supported its citizens with universal programs, but when it came to public opinion the researchers were surprised to find that there was strong support for the welfare state in all countries. All supported, with Australia and the United States lagging a little, the government providing health care for the sick and a decent standard of living for the aged. Generally less popular was the role of government in providing jobs and helping the unemployed. If it was not merely the type of institutional regime that explains public opinion, then what does?

Larsen (2008) also studied why liberal regimes are less willing to support welfare systems than social democratic regimes. With a focus on types of welfare systems, Larsen took a slightly different approach than his predecessors and developed a “new theoretical macro-micro link by combing the literature on deservingness criteria and the welfare regime theory” (Larsen 2008:2). By looking into the degree of universalism in welfare policy, the differences in economic resources between “the bottom” and “the majority,” and the degree of job opportunities at a particular point in time, he was able to show that these characteristics of a regime had an impact on the public perception of deservingness and thus on public support for welfare policy. Instead of simply measuring public opinion about whether the state should provide welfare, Larsen went a step further to then figure out who was considered deserving in the society and the effects of these beliefs on the types of programs supported. As specified by Van Oorshot (2000), the deservingness criteria included five dimensions:

1. *control*: poor people’s control over their neediness, or their responsibility for it: the less control, the more deserving;
2. *need*: the greater the level of need, the more deserving;
3. *identity*: the identity of the poor, i.e. their proximity to the rich or their ‘pleasantness’; the closer to ‘us’, the more deserving;
4. *attitude*: poor people’s attitude towards support, or their docility or gratefulness: the more compliant, the more deserving;
5. *reciprocity*: the degree of reciprocation by the poor, or having earned support: the more reciprocation, the more deserving. (P. 36)

As it has been the case since the conception of the deserving poor, the public tended to favor the disabled and vulnerable populations to that of the able-bodied. Van Oorschot’s (2000) study confirmed earlier deservingness rankings (Will 1993) in which the public was most in favor of support for the elderly, followed by the sick and disabled, needy families with children, and at the bottom unemployed persons. Subsequently Larsen’s

determined how the type of regime influenced the ability of the poor and unemployed to fulfill the deservingness criteria.

Social democratic regimes were inclined to have a more inclusive and less stigmatized view of poverty because their welfare systems were based on universal benefits and services. In a society in which access to health care, shelter, and a certain degree of comfortable living was a right there was no question about whether a recipient was in need or should be blamed for their position. The recipient retained his or her identity as an equal citizen who belonged to the “national us” rather than a separate group. In societies in which the welfare state was defined by selective benefits and services, the poor were sorted depending on their deservedness. They were stigmatized as a deviant, special group distinguished from the “well-adjusted” majority (Larsen 2008:Table 1). This data showed that the type of regime and the welfare it was associated with did in fact have a strong relationship to public opinion in regard to welfare. Welfare institutions shape attitudes on who is deserving and promote a national view on what welfare should look like in the future. Approaching medical care and shelter as human rights corresponds to how the poor are perceived and affects the type of programs and strategies that are wanted and supported by the broader population. In my research I will keep in mind the correlation between the type of welfare system and the public opinions on poverty and homelessness and analyze how public attitudes correspond to the amount and types of programs available in the United States and France.

Methods

This paper compares differences in public opinion and institutional policy towards the homeless in the United States and France. It explains why the former views government regulation of social insurances as detrimental while the latter believes it is the government's responsibility to take care of its citizens. In the last sixty years since the creation of a social security program under the New Deal, Americans have debated over whether the government should provide welfare, and if so, how those welfare systems should operate. During these debates researchers have looked to the model of Europe to understand what universal care looks like in practice, and to understand why some groups, especially political and economic conservatives vehemently oppose universal policies. In choosing a European nation as a comparative case, I did not want to select a polar opposite, such as Norway or another Scandinavian country that offers universal benefits; instead, I was drawn to France because of its deeply rooted dedication to the welfare state in the face of government pressure to cut back on public spending, particularly old-age pensions. France may not provide the best example of a smoothly running or even fair social security system, but this is what makes the French public's dedication to the welfare state all the more interesting. Home of many Enlightenment thinkers and radical left-wing revolutionaries who championed equality, citizenship, and inalienable rights, France proves a good example of how a tradition of social security and state regulation can create a national identity that is inextricably tied to a sense of social solidarity and welfare.

In order to compare the two countries I researched their social, political, and economic histories to understand the context of current state welfare policies and public

attitudes toward those policies. Using statistics from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) I analyzed the amount each state spent on social securities as a percentage of their gross national product (GNP). As a part of the comparison I also analyzed data from the World Values Survey (WVS) to illustrate the ways in which public attitudes toward government involvement, equality, work, and the causes of poverty can explain why the citizens of each nation would be more or less opposed to the government playing a large role in securing the welfare of its citizens. All the WVS surveys, except when asking why people are in need, asked the respondent to answer on a scale of one to ten, with one meaning they fully agreed with the statement and ten meaning they fully disagreed. I collapsed the percentages of respondents that answered from one to four to represent those that, to varying degrees agreed with the statement, and collapsed the last four to signify those that disagreed, and left out respondents who did not feel strongly either way.

Analysis

The link between welfare systems and public opinion can be best described when examining the tradition of welfare within a country. Although there may be dissenting views, national public attitudes tend to follow long existing beliefs. In the United States, founded on the belief that there is opportunity for all those that seek it, public attitudes toward the homeless tend to focus on individual characteristics. Even today when more people are aware of structural barriers, the public is still weary of welfare and its possible adverse effects on the individuals receiving aid and on government expenditures. France on the other hand built its public assistance programs around notions of national

solidarity and workers rights to social insurance such as accident and family insurance provided by the employer and mandated by the state. Although in the United States a large portion of the population endorses social rights and social equality (Will 1993), most Americans question the effectiveness of social programs and espouse an ideology of deservingness and a fear of program misuse. Both the French and American public discerns who within their populations is deserving of aid, but there is a difference in the relative ability and ease of the impoverished populations to meet the deservingness criteria. Due to the dominant homeless ideology and tradition of aid within each nation it is harder in the United States and easier in France to meet the criteria of deservingness.

The late 19th century and the years leading up to the momentous effects of the two World Wars on economic and social policy were times during which the United States and Europe experienced an increasing awareness of public need as migration from rural areas to cities increased and workers expressed their frustrations through unions and labor parties over the industrial system that worked them too hard and gave too little. Based on the prominent ideologies of the time and the will of growing interest groups, the early 20th century marked the nascent years of the modern welfare state in western industrialized countries. How each nation chose to create and implement welfare legislation reflected public attitudes about poverty dominant at the time. Conversely the type of welfare systems produced perpetuated specific attitudes about poverty and the role of the government in supporting the citizenry. France, for her part, developed a more universal system that promotes the inclusion of all citizens and an ethos that all citizens are deserving of help from the government. The United States policy of selective benefits reflects a much more narrow definition of deservingness, one in which citizens are

expected to be able to support themselves unless extraneous circumstances arise, such as a depression when economic factors outside the control of the individual are undeniably evident. A comparison of the two countries and their attitudes toward homelessness is best rendered after a review of their welfare traditions and historical attitudes.

The United States and Welfare

Before the 1930s and the rise in support for government assistance, social welfare was overseen by private institutions that often had a religious or moral purpose to their services. Akin to the redemptive ideology of 16th century Europe, 19th century philanthropists believed that poverty and homelessness were detrimental to the social order and could cause a weakening in the work ethic of otherwise able-bodied persons. The middle class grew increasingly suspicious of the poor, viewing them as persons given to temptation, who would not work unless forced, and needed to be redeemed by a strong work and religious ethic. Men needed a change of character, whereas women, as a consequence of the Victorian ideology of women as weak and unable to care for themselves, were thought to be deserving of aid since they had less control over their economic situation. Institutions and laws were enacted during the late 19th and early 20th centuries for the aid of women and children, while a hostile reaction formed toward itinerant men. The latter were seen as outsiders who rejected the male responsibility of achieving financial stability for oneself and one's family. These men were bums, tramps, and vagrants who conjured negative images of dangerous men who were unwilling to follow orders and who hated the discipline of life required for work (Kusmer 2002).

With the advent of railroads in the United States during the mid 1800s and the explosion of railway added across the nation by the early 1900s, transient men became more mobile. No longer strictly a problem of idle poor from “evil cities,” vagrant men found their way into the heart of rural hardworking America where their image was dehumanized and criminalized. Small towns became fearful of possible gangs of vagrant men, who were seen as criminal by nature and against the American belief in hard work. Especially after the financial unrest of 1873 and subsequent riots by railroad and other workers in 1877, vagrants provided a symbol for the “specter of Communism” that Americans believed was out to overthrow their democracy. People were more apt to blame vagrants; “if, in the nation that above all others honored and rewarded productive labor, some seemed to prefer idleness, this was not seen as a weakness in the society or the economic system” (Kusmer 2002:47). Vagrancy was constructed as an inherent character flaw within individuals, one that predisposed them toward communist and subversive tendencies. The fear of communism helped repeal the Infancy and Maternity, Sheppard Bill of 1921(introduced in 1918) which included federal grants to states for public health facilities. Medical professionals accused the bill proponents of promoting socialism and communism, two words that had engendered fear in the minds of Americans (Reintsma 2007). By the end of the 19th century vagrant men were not perceived as such a menace because their character became known and less threatening, yet legislation would not appear until homelessness and poverty became a larger threat to the nation as a whole.

The 1930s and the devastating effects of the Great Depression brought the social welfare for all citizens to the immediate attention of the federal government as it became

clear that the need for assistance was beyond the capacity of either state or local community budgets. With the official unemployment rates increasing from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 24.9 percent by the end of the summer of 1933 (Pion 1993) more people were willing to acknowledge that homelessness was beyond the control of many Americans. Even those that wanted to work could not find job and they were seen as deserving since they were otherwise productive and moral citizens. The impact of joblessness hit many Americans and gave them the perspective that homelessness could happen to them as well. But while the impoverished may have been pitied, migrants were still subject to much hostility. In particular the migrants from the Great Dust Bowl, as exemplified in John Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath, were treated as criminals and ruffians even though they were travelling specifically to find work. Aside from the sometimes cruel treatment of migrants, the federal government with President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the helm began to institute public works programs and pushed for the creation of social security for needy citizens to combat the Depression and the effects of widespread poverty.

Despite Roosevelt's belief that unemployment, and the consequent misery it entails, was generally caused by an uncontrolled economic system rather than by the unemployed themselves, he was reluctant to provide direct cash assistance to the poor. Instead, to keep the able-bodied poor off welfare he favored work relief programs, such as the Public Works Administration, to provide training and jobs (Pion 1993). The New Deal may have provided a giant step towards creating a safety net for Americans in times of need, but it did little to challenge the categories of the able-bodied versus the deserving poor. The creation of selective programs sustained the belief that there were those that deserved the help of the government while others, if able-bodied, needed to support

themselves within the “open” market and labor force. Attitudes towards the poor may not have changed, but one of the most important aspects of the New Deal was the role of the federal government in providing monetary aid to states. The Federal Emergency Act of 1933 made 500 million dollars available in grants to states and signified the beginning of an increasingly large flow of federal dollars to the states for welfare programs.

As the government began to take more responsibility for the welfare of the people through the injection of federal aid into state welfare programs, the role of the government as an entity that provided security to its citizens was cemented in the Social Security Act of 1935. The act incorporated both public assistance and social insurance into measures that provided old-age insurance and public assistance for the aged, unemployment insurance, aid to dependent children in single parent families (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC), as well as to crippled children and to the blind, and federal funds for state and local public health works. Detractors from Roosevelt’s New Deal policies argued that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to impose its power on state governments; the Supreme Court struck down many of the New Deal policies on that basis. Opposed to federal intervention, some believed that government planning of the economy was both unnecessary and counterproductive, and that laissez-faire politics would have ended the Depression sooner. Also the shift from a focus on individualism to collectivism created opposition in a nation that valued individual hard work and the ability of the market to balance itself. Yet Roosevelt was able to pass the Social Security Act. The New Deal legislation placed the government squarely at the center of social welfare and the debates that would come

later in the century as economic recessions and an expanding global market contributed to higher levels of poverty and homelessness.

Social welfare was put on the shelf as the country readied itself for World War II. In the 1950s Americans enjoyed boom times, both in babies and housing, and experienced relatively full employment and increasing incomes. Welfare issues did not become a national issue again until the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson during the civil rights movement, which uncovered injustices in the economic and social systems. Started by Kennedy in his New Frontier Policy and later continued by Johnson in his Great Society programs, the War on Poverty was a response to mounting evidence of the lack of opportunity for poor people, especially minorities. Presidential determination, more than the will of the public, drove welfare initiatives (Reintsma 2007:108). Among the major legislation of the Kennedy and Johnson era were amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935 in 1962 which greatly increased federal funds to states for welfare programs and the addition of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965². Such programs were designed to support those citizens who had fallen through the cracks for reasons related to the state of the economy and the availability of opportunities, and not their own character. Although the War on Poverty tended to blame the failings of the economic system and not individuals for their circumstances, the policies were mostly consistent with the American dislike of welfare; they emphasized improving the opportunities of the poor through education and equal rights and paid little attention to

² The War on Poverty also included the 1961 of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to include two parent families if the head of household was unemployed, the Food Stamp Act of 1964, the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and the Economic Development Act of 1965 which were designed to encourage industries to relocate in depressed areas, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

the welfare system itself (Pion 1993). The War on Poverty further paved the way for a structural, and therefore less stigmatized, view of the problems afflicting the poor, but America's tradition of individualism and the concern that public assistance destroyed the desire to work prevailed.

The election of the republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon in 1968, in the midst of disillusionment with the War on Poverty programs and the escalation of the Vietnam War, might have marked the end of welfare development. However, programs actually expanded during his presidency. In an attempt to restructure the social welfare system, Nixon proposed to simplify public assistance and construct a system that awarded work by establishing a minimum benefit level for poor families across all states. Called the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), the program was to replace AFDC, food stamps, and several other social welfare programs with a refundable income tax for poor families. Unpopular in both conservative and liberal camps, FAP failed to win Congressional approval in part due to Nixon's refusal to make FAP benefits contingent on the willingness of the recipient to work. The absence of a contingency became a major detractor for a majority of Americans who believed that the welfare system undermined the work ethic among recipients. FAP was also believed to blur the distinction between public assistance, which provided special aid to those who could not help themselves, and social insurance, such as Social Security and Medicaid which were considered a right for all citizens. Without a clear distinction between the deserving needy poor and the able-bodied poor upon which welfare system had been established, Americans were unwilling to support the FAP program. Towards the beginning of Nixon's second term expansion in the welfare system did occur, including the adoption of the Supplemental Security

Program in 1974. This program created the nation's first guaranteed national income program to the needy, elderly, blind, and disabled. None the less his aims to simplify the welfare system did not occur and the structure remained much the same.

A new era of welfare reform began in the 1980s with the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the conservative call for low taxes, small government, and a transfer of power from the federal bureaucracies to the states and localities. Upholding and feeding into the traditional fears that the welfare system was wasteful, injurious to the American work ethic, and fostered dependency, Reagan was able to cut federal support for many programs, including AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, school lunch, and Social Security (Pion, 1993). Reagan embodied a conservative ideology that viewed the role of the government in the affairs of the citizens as intrusive; his administration opposed any social security and assistance programs to targeted groups. Unlike previous attempts to scale down the benefits and costs of welfare, Reagan's policies were "an aggressive act, not only against the able-bodied on welfare, but against the welfare system itself and all recipients of public assistance; a welfare policy reminiscent only of the poorhouse era" (Pion 1993:29). Reagan's extreme effectiveness in terminating some welfare programs and slashing others reflected an America that believed hard work in the market and a good work ethic could help one achieve the American dream. There was a spirited opposition to the cuts in social programs, but the conservative backlash proved fatal to many programs. Feeling the pressure of the economic recessions of the 1970s and early 1980s, resulting in 1983 in the highest poverty rate in 20 years and the highest budget deficit in history, the Reagan administration did sign a 9.6 billion dollar relief package that included the creation of public service jobs. Not all was lost in terms of welfare

during the Reagan administration, but he did renew the debate over the role of government involvement in the welfare of the citizenry.

President Bill Clinton was the next president to oversee large changes to the welfare system during the 1990s and, caught in the conflicting desire of the public to help the poor and at the same time punish them for their dependency, had to walk a tight line between providing assistance to a growing number of poor Americans and appeasing those still attached to a traditional view of poverty as the responsibility of the individual and states. In February of 1993 Clinton first made his often quoted pledge in the State of the Union Address to ‘end welfare as we know it’ and publicly introduced the concept of ending entitlements to welfare without work after a specified period of time. Though Clinton devised new welfare legislation in the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 that focused on the achievement of self-sufficiency and entrance into the permanent workforce, a Republican victory during the mid-term election of 1994 meant the opportunity Democrats had to pass Clinton’s bill was lost. Instead the welfare rhetoric of the 1990s was dominated by the Republican political ideology and their Contract with America. One of the ten acts in the document, the Personal Responsibility Act was the result of the collaboration between House Republicans and conservative interest groups to make changes to the welfare system; this included time limits that Clinton had suggested but without his guarantee of some sort of job if none was to be found in the free market.

Passed in 1996 the Personal Responsibility Act required that the recipient work after two years of benefits and placed a lifetime limit of five years on public assistance. Responding to fears that welfare programs encouraged the poor not to work, the time

limits and work requirements offered a type of welfare that would help the absolutely needy but was restrictive enough to make sure that the recipient did not become dependent. Able-bodied individuals were expected to support themselves, and if they were not able, they could rely on the government for a short time. Restrictions were even placed on families as the AFDC was replaced in 1996 by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). AFDC had been criticized for offering incentives to women to have children and for providing disincentives for women to join the workforce, epitomized in the Reagan era image of the ‘welfare queen’ who supposedly lived quite well off cheating the welfare system. Selective and restrictive programs such as these helped foster the view of the poor and homeless as special populations that were distinct in character from normal hard-working citizens. The 1980s had seen the rise in the “new poor,” women, families, and young people as opposed to the image of the 1950s through the 1970s of addicted or handicapped middle-aged men, and this new image of poverty heightened researchers’ interest in the underlying factors of poverty. However, the overall public view remained much the same; though some were poor due to factors beyond their control, a majority had created their own problems and having no desire to better themselves would try to abuse the system to avoid work and responsibility (Hombs 2001; Rosenthal 1994). The stated goals of both the Clinton Administration and the Republican leaders of Congress emphasized getting people off of welfare and into the workforce rather than an in depth look into the actual causes of poverty such as the lack of low-income housing, unemployment and discrimination in hiring practices, holes in the safety net, and deinstitutionalization without proper post-care programs.

Throughout the history of welfare in the United States it is evident that although in times of great economic trouble people are more willing to accept the structural views of the causes of homelessness and will support heavier government involvement in public assistance and insurances, for the most part the poor are viewed as people who cannot, or choose not, to participate in the regular economy and instead leach precious funds from the state and federal programs that should help only the truly needy. America is a society of highly selective deservingness policy with a history of individualism and a conservative fear of big government. Inciting both fervent support and protest the social welfare policies of the United States have produced two sides to the welfare debate:

To supporters, social programs represent the positive contribution of the government to provide the basic necessities of food, housing, and health care to the needy; to provide income payments to the retired, the disabled, and the unemployed; and to invest in human capital through education, training, and employment programs. To detractors of the welfare state, these social programs are variously seen as unnecessary government intervention, as failed programs which discourage initiative and encourage dependence, and as costly programs which are beyond government budgetary control. (Browning 1986:1)

In spite of widespread support for programs such as social security and benefits for the disabled, and a general unwillingness to cut benefits, the welfare of the United States has been defined since its inception by the debate over the shape and size of social programs. As of April 2011, 66 percent of Americans were worried that the Republican plan for reducing the federal budget deficit would cut Medicare too much, 65 percent were worried about cuts in Social Security, and 64 percent thought it would take away needed protections for the poor and disadvantaged (Gallup 2011). And yet four months later 42 percent supported making significant changes to the Social Security and Medicare programs to reduce their cost (Gallup 2011). Traditional American values of

individualism and self-sufficiency promote the view that government involvement in the welfare of the citizens is detrimental to the individual's personal drive. At the same time people are unwilling to give up social insurance for times of exceptional economic hardship. Americans must understand the social and economic factors behind poverty and homelessness before they can make a truly informed decision over what they believe the role of government should be in the lives of all citizens.

France and Welfare

The French Welfare state took shape in between the two World Wars as the migration from rural areas to the city continued the pattern of industrialization and more people found themselves at the mercy of the economy for their overall welfare. In the Bismarckian tradition of social insurance, the French welfare system is based upon a contribution record, most benefits are earning related, financing is provided mainly by employers' and employees' contributions, and the state, as a social partner, is greatly involved in the management of the system (Mandin and Palier 2002). From the 1920s until the emergence of a real problem in unemployment and homelessness in the latter part of the 20th century, employment-dependent programs made up the core of France's family welfare and social insurance programs. This tradition of compulsory family, medical, retirement, and disability insurance provided through employers and overseen by the state took shape after World War I when in 1921 the French parliament began considering legislation for the country's first compulsory social insurances. Before this time workers had received some benefits from their employers, such as a family insurance which gave extra allowances to larger families, but in the event of retirement,

disability, or illness the worker was left to fend for himself. Following in the tradition of egalitarianism molded in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the state acted on the belief that the rights of the individual are universal and that it is man's natural right to live as well as the society can provide.

Of course it was not only the universal rights of man that motivated the state to introduce its first social insurance bill, the Vincent Bill of 1921, but a tradition of universality did help provide a basis on which the state could defend its decision. Two main issues drove the state's social insurance bill, wartime pacts with soldiers and the ability and strength of the workers to strike. During World War I the state had promised a postwar society of rights and prosperity in order to sustain popular support for the war, and now that the troops were working in the factories they had to be repaid for their sacrifices. At this time workers' collective strength also reached new heights, culminating in the successful organization of strikes in 1919 that convinced many of the French elite of the threat of class warfare. The social insurances were meant to appease workers' unions and stave off more strikes and internal strife. Supporters of the Vincent Bill believed that greater security in the face of illness, disability, and an impoverished retirement would increase workers' satisfaction with their present condition; social insurances were a small price to pay for the smooth running of the industrial state. Though the Vincent Bill would never be signed into law, it did begin a spirited debate over which risks should be insured, the level of benefits, who should benefit, and how social insurance should be financed and administered (Dutton 2002). Most opposed to the bill, the employers argued that mandatory social insurances would drive up the cost of labor, spur inflation, and make French producers uncompetitive in the world market.

Underlying the employers' claims against compulsory insurances was their reluctance to give up their authority over the administration and payment of family allowances.

During the 1920s social insurances were provided by small-scale mutual aid societies, or *casisses*, that employers and their employees paid into. The societies were, like the employers, unwilling to give up their role in providing aid and resisted government control. Despite the resistance of employers and aid societies, a version of the Vincent bill was approved by parliament in 1924 which marked a milestone in French social welfare, but final legislation and guidelines were not issued until six years later. The inclusion in the bill of all major risks and its compulsory nature represented an unprecedented victory for center and center-left reformers over conservatives who favored the continuation of voluntary social protection. Aiding the creation of compulsory social insurances was a rise in pro-family policies, in unions and aid societies that viewed that family as deserving of assistance in addition to wages. A rise in the influence of socialists also contributed to the creation of social insurances, for the party believed in the well-being and equality of all citizens. Socialists also made an important contribution through their call for the addition of unemployment insurance by insisting that social protections that relied on workers' and employers' contributions were meaningless without a plan for involuntary unemployment. They acknowledged that people should be given assistance if they are not working because it was not always the fault of the individual if they were out of work. On the whole supporters of the mandatory social insurances overseen by the state thought that the system would contribute to relatively good labor relations and actually prove advantageous to the general welfare of French people and industry.

Between 1928 and 1932 France experienced an exceptional wave of social reform legislation. Certainly not without its flaws but an important step in the French welfare state, in 1928 the nation finally passed a unified social insurance law that covered the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and provided a stop-gap payment of insurance premiums during short durations of unemployment. As was the case in the United States, the onset of the depression in the late 1920s encouraged the legislature to further intervene in the welfare of the people. Expectations of the depression had lowered employers' support of family allowances, making it easier for the state to argue that it needed to take action. The state justified family allowance legislation on grounds of national solidarity and as a solution to the demographic problem of lowering birth rates. The state was still worried about possible aggression from Germany and wanted a strong population in size and unity. In 1932 it became law that all employers were obligated to join aid societies for the payment of family allowances, and though the societies were still private the government pushed them to offer more services, further reinforcing the role of the state as the overseer of the nation's welfare. State intervention increased in 1939 under the *Code de Famille*, which allowed the state to provide allowances to peasants with small landholdings and agricultural workers (Dutton 2002). A combination of the world economic crisis and the growing support of workers placed the French state at the helm of social welfare and the welfare state itself became something that was intrinsically French. Workers came to support and rely on government assistance and saw it as the right of all citizens to be taken care of, to a certain degree, by the government. The legislation and liberal/socialist leaning politics of the populace in the 1930s embedded the idea of welfare within the French national consciousness that people

deserved a certain standard of living and that it was the duty of the government to provide that standard.

After World War II the provisional government of Charles de Gaulle continued welfare reform. With government involvement in providing welfare already firmly in place, de Gaulle welcomed the input from a group of French social reformers who had spent the war years in London. Expressing the need for a unified system of welfare for a country torn apart by internal discord and the humiliation of the German war-time occupation, the Section Sociale identified four principles to expand postwar social protections:

- (1) Insurance must protect workers against unforeseen disruptions of income of all kinds;
- (2) Cost will be shared by workers, employers, and society (*la collectivité*);
- (3) Social welfare should create solidarity between the insured, in particular, and among the entire society in general;
- (4) Compulsory participation should extend to all members of society. (Dutton 2002:204)

These reforms illustrated a strong desire to unify the nation through the solidarity of the workforce and a belief that a strong *dirigiste* state would be crucial in the implementation of such reforms. Contrary to the rather deregulated economic tradition of the United States, after the war French reformers and government officials proposed that the economy be directed by a central authority, the state, in order to ensure economic and social success and stability. Political elites educated at top tier universities would nationalize and direct many of France's top industries and oversee the entire welfare of the state and its people. The people authorized the state to invest in the lives and welfare of the nation and to direct the growth and well being of France.

When the social welfare state was reformed in the years after World War II the state maintained a large supervisory role over the system of non-state agencies that made

up the *La Sécurité Sociale*. Laying down the basic principles of the social security system, the state's authority over welfare included the setting of benefit and contribution levels. As de Gaulle tried to reinvigorate France with a positive French national identity, the welfare system instilled in workers a sense of belonging to a greater French universality and character that upheld the rights of citizens to a decent standard of living (Girling 1998). Under de Gaulle, France experienced boom years of economic growth during the 1950s and 60s, but dissimilar to the United States' pattern of neo-liberal economics, French growth was characterized by elitist planning and substantial state intervention. The creation of a larger middle class and the upward direction of the economy gave reason for the public to trust in the *dirigiste* state style of government and assured them of the ability of the government elites to guide the state. Intervention by the state in the economic affairs of the public was widely accepted and expected. With a highly regulated economy France was able to weather the economic recession of the 1970s; however during the recession of the 1980s France's gross national product plummeted and it was evident that the structure of the economic system was not working well.

Unemployment in the mid-1980s reached 10 percent and there began a push and pull between socialist liberals and conservatives over the extent to which the state should regulate the economy, a battle between a paternalistic state and a deregulated state to promote growth. First socialists nationalized a majority of France's industries in the early 1980s and then the conservatives moved to privatize those industries in the mid-1980s; yet the rising problem of poverty would not be abated by either tactic. The crisis was in part due to the new nature of poverty in the 1980s. The previous system of pay-as-you-go

insurance provided to workers with a long history of paying into the social security system was insufficient to address the “new poor,” who were younger and belonged to single-parent families. The new poor replaced retired people and heads of households holding marginal jobs as the main recipients of welfare. Long-term unemployment was not sufficiently covered by the welfare system that had been created for, and by, skilled and unionized male workers whose main concerns were coverage for brief periods of unemployment, accident and illness insurances, and pensions in their old age. Although France up until this time was a decidedly paternalistic state, it was actually the leader in income inequality from the 1950s to the 1980s, with the top 20 percent of income earners receiving 24 percent of social transfer payments and the bottom 20 percent of earners receiving only 18 percent in 1974 (Smith 2004). Economic equality was not a reality in France, but the people’s belief in the system remained steadfast. Attached to a romanticized vision of the public sector, the public opposed any changes to the system, except increases to the system, such as the 1989 inclusion of a Minimum Income for Reintegration Act, which paid a minimum monthly supplement to people at the poverty level in exchange for a flexible contract that required anything from repayment to job training. The fifty year tradition of social securities and large government involvement aided the creation of more policies to include those left out by the older system and to enhance social cohesion among insiders included in the labor market and the outsiders edging toward the margins of society.

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s workers and students alike staged massive and debilitating protests against budgetary cuts to social programs and defended their rights to universal benefits. In a move to offset a large budgetary deficit the government

tried to shift towards a more competitive American style economy, unencumbered with high rates of public expenditures and costly welfare obligations, with the thinking that the state could not compete in global capitalism when weighed down by social insurances. Even if these measures to cut spending in pensions and other social programs would benefit the economy, the deep rooted French belief that a statist approach to job creation and high social spending is normal makes proposals in expenditure cuts appear threatening to the very core of the French national identity (Smith 2004). Ideas matter even if they are not grounded in truth and the historical myth of the greatness of the French regulatory state, of French solidarity under the banner of social programs, helped create an imagined reality which influences the policy people support. Just as Americans disapprove of welfare on the basis of a tradition of individualism, economic independence, and the belief that social insurance only serves to create dependence, the French have retained a belief in the role of the state as caretaker and protector of the human right to a decent standard of living. Traditions run deep and the idea of social solidarity through including all citizens in the right to housing, employment, and social insurances by the government has kept France a universal care state even if this degree and range of support is difficult to sustain.

The Economics of Welfare Support and Interest

People across history and nations are most willing to support welfare policies in times of economic hardship. Both the United States and France formed the bases of their welfare systems during the economic crises of the 1930s and were able to garner support for those systems due to the inadequacy of local, private institutions. Recessions and

crises affect the entire state and as more people lose their jobs and housing the prospect of poverty becomes more real to the average citizen. Although the constituents in both nations were convinced of the need for public assistance programs, how those systems were constructed reflected major differences in public attitudes toward the poor.

Roosevelt's New Deal legislation built upon a tradition of individualism that, despite acknowledging economic barriers to success, was concerned with ensuring that people would not become dependent on the government for aid and focused on work requirements. France's welfare system on the other hand was influenced by beliefs in the universal rights of man and promoted a sense of solidarity within the state. In the universal care system everyone has the same access to care and economic situations are equalized by the state. Hard times accentuate inequality but only universal care systems treat the cause, not merely the symptoms.

Welfare was not of particular importance during the 1950s for the United States and France because both countries were experiencing economic boom times. France was profiting from government planning and the United States was growing rich from the free-market. While times were good poverty was far from the national consciousness and the public was content with the status quo of the welfare state. France continued its economic prosperity during the 1960s and experienced little reform in welfare. Though it was not precipitated by an economic crisis, the United States took a renewed interest in welfare during the 1960s. This was due to the civil rights movement and an overall revolution in how the country understood inequality. Extreme inequality between white Americans and minorities showed that there was not equal opportunity within the United States and the government was forced to intervene because it had the power to create

laws that opened opportunity. During the 1960s the American public became more aware of structural barriers to success, yet there were no changes in welfare system or public attitudes toward poverty. If anything people became more disparaging of the poor because it appeared that they were not taking advantage of government mandated equal access and were continuing their lazy lifestyle. They did not understand that equal access does not necessarily translate to equal opportunity, or that barriers to success remained.

After rocky financial years across the globe in the 1970s and 1980s debates over welfare emerged once again. Both countries experienced a new impoverished population that was younger, of both sexes, and included growing numbers of single-parent families. American poverty before this point had been the realm of single men who were detached from society usually due to disability, illness, or addiction. Services were available to these populations but they were mainly ignored as hopeless causes with too many personal problems to be fully integrated into society. The French were more accustomed to viewing poverty as the problem of retired persons without enough savings and two-parent households with marginal jobs. Within the French welfare system provision had been made for these two groups and efforts were made to ensure their inclusion in society. Although the demographics of the poor changed, the United States and France adhered to the patterns of welfare found throughout their respective histories. More attuned to the possible structural causes of inequality, the French looked to create more aid including measures that targeted unemployment among youth. The United States, in keeping with its suspicion of the character of the poor, approached welfare as a problem of morals rather than of the system itself. The political response to poverty in America, in the form of the Contract with America, focused on unwed mothers as the source of the

poverty cycle. Children born to single mothers in poor areas were more likely to live their adult lives in poverty as well, and Americans interpreted this as a moral issue rather than a structural one. Interest in the welfare state and support of social assistance in both countries was generated by economic downturns, but how they chose to provide aid was dictated by tradition.

Although racial components in the history of public attitudes toward welfare are not a primary focus of this paper, I would be remiss if I neglected to briefly discuss the effect of racial tensions on the structure of the welfare system in the United States. Along with the deservingness criteria of control, the criterion of identity differentiates between French and American attitudes toward the poor. Due to a long history of racial tensions and hostility toward minorities, the United States has had more difficulty creating a solid, cohesive national identity that encompasses all citizens. In a country without an all inclusive national identity, citizens are less willing to allocate their tax money toward the poor because they feel that poverty is a problem of minority groups and, consequently, welfare programs will not benefit society as a whole. Since the founding of the United States, racial minorities have been associated with poverty. In the 19th century poverty was characterized as the problem of immigrants, such as the Irish and Italians, and later became a problem of African Americans and Latinos. Poverty in the United States has been constructed as something that happens to “the other,” as a problem of racial minorities and not the concern of the white working class majority. As Rodgers, Beamer, and Payne (2008) found, states with a high percentage of African Americans “clearly design welfare programs to discourage participation and punish even minor transgressions. The programs in these states are paternalistic in the sense of forcefully

regulating the behavior of clients, whom policymakers seem to assume to be especially troubled, uncooperative, and undermotivated” (p. 537). France has a much more solidified national identity than the United States and therefore views poverty as a national problem. Of course this may change as the Western European societies become more diverse, but the tradition is in a cohesive identity. When there are no distinctions between citizens there is less cause to oppose universal welfare because all citizens are perceived of as benefiting from the system.

A Comparison of Attitudes

As expected, when comparing the percentage of GDP each nation spent on public social expenditures the United States fell behind the average for the other countries within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and far behind France, which actually spent the most of all OECD countries in both public expenditures and overall public and private social expenditures (OECD 2007). Spending 31.3 percent of its Gross National Product (GDP) on social expenditures, France only spent 2.9 percent of that in private social expenditures, showing that within the French welfare system people rely heavily on the state. The numbers for the United States on the other hand, which spent 16.2 percent on public and 10.5 percent on private social expenditures, reflects a state that is less involved in providing assistance to its citizens and instead depends heavily on the private sector to spend money and effort on the lives of those citizens of lesser means. These numbers set the scene for public attitudes in the United States and France toward the welfare system, and show the level of involvement of the state in the social welfare of its people. Accustomed to the heavy engagement of

the government in the economic and social affairs of the state, the French welfare tradition, as I will demonstrate, fosters more egalitarian public views of poverty by framing the issue as a social problem rather than an individual one. The United States welfare system for its part is dominated by selectivity, which opens the discussion of whether recipients are in need or are to blame and perpetuates the belief that only some are deserving while the rest should be able to support themselves.

Perceptions of need, control and the role of the government divided the French and American public in a very clear manner between a public that believed barriers outside the control of the individual were to blame for inequality and a public that was much more ready to place economic responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the individual. When asked how much freedom of choice and control they believed to have over their lives, 11.3 percent of French responded that they felt no freedom of choice at all and 3.9 percent of Americans felt the same (World Values Survey 2006). A person who believes that there is little freedom of choice and control over their personal life would be more likely to blame their situation on factors outside of themselves, making them more aware of the structural barriers to success. In line with this view, 35.1 percent of French respondents also thought that hard work generally doesn't bring success and that it is more a matter of luck, while only 13.7 percent of Americans agreed (World Values Survey 2006). Overall the French public did not think that they lived in an open and mobile society, which corresponds to the French tradition of redistribution by the government. Americans, believing that they had control over their lives and had access to opportunity if they worked hard enough, agreed with the view that with determination people are able to better their situation without the aid of the government.

Views toward government involvement further reinforced the difference in attitudes toward opportunity and the responsibility of the individual versus the responsibility of the state. Comparatively the French respondents were more in favor of government involvement in the redistribution of wealth and believed that it was an essential character of democracy to aid the unemployed and poor. 40.3 percent of the French believed that incomes should be made more equal while only 19.1 percent of Americans thought the same (World Values Survey 2006). More Americans supported the view that larger income differences are actually needed as an incentive to work, a view that fits the fear Americans have that providing social welfare assistance will make recipients dependent and diminish their motivation. Harkening back to the social philosophy of Malthus, Americans believe that people will not work unless they have to, and they are less supportive of programs that, in their view, will offer an easier income than working and increase dependence on those services. Over 28 percent of Americans did not view providing aid for unemployment as an essential responsibility of government, as opposed to only 12.6 percent of French, and 35.5 of Americans did not think government taxes on the rich and subsidies to the poor were essential either (World Values Survey 2006). Again and again the data showed that United States respondents do not think that the state should have a large role in the welfare of the people. They opt for an open society in which the individual, if motivated and hard-working, could succeed. France of course was more receptive to structural explanations for low status and expected the state to fix the inequalities caused not by the individual but by the social and economic structure itself.

Most telling of all, the question of why people are living in need clearly showed the difference in perceptions of control between the two countries (World Values Survey 1990). The most striking differences were between the French emphasis on unluckiness and the American emphasis on laziness. With a difference of 10.5 percent, a lower percentage of Americans than French thought that people were living in need due to unluckiness (French 18.3 percent, American 7.8 percent) and 24.4 percent more Americans thought that people were living in need due to laziness (French 15.4 percent, American 39.8 percent). Americans blame the individual for their situation and are more likely to attribute poverty to the character of a person. Placing the blame for poverty on the characteristics of the individual makes it much harder for people to sympathize, because if they believe that people are in control of their situation and are poor due to their own faults they are less willing to help. The French are more supportive of a paternalistic state because they believe people fall on hard times due to factors beyond their control, making it the duty of the state and the community to offer aid.

Attitudes towards poverty and the role of the state correspond to the types of welfare systems found in the United States and France. Fostering a more universal view of welfare, the French public is dedicated to a large welfare state and thus perpetuates structural views of economic and social barriers outside the control of the individual. A more closed and selective system in the United States is reflected in the beliefs of the public that economic problems are formed on an individual level and are affected by an individual's personal characteristics. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) found a 61 percent correlation between the belief that luck determines income and the amount of social welfare spending and an 81 percent correlation between the belief that poverty is

society's fault and spending levels (Figure 7.1 and 7.2, among countries with a per capita GDP above 15,000 in 1998). Public attitudes shape policy support by creating a picture of need that is either in or out of control of the individual. There is a constant interaction between a country's political culture, social attitudes, and political institutions. The way French or American people view the welfare system is a combination of the attitudes they have learned in the social and political realms. French people growing up in a society that was formed around a belief in government planning and regulation are socialized to believe that the state is the grand protector and this in turn promotes structural views of the causes of inequality. We see such a difference in approaches to public welfare in part because of differences in the tradition of the two countries and the public attitudes those traditions influence. In the web of social welfare and politics public attitudes matter because whether or not the public supports the state as the insurer of the human right to a decent standard of living will affect in what direction social welfare will go. Symbiotic in nature, a more universal care system will encourage people to look beyond individual characteristics to pressing factors such as the lack of affordable housing and other underlying barriers to success, and a more understanding public view of poverty will aid in making policy changes to bring more equality to people.

Conclusion

Consistent with previous research (Lasen 2008, Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Bean and Papadakis 1998) I found that public attitudes towards the poor and homeless in the United States and France were heavily influenced by the type of welfare system practiced by a state. The practices of the state framed poverty in a particular way, as either the fault of the individual or as the responsibility of the society as a whole, and guided the public's

view on their perceptions of the poor. Of course this was not a one way street; public opinions influence public policy and policy influences opinion, yet I focused on the effect of the welfare system because it represented a longstanding tradition of policy and public opinion that over the decades had been enmeshed into the very way people understood poverty within their society. The United States and its selective care system represents a tradition of individualism and limited state intervention; this system perpetuates an image of the poor as a stigmatized group. France's universal care system and social citizenship rights resulted from a strong belief in the rights of workers to a decent standard of living. Its system supports egalitarian views that the state is obligated to care for the wellbeing of all citizens. The United States has not yet acknowledged public assistance and assurances, such as affordable housing and healthcare, as a human right because the American public still believes that the poor are in their situation due to personal character flaws, and therefore are not entitled to assistance. Individuals have a right to a decent standard of living only when poverty is attributed to structural factors outside the control of the individual.

How people view the poor affects their perceptions of the best solutions to poverty. As we saw in Medieval Europe, a view of the poor as a normal part of the society and as representatives of Christian piety lead people to believe that all poor were deserving of social assistance no matter their particular situation. As time progressed the poor were distinguished as the deserving and undeserving. With the categories came the idea that poverty could be due to a flaw in character, such as a predisposition towards laziness inherent in some individuals. In my research I found that notions of deservingness were often based on perceptions of individual control. Americans tended to

think that they have more freedom of control over their personal situations and correspondingly believe that assistance should only be for the truly needy. For them aid had to be regulated so that people would not become dependent on the state. Even when they accept a structural view of the causes of poverty, there remains a strong conviction that receiving public assistance could cause dependence and consequently recipients should be required to work for their aid. Individualism and independence are important to the American public and these values inform the selective, means-tested, and time limited policies that characterize the United States. The French do not think that they have as much control over their lives and this belief is indicated in their continued support of universal care despite its costs. For the French, hard work does not always bring success since individuals are subject to external factors and the French believed it was the duty of the state to ensure equality among its citizens. Moreover the French believe that everyone is entitled to welfare as a human right, so they are not concerned that people will become dependent. Instead they expect the state to aid everyone no matter their situation. A public view of poverty as beyond the control of the individual fostered a perception of every citizen as deserving of public assistance.

A more universal approach to welfare and the change in public perceptions that it could influence would possibly help the United States deal more aptly with the growing numbers of the working poor and homeless by removing the stigma of poverty and promoting the creation of preventative programs. As of today many public programs only help to alleviate the effects of homelessness but do not deal with the causes, thus many people find themselves in a cycle of poverty that further excludes them from society. When the cause of homelessness and poverty is no longer attributed to the initiative and

control of the individual, the underlying causes of poverty are clearer. For example, people are homeless not only because they have lost a job, are paid too little, or are burdened by unexpected costs; there is also an actual lack of affordable housing that leaves people without homes no matter how hard they work. Instead of providing aid when the situations hit bottom policies should protect people from ever even entering poverty. Barriers to success are hidden within our social and economic structures, and they cannot be dealt with until public attitudes toward poverty are less rooted in biases based on stereotyped images of a dependent poor. By making all citizens deserving of public assistance and viewing a decent standard of living as a human right we can create a more socially conscious state that attempts to provide equality for all.

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Appendix

Table 1

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK				
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [2006], United States [2006]</i>				
BASE=2177		Country		
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France	United States
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	Not an essential characteristic of democracy	12.50%	7.90%	16.40%
	2	5.20%	5.50%	4.90%
V152. - Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy, and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy.	3	6.80%	6.50%	7.00%
	4	6.40%	5.40%	7.20%
	5	18.60%	12.60%	23.70%
	6	10.40%	7.90%	12.60%
	7	11.50%	12.70%	10.60%
	8	11.90%	16.80%	7.90%
	9	5.50%	8.50%	3.10%
	An essential characteristic of democracy	11.00%	16.30%	6.60%
	Total	2177 (100%)	988 (100%)	1189 (100%)
	Base for mean	2177	988	1189
Mean	5.6	6.3	5	
Standard Deviation	2.78	2.8	2.62	

Table 2

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK				
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [2006], United States [2006]</i>				
BASE=2208		Country		
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France	United States
Hard work brings success V120. - Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can chose any number in between. Agreement: Hard work brings success.	In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life	14.10%	8.30%	18.80%
	2	10.10%	7.10%	12.50%
	3	14.80%	11.90%	17.20%
	4	12.10%	9.60%	14.10%
	5	17.20%	20.10%	14.80%
	6	8.40%	7.70%	9.00%
	7	8.30%	10.90%	6.20%
	8	7.50%	12.00%	3.90%
	9	3.70%	6.00%	1.80%
	Hard work doesn't generally bring success - it's more a matter of luck and connections	3.80%	6.20%	1.80%
	Total	2208 (100%)	998 (100%)	1210 (100%)
	Base for mean	2208	998	1210
	Mean	4.5	5.3	3.9
	Standard Deviation	2.51	2.56	2.26

Table 3

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK				
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [2006], United States [2006]</i>				
BASE=2202		Country		
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France	United States
Income equality V116. - How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: Incomes should be made more equal vs We need larger income differences as incentives.	Incomes should be made more equal	10.80%	16.40%	6.10%
	2	4.30%	7.30%	1.90%
	3	6.10%	8.40%	4.20%
	4	7.60%	8.30%	6.90%
	5	17.40%	16.30%	18.40%
	6	13.50%	7.80%	18.20%
	7	14.90%	9.70%	19.20%
	8	12.90%	13.50%	12.40%
	9	4.50%	5.00%	4.20%
	We need larger income differences as incentives	8.00%	7.40%	8.50%
	Total	2202 (100%)	999 (100%)	1203 (100%)
	Base for mean	2202	999	1203
	Mean	5.6	5.1	6.1
	Standard Deviation	2.58	2.83	2.26

Table 4

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK				
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [2006], United States [2006]</i>				
BASE=2172		Country		
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France	United States
Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment. V155. - Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy, and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy?	Not an essential characteristic of democracy	5.60%	2.40%	8.20%
	2	3.80%	2.10%	5.30%
	3	5.30%	4.00%	6.40%
	4	6.50%	4.10%	8.50%
	5	18.40%	16.30%	20.20%
	6	11.60%	10.40%	12.50%
	7	13.20%	14.70%	12.00%
	8	14.50%	20.30%	9.70%
	9	7.90%	11.20%	5.20%
	An essential characteristic of democracy	13.10%	14.60%	11.90%
	Total	2172 (100%)	984 (100%)	1188 (100%)
	Base for mean	2172	984	1188
	Mean	6.3	6.9	5.8
	Standard Deviation	2.53	2.26	2.62


Table 5

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK								
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [1981], France [1990], France [1999], United States [1982], United States [1990], United States [1995], United States [1999]</i>								
BASE=4344		Country/region						
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France			United States		
			Total	Year survey		Total	Year survey	
				1990	1999			1990
Why are there people living in need E190.- Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?	Unlucky	12.60%	15.90%	18.30%	14.40%	7.80%	7.80%	-
	Laziness or lack of willpower	23.90%	12.90%	15.40%	11.40%	39.80%	39.80%	-
	Injustice in society	39.10%	43.50%	42.10%	44.30%	32.70%	32.70%	-
	Part modern progress	21.40%	24.70%	21.00%	26.90%	16.50%	16.50%	-
	None of these	3.10%	3.00%	3.20%	2.90%	3.10%	3.10%	-
	Total	4344 (100%)	2578 (100%)	976 (100%)	1602 (100%)	1765 (100%)	1765 (100%)	0 (100%)

Table 6

VALUES SURVEY DATABANK				
<i>Selected countries/samples: France [2006], United States [2006]</i>				
BASE=2224		Country		
Weight [with split ups]		Total	France	United States
How much freedom of choice and control V46.- Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.	None at all	1.20%	1.80%	0.80%
	2	0.60%	1.30%	*
	3	1.80%	3.10%	0.70%
	4	3.60%	5.10%	2.40%
	5	14.10%	20.00%	9.30%
	6	11.60%	12.60%	10.80%
	7	18.70%	19.10%	18.40%
	8	21.40%	18.00%	24.20%
	9	13.20%	9.00%	16.60%
	A great deal	13.70%	9.90%	16.80%
	Total	2224 (100%)	999 (100%)	1225 (100%)
	Base for mean	2224	999	1225
	Mean	7.2	6.7	7.6
	Standard Deviation	1.96	2.05	1.77

Table 7 – OECD: Public and private social expenditure in percentage of GDP in 2007



In % of GDP	Private	Public	Total (%)
OECD	3.0	19.3	22.3
United States	10.5	16.2	26.7
France	2.9	28.4	31.3