

**“ORANGE IS THE NEW BLACK”:  
AN ANALYSIS OF OBAMA-TO-TRUMP VOTERS**

A Thesis  
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Emily Burnham  
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On my honor  
I have neither given nor received  
unauthorized aid on this thesis.

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Spring 2019

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study uses 2016 ANES data to explore the group of Americans who voted for Barack Obama in 2012 and Donald Trump in 2016, focusing specifically on the factors influencing this trajectory. The voting trajectory from Obama to Trump comprised approximately 13% of the actively voting 2016 electorate. I use bivariate analyses and multiple logistic regression models in order to provide an explanation for this voting trajectory, and to separately explore this group outside of the larger populous of Trump voters. The study finds that economic insecurity, misogyny, anti-immigrant sentiment, and racial resentment all had a significant effect on the likelihood of voting for both Obama and Trump for president, controlling for historically influential factors like political party identification and others. Anti-immigrant sentiment proved to have the largest effect on this voting group. The study concludes by calling for more research on this influential voting trajectory, as well as the other trajectories between 2012 and 2016, including non-voters.

The 2016 election of Donald Trump surprised many Americans, and it simultaneously spurred a multitude of questions asking for an explanation as to how his election occurred. This election paved the way for research on the current political moment in a way that transcends party affiliation and traditional measures of liberalism and conservatism. After the primaries, in a general sense, liberals aligned behind the Democratic nominee and conservatives behind that of the Republicans. Predictions across reputable sources anticipated a Clinton victory. Many assumed that citizens who voted for Barack Obama in 2012 would naturally align themselves with Clinton, particularly due to the Obamas' endorsement of her campaign. While consistency within their party proved to be the case for the majority of Democrats, a small but influential group of voters emerged: the constituents who voted for Barack Obama in 2012, then switched party allegiances and voted for Donald Trump in 2016. This paper seeks to move past simply studying party affiliation and instead looks toward measures of values and attitudes to understand this unique voting trajectory.

According to the American National Election Study survey, approximately 13% of supporters of Obama in 2012 voted for Trump in 2016 (Skelley 2017). The Cooperative Congressional Election Study found similar results, observing that 11% of Obama voters became Trump voters. Though these may seem like small findings in the grand scheme of the election, those percentages translate to anywhere from six to nine million Americans (Skelley 2017). In an election in which there was a difference of only about three million votes in the popular vote, this voting trajectory narrowed the gap significantly between Trump and Clinton.

These voters were influential in electing President Trump because of their positionality; they were overwhelmingly white, working-class men (Cohn 2017; Morgan and Lee 2018). Many of them lived in the Rust Belt region in the midwestern United States, as evidenced by the close margins of victory for Trump in that area (Skelley 2017; Johnston et al. 2017). This group held a unique and flexible place in the context of the 2016 election. A combination of the redesign of industry and economy in that region, along with the changing demographic makeup of their

cities and towns, influenced the white, working-class, Rust Belt voters to more broadly consider their options for President.

In order to better understand the voting trajectory that contributed to these election results, the broader political moment can be broken down into a variety of attitudinal and identity-driven factors. Many scholars argue that general racial resentment, accumulated over time, accounts for much of the change in party allegiance, writing that white working-class Americans became disgruntled with employment practices focusing more and more on minority rights, or minority rights campaigns gaining prominence. Other social scientists see the switch manifesting from alternative shared prejudices, such as an anti-feminist ideology or an authoritarian mindset. Still others cite the recent anti-immigrant rhetoric, compounded with global current events and a general Western shift toward overt xenophobia. This paper seeks to explore potential factors influencing the voters who switched from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016, as compared to voters who chose Obama in 2012 and Clinton in 2016, using logistic regression models that address these attitudinal and identity-driven factors. In particular, this study uses six factors to analyze this voting trajectory, including racial resentment, misogynist attitude, economic insecurity, religiosity, anti-immigrant sentiment, and authoritarian worldview.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 proved to be out of the ordinary in a variety of ways. Throughout the election process, his opponent, Hillary Clinton, was favored to win the general election and had decades of political experience, including a career as an attorney, the First Lady, and the Secretary of State. She also had the endorsement of the Obamas. When Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Americans responded in a variety of ways: some with disgust, some with pride, and others simply with utter confusion. What had shifted between Obama's election in 2012 and the 2016 election of now-President Trump?

Some citizens who abstained from voting in 2012 saw promise in this new candidate and felt inclined to vote in 2016 because of the political moment (Faber et al. 2017). Still others

chose not to vote in 2016 at all. Further, while the majority of Democrats chose to consistently vote with their party, an unexpected group emerged during this election cycle: the constituents who voted both for Obama and for Trump. The appeals Trump used provided him with an opportunity to cause some voters who chose Obama in 2012 to vote Republican in 2016 (Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Morgan and Lee 2018). Many scholars have attempted to make sense of the election of Trump using a variety of explanations, some being shared racist or sexist prejudices, as well as situational attitudes like economic insecurity; this study seeks to use these theories to inform an exploration of Obama-to-Trump switchers.

An exploration of the factors that could have caused the voting trajectory from Obama to Trump is necessary to understand the most recent presidential election. Much of the literature on the election thus far considers the party affiliation of the voters or the traditional characteristics of liberals and conservatives in their explanations of 2016. However, because the Obama-to-Trump voters defected from their 2012 candidate's party, this study seeks to progress past party identification, to understand why and how a significant portion of the electorate in 2016 selected the near opposite of their choice in 2012. I contrast the voters who were loyal to the Democratic candidate, voting for Obama and Clinton, with the voters who defected, voting for Obama and Trump, in this exploration of their voting behavior.

### *A New Rhetoric*

A variety of factors contributed to a new type of campaign during this election. To begin, the type of language used during the campaign proved to be unique and confrontational in a way not seen before. Trump's rhetoric was out of the political norm, employing overt racist and misogynist appeals typically not seen on the national electoral stage (Smith and Hanley 2018). The difference between now-President Trump's rhetoric and that of peer politicians was the specificity and topic of Donald Trump's vocabulary; he used targeted language in reference to women and to minority groups that employed misogynist and racist appeals. No longer was "dog-whistle politics" and its accompanying subverted racist and sexist undertones the standard; overt racism and sexism became the strategy of the political moment (Lopez 2014; Bock, Byrd-

Craven, and Burkley 2017). This type of language specifically appealed to Trump's main voting group; the white, working-class men who voted for Trump appreciated their candidate's attention toward their particular issues, the relevant issues being perceived competition for work with minorities and the desired revival of manufacturing jobs.

### *Economic Insecurity at the Forefront*

Because Trump's language was particularly important for this group of voters, many people, including political pundits and the news media, initially argued that economic insecurity was the strongest reason for a Trump presidency (Cohn 2017). The demographic makeup of Trump voters certainly supports this thesis; his electorate was overwhelmingly white, male, and working class (Morgan and Lee 2017b; Morgan and Lee 2018). These voters live in Rust Belt states near the Midwest, where industry has been steadily declining over the past few decades. Importantly, Trump saw success in these rural towns and small cities that were doing poorly in terms of health, finances, and social services (Monnat and Brown 2017; Johnston et al. 2017). This points to a location-based pattern in economic insecurity that was connected to the decline of industry in the Rust Belt region of the US. The economic recovery after the 2008 recession did not dramatically improve the lives of these constituents. They felt disenfranchised by a president who had promised change and hope. In particular, the white working class felt as if they were being left behind economically and socially (Morgan and Lee 2017a; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; Mutz 2018). Trump used this vulnerability as an opportunity to advocate for the return of manufacturing jobs and positions in dying industries like coal or oil – those disenfranchised constituents viewed this as a tangible sign of hope in areas that were rapidly automating those jobs or were paying workers less and less. Instead of watching the world change contrary to their interests, the white working class heard a voice who advocated for their interests to be prioritized, just like when America was “great.”

During Obama's second term, the white working class engaged in politics less frequently. They felt a rapid decline in the degree to which they felt represented in the electorate (Sides et al. 2017; Federico and de Zavala 2018). Once the 2016 election season began, this group supported



a candidate who validated their economic interests in every speech he made; these issues were prominent in their daily lives because of the recent recession and the downturn of industry. Whether or not the white working class was actually left behind after the events of 2008 was not important; the perception that other groups were improving financially while working-class wages stagnated, or jobs were terminated, proved to be a crucial factor for this group (Mutz 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018; Hochschild 2016). This group perceived that Obama had ignored them in the cleanup of the recession. After a presidency that had promised change and hope, the white working class wanted change in their pockets. For this, they looked to a candidate who addressed their concerns directly.

#### *Underlying Racial Resentment*

Not only was this group characterized as working-class, but they were also specifically characterized as white. Scholars theorize that racial resentment was latent in white working-class voters and had been forming since the post-Civil Rights era of racial equality (Schaffner et al. 2018; Smith and Hanley 2018; Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich 2018; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). In 2012, many overtly racist voters actually chose to stay home instead of choosing a side (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). Trump's blatantly racist rhetoric activated that resentment, pulling racist voters to the polls rather than pushing them away, and energizing more latently racist tendencies within some voters who did participate in 2012.

The aforementioned perception of being left behind was inherently related to race (Hochschild 2016). The white working class believed that they were losing jobs or wages because of the advancement of people of color and immigrants moving into their cities and competing for work. Trump played his cards well into the fears of this group – using racist rhetoric, he legitimized the fears of his constituents and made explicit promises to return the white working class to their historically 'better' positions (Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor 2017; Morgan and Lee 2017b). By promising to "Make America Great Again," Trump reminded citizens of a time when white Americans could work hard, have a steady job, and support a family without competing with citizens of color (Federico and de Zavala 2018). Economic

stability was a driving force for this group, yes, but it was innately tied to a feeling of racial animosity as white Americans saw the racial makeup of their cities and towns changing (Mutz 2018; Major et al. 2018). Trump's racist appeals in the name of restoring financial security read as an acknowledgement of whites' struggles and a promise to uplift them once again.

Alongside that racial resentment resides ethnocentrism – and the accompanying fear that many white Americans are beginning to feel when they experience the increasing racial diversity in America (Mutz 2018; Faber et al. 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017). White working-class voters cried for help in 2016 because of a fear of the breakdown of a class-based hierarchy but, as previously mentioned, this class-based hierarchy is inexplicably tied to a race-based hierarchy (Sides et al. 2017; Phillips 2018). White workers have always had a leg up on their counterparts of color; it is white citizens' "wages of whiteness" that provide extra opportunities for advancement, financial benefit, and higher class status (DuBois 1935). In the days when America was "great," white working-class citizens had greater class status than their black counterparts, and even greater class status than other counterparts of color. When the racial demographics of this country began to change, white workers felt as if they were receiving less than they deserved because they had not historically had to compete with others outside of their ethnic group (Federico and de Zavala 2018). This perception was and is fueled by race.

#### *A Campaign Against Immigrants*

Race proved to be important other ways, too; in addition to being encouraged to resent citizens of color, white Americans were primed to be afraid of and aggressive toward immigrants to the US. Trump not only blurred, but nearly erased, the line between legal and illegal immigrants, categorizing anyone considered an immigrant as lesser in the social and economic ladders (Morgan and Lee 2017b; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). Such characterizations perpetuate the notion that if citizens of color make financial or status gains, white citizens will be pushed down the economic and class ladders, instead of being able to compete at the same level. For citizens who are particularly proud and aware of their whiteness, the increasing racial

diversity in America continues to pose a direct threat to their livelihoods (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Major et al. 2018).

During the campaign, Trump's rhetoric on the topic of immigration was overtly racist and aggressive; his call to build a physical wall spanning the entire border of Mexico and the United States was a cornerstone of his campaign, and advocacy for this wall centered on fear (Pennycook and Rand). The wall campaign focused on Mexican, Central American, and South American residents, claiming that those immigrants present threats to American jobs, American women and children, and national security. In his campaign announcement, Trump claimed that countries are "not sending their best... they're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists" (Time Staff 2015). This type of language bred shared hate among white citizens and perpetuated stereotypes about immigrants that are fueled by fear. The perceived insecurity in safety, jobs, and wages due to the presence of immigrants resonated with white working-class voters (Major et al. 2018). The threat of economic insecurity and diminishing social class based on race inspired this group to become more politically engaged and to lend support to Trump in the 2016 election, particularly because of his strong anti-immigrant and race-fueled agenda. The historically Democratic-leaning, yet flexible, white working class pledged their allegiance to an unconventional Republican who spoke to their hopes and fears (Morgan and Lee 2017a).

### *Religion as a Source of Values*

Yet another important factor in Trump's election was his outspoken support for tradition and religion. Trump's constituents proved to be no exception to the pattern of religious conservatism in voting, in large part because they were increasingly validated by Trump's language. Trump received endorsements from religious leaders and religiously-affiliated elected officials alike, with one congresswoman arguing at the time that this was "the last election when we even have a chance to vote for somebody who will stand up for godly moral principles" (Grose 2018). The religious right saw Trump as the answer to their prayers, as an elected official

who would support their value of traditionalism and denounce morally-charged issues such as abortion and gay marriage.

Though fewer and fewer white Americans define themselves as religious, Trump's electorate contained a particularly strong contingency of devout white evangelicals (Wong 2018; Grose 2018). Further, despite the decrease in white religious affiliation, white evangelical women emerged as one of the prominent groups of constituents voting for Trump (Wong 2018). The intersection of the race of these voters and their degree of religiosity created an influential and unique voting trajectory. This population is even more right-leaning than their evangelical counterparts of color and takes a hard stance on conservative issues. In this election, they prioritized conservatism as a solution to threats to their religious and personal communities and to combat perceived discrimination against Christians (Wong 2018). President Trump continues to emphasize the values of these voters; in his 2019 State of the Union address, he referred to both fetuses and living children as "made in the holy image of God," underscoring a traditional evangelical stance against abortion and reaffirming his dedication to traditionalism (CNN 2019).

#### *Misogyny and Masculinity*

While race, religion, and economic insecurity each played important roles in motivating certain voters in 2016, other scholars find that Trump's unabashed anti-feminist rhetoric motivated political engagement throughout the electorate. With a swath of examples from which to choose, constituents with misogynist tendencies found a candidate with similar opinions about women. Supporters unapologetically echoed anti-feminist chants. They argued for the heterosexual nuclear family, for the rights of the unborn child, and for the presidency as a masculine space (Wong 2018; Francis 2018). Regardless of a public threat to their personal gender identities, not all female voters rejected this language as misogynist; in fact, many white female voters still chose to cast their votes for Trump despite attacks to a female identity. Many women who voted for Trump chose to advocate for traditional rather than progressive gender roles, which allowed them to align with his misogyny and justify their votes within a conservative ideological base (Bock et al. 2017; Strolovitch et al. 2017). Numerous women

supported his platform and anti-establishment narrative so intensely that they claimed that they would let Trump “grab [them] by the p\*\*\*\*,” reclaiming a phrase that the president had used in a 2005 video recording that many other voters saw as an admission of predatory behavior. During the election, Trump made overt references to female body parts, references to sex acts, and general misogynist remarks about the role of women in the workplace and their role in politics (Strolovitch et al. 2017; Valentino, Wayne, and Ocen 2018).

In the past, political candidates shied away from such blatantly racist and misogynist appeals as the ones that Trump made during his campaign; these other politicians feared that such overt statements would hurt their campaigns, instead using, and continuing to use, racialized and gendered undertones (Valentino et al. 2018; Lopez 2014). Trump moved past traditional rhetoric strategies to engage latent racist and misogynist voters (Cassese and Holman 2018; Valentino et al. 2018). These strategies established new standards of respect in politics.

Prior to Hillary Clinton’s nomination as the Democratic candidate, the presidency had traditionally been viewed as a masculine space, likely because a man has always held the position. When that notion of a masculine space was paired with a candidate with overtly misogynist views, the view of the presidency as a man’s job further embedded into the public expectation (Francis 2018; Strolovitch et al. 2017; Boyle and Meyer 2018). With his opponent being a woman for the first time in United States history, the political moment provided Trump with the ability to wield this misogynist rhetoric in a way that directly disadvantaged his Democratic counterpart. His use of targeted anti-feminist language towards a fellow candidate was nearly unprecedented in US politics (Boyle and Meyer 2018). It was, however, effective; echoes of sexist insults could be seen on posters, as well as heard at many of Trump’s rallies both throughout the election season and today. T-shirts were created with profane, female-centric insults with specific reference to Mrs. Clinton. These direct and aggressive phrases set a new precedent for political engagement, allowing less-informed citizens to feel engaged in the election through rally chants. It also mobilized a group of people toward hatred of the other candidate’s demographics and character instead of pure disagreement with that candidate’s

values and platform (Bock et al. 2017; Cassese and Holman 2018). The rhetoric allowed white men, and even white women, who were already proud of their whiteness and their masculinity, to reinforce that culture and privilege (Strolovitch et al. 2017). Regardless of class status, shared prejudices held a notable amount of sway for voters in 2016.

Another prominent factor within Trump's campaign was an authoritarian worldview, which is related to multiple of the aforementioned factors. Authoritarian thinking is primarily binary in nature; the world operates in black and white or good and bad, hence why authoritarianism is tied to misogyny, racism, and the like. During the election, Trump was unashamed in his biases and proud of the divisions his rhetoric created (Smith and Hanley 2018; Crowson and Brandes 2017; MacWilliams 2016). The authoritarian mindset also argues that people ought to be disciplined and that the correct type of discipline comes from institutions of morality (Lakoff 2006). Such institutions include the traditional heterosexual family, the church, and others (Wong 2018; Phillips 2018). During the campaign, Trump promised during an interview with Christian Broadcasting Network that voters could "trust him on traditional marriage," affirming his commitment to conservative and disciplinary institutions (Brody 2016).

Authoritarians also believe that the world is naturally dangerous; in order to combat everyday danger, citizens must arm themselves and protect those moral institutions. In particular, immigrants pose some of the greatest threats to moral institutions because their identities are at odds with the values of traditionalism and how it relates to racial homogeneity; the anti-immigrant campaign plays into the "good versus bad" narrative of authoritarianism (Lakoff 2006). President Trump's wall-at-the-border campaign thus played well to Republican ears because of its tie to conservative, disciplinary values (Lakoff 2006; Inglehart and Norris 2017). The authoritarian mindset supports the traditional conservatism of Trump's chosen political party, while also providing a frame through which Trump strategically appealed to less-traditional conservatives who already tended toward misogyny and racism.

To understand the current political moment, we must study the ways in which the four years between Obama's election in 2012 and Trump's election in 2016 shifted a group of

Americans' voting preferences, and the factors that instigated that shift. Voters who shared misogynist, racist, anti-immigrant, and authoritarian attitudes with Trump may have advanced his election to the presidency (Inglehart and Norris 2017). Promises of hope rang through his commitment to bring back jobs and to build up the white working class, despite their votes being historically cast for the Democratic party (Morgan and Lee 2017b). His references to minorities and immigrants taking American jobs and creating a threat to national security validated latent racism among constituents (Faber et al. 2017). For eight years, the electorate hoped that Obama would change their lives. Disappointed, they looked to an untraditional candidate for a new solution. In 2016, for a small but important portion of the voting population, Trump filled the gaps that Clinton could not. In this study, I will use the factors often attributed to a Trump election to explore the group who passed their vote from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016, compared to a vote for Clinton, seeking to explain this unique and unexpected voting trajectory.

## **METHODS AND DATA**

To study factors that may have influenced the voting trajectory of Obama 2012 to Trump 2016, this paper uses data from the American National Election Study (ANES) survey conducted in 2016. The ANES survey includes information collected before and after the election, with survey questions encompassing a wide variety of demographic characteristics, opinion questions on candidates, feelings thermometers on topics and people, and lifestyle / attitudinal questions. ANES uses Computer-Assisted Self-Interview (CASI) software and face-to-face interviewing, with data collection taking place from September 2016 to January 2017. The sample is constructed by randomly sampling eligible US voters using residential addresses. The American National Election Study has self-reported data on presidential vote both in 2012 and 2016.

I used STATA statistical analysis software to organize and analyze the factors affecting this voting trajectory. I created a primary dependent variable measuring if voters chose to cast their vote for both Barack Obama and for Donald Trump. Thus far, the literature on the 2016 election has been framed around the winner and loser; comparisons between voting for Clinton

and voting for Trump are common, as are studies of Trump voters in general. By using a lesser-researched dependent variable, this study aims to contribute to the existing election literature in a unique way. Though the voting trajectory in question might seem small in number, the Obama-to-Trump voters actually comprise about 12.9% of the actively voting electorate, as I will detail later in this paper. The study of this group may offer increased nuance to the narrative of this presidential election. The reference group for this variable includes those who voted for Barack Obama in 2012 and Hillary Clinton in 2016. The variable will allow us to see which factors influenced voters to move away from the Democratic candidate and towards that of the Republicans in their vote for president.

A series of independent variables will serve as the control variables in this study, as these variables have been found to be associated with voting behavior (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). These variables include the respondent's gender, race, their self-reported annual income, and their highest level of educational attainment. The study also includes a variable categorizing the respondent's political party identification. Age is also included, but because a portion of people who participated in the 2016 survey were not eligible to vote in the 2012 election, the age variable has been restricted to respondents who were over the age of 23 when they participated in the 2016 ANES survey. The sample used in the survey contains 4270 respondents; however, with the restriction on age and a 2012 vote for Obama, the sample contains 1039 respondents.

#### *Creating Measures of Attitudes and Values*

The study focuses on value-based and dispositional attitudes as a way to understand voting behaviors, especially as a frame to look at the 2016 election. Oftentimes, in surveys, respondents might answer a question with a lower degree of accuracy than exists in reality, especially if the question asks for a self-rated measure of character such as misogynist attitude. Thus, this study makes use of multiple questions that act as proxy measures on certain concepts. Six composite primary independent variables were created for this purpose using Cronbach's alpha. The minimum number of questions answered in order for the variable to be created was different for each composite measure; however, the minimum number was consistently



approximately three-quarters of the number of questions. Appendix B also includes an extended description of each question that was incorporated into these composite variables, as well as their overall alpha value and the minimum number of questions needed for incorporation.

To represent a sexist attitude, I combined eight measures that asked for the respondent's evaluation of the role of women in American society, informed in part by studies done by Valentino et al. in 2018 and Bock et al. in 2017. These measures ask about women seeking equality with men and the degree to which equality should occur, while discrimination against women should cease. A higher value of this variable represents a more sexist attitude. The overall Cronbach's alpha for this composite variable was 0.78; the variables have high coherence with one another.

Another variable represents racial resentment and racial attitudes, using a combination of twelve measures, in part guided by studies conducted by Mutz (2018) and Major et al. (2018). Eight of these measures are indicators of attitudes toward African Americans and the extent of discrimination and stereotyping toward this group. Three of these measures serve as indicators of attitudes toward Hispanic/Latinx Americans and the extent of discrimination and stereotyping toward this group. I also include a measure addressing support for affirmative action. A higher value of this composite corresponds to a higher degree of racial resentment. The Cronbach's alpha for this group was 0.82, indicating a high level of coherence in creating this measure.

Further, I generated a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment, partially informed by Hooghe and Dassonneville's 2018 study. This proxy variable is composed of eight separate variables. I include the respondent's opinion on unauthorized or illegal immigrants, accounting for job competition, the proposed wall at the Mexican border, as well as opinions on crime and the purity of American culture. I also include specific questions on immigrant children, especially in regard to birthright citizenship for children of both legal and illegal immigrants. A thermometer of feelings regarding illegal immigrants is also incorporated into the composite. A higher value of this variable denotes a more negative sentiment toward immigrants to the United

States. The Cronbach's alpha for this composite is 0.84, indicating a high coherence between the component parts of the proxy.

As for religiosity, the proxy measure includes five questions asking if religion is an important part of the respondent's life and if the respondent is a regular attendee of religious services (Grose 2018). The variable also addresses the respondent's religious self-identification, particularly if the respondent is evangelical and/or born again. Although religion may not have been a crucial issue for Obama voters, especially because he ran against Romney in 2012, this variable is included to ensure the authoritarian and misogyny variables are not fronting for an investment in religion. A higher value of this variable indicates increased religiosity. This variable has an alpha of 0.72, indicating a moderately high degree of coherence.

The fifth primary independent variable represents economic insecurity and includes ten questions regarding the respondent's finances over time and the degree to which they will be able to pay important bills or are worried financially, guided in part by Inglehart and Norris (2017) and Mutz (2018). This measure also addresses job loss, economic mobility, and the handling of the national economy. A higher value of this variable corresponds to a more insecure economic situation. The overall alpha for this composite measure was 0.69, thus the variables have moderate coherence with one another.

Finally, the authoritarian worldview measure is composed of four measures that address the degree of authoritarianism in parenting priorities and child-rearing techniques; these priorities typically indicate the degree to which the parent has an authoritarian view of how the world should work and are frequently used to measure authoritarianism (Smith and Hanley 2018; MacWilliams 2016; Schaffner et al. 2018). A higher value of this variable corresponds with a more authoritarian worldview. The overall alpha for this variable was 0.72, indicating a moderately high degree of coherence within the variables.

A descriptive statistics table is available in Appendix A, with more information on the dependent variable, the control independent variables, as well as details on these composite independent variables in Appendix B. To analyze these measures, I ran a variety of bivariate

analyses between my dependent variable and each of the primary independent variables of interest; these included t-tests of the six primary independent variables and the dependent variable, and a cross-tabulation of party identification and the dependent variable. These tables appear in Appendices D and E. None of the six variables have a normal distribution, thus I conducted Mann-Whitney tests as nonparametric alternatives. The results of these tests conformed to the results of the t-tests. I used multivariate logistic regression in order to analyze the Obama-to-Trump trajectory, with seven different models. These models included six individual logistic regressions with each independent variable and a full model with all variables. In addition to bivariate and multivariate analyses, I ran tests for multicollinearity to ensure that the variables were operating independently; I found no highly correlated variables.


## **RESULTS**

This study seeks to add to the literature on the 2016 US Presidential election and present new information on a specific voting trajectory. Historically, the literature has connected voting trajectory with political party identification. To begin this study, I explored if this theory informed the Obama-to-Trump path before analyzing the attitudinal and dispositional variables. Of the voters who reported a 2012 Obama vote and a 2016 Trump vote, about a quarter were Democrats, along with about a quarter being Republicans. The largest group of Obama-to-Trump voters were registered Independents, at about 46.3% of the sample, and a small portion, of nearly 4%, identified as 'other.' For context, 'other' could refer to a third-party voter or an unaffiliated voter. This leaves Democrats who voted for both Obama and Trump represented at 4.8%, in contrast to the 95% of Democrats voted for Obama and also voted for Clinton. Further results of the cross-tabulation of this sample are available in Appendix E. As the cross-tabulation shows, this study is looking at a varied portion of the voting electorate who are primarily Independents, with an equal portion of the rest being Democrats and Republicans.

Though political party did have an effect on this voting trajectory, I also explored the effects of the attitudinal and dispositional variables on voting Obama and Trump. As previously

mentioned, I ran a series of t-tests and the associated Mann-Whitney tests on the six primary independent variables, using the Obama-to-Trump trajectory as the grouping variable. For all six variables, the differences in means are significantly different than 0; thus, there are significant differences in means between Obama-to-Clinton voters and Obama-to-Trump voters. The results of the Mann-Whitney tests support this claim. In general, nearly all of the variables have large effect sizes, except for religiosity, as shown by the Cohen's *d* values associated with the t-tests. Without controlling for other factors, anti-immigrant sentiment and racial resentment have the largest substantive effect on Obama-Trump voting, with Cohen's *d* values of -1.6 and -1.4 respectively. Misogyny also has a large effect ( $d=-.9$ ) and economic insecurity has a large effect as well ( $d=-.8$ ). Further results of these t-tests are available in Appendix D.

These distributional comparisons are also illustrated in a series of 12 boxplots in Figure 1; six of the boxplots refer to Obama-to-Clinton voters, with the other six referring to those who voted Obama-to-Trump. In general, the boxplots visually display the distributions of each variable and, in particular, show that the median of each interval variable is higher in Obama-to-Trump cases than in Obama-to-Clinton cases. This figure illustrates that Obama-Trump voters have higher distributions on all of the primary variables.



**Figure 1**

Further explorations of the attitudinal variables included a multiple logistic regression, the results of which are displayed in Table 1. I conducted seven models of the regression: one for each of the six individual primary independent variables and one full model that included all six. All models used the six control independent variables, which include age, gender, race/ethnicity, party identification, educational attainment, and income category. The regression also included a variable accounting for the post-survey weights from the ANES survey. I will report the *c*-statistic for each model, which details the goodness-of-fit of the model, or how well the model represents the data (Cleveland Clinic Lerner Research Institute). The STATA command structure is such that the sampling weights cannot be included in the calculation of this statistic; thus, all *c*-statistic calculations were run on unweighted models.

On occasion, some of these control variables exhibited a significant effect on voting trajectory. One notable control variable category that achieved significance was the Black non-Hispanic group, for which there was a significant decrease in the likelihood of voting for both Obama and Trump by 96.5% in the full model, as compared to their white counterparts (OR=0.04,  $p<0.001$ ). However, the number of voters in this group is relatively small; further, the main focus of this study lies in the effect of the primary independent variables and their explanatory power.

**Table 1: Logistic Regression Results**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Obama to Trump Voters							
Age	1.01 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)
Gender Ref: Male							
Female	0.91 (0.23)	1.86* (0.50)	1.25 (0.37)	1.17 (0.31)	1.04 (0.27)	1.11 (0.28)	1.24 (0.38)
Race Ref: White							
Non-Hispanic Black	0.05*** (0.03)	0.03*** (0.02)	0.03*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.06)	0.03*** (0.02)	0.02*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.03)
Non-Hispanic Hispanic	0.42 (0.19)	0.30* (0.17)	1.45 (0.75)	0.68 (0.33)	0.42* (0.18)	0.33* (0.16)	0.78 (0.42)

Other Non-Hispanic	0.34*	0.28*	0.31*	0.35*	0.31*	0.29*	0.21*
Income Category	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Ref: Under \$25,000							
\$25,000 - \$49,999	0.66	0.99	0.88	0.72	0.74	0.66	0.90
	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.42)
\$50,000 - \$74,999	0.58	0.56	0.42	0.39*	0.44	0.38*	0.68
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.33)
\$75,000 - \$124,999	0.83	0.86	0.60	0.55	0.61	0.69	0.82
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.38)
\$125,00 or more	0.78	0.88	0.52	0.45	0.53	0.59	0.91
	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.55)
Highest Level of Education							
Ref: Less than HS/HS Grad							
Some College/ Associate Deg	0.70	0.86	1.06	1.03	0.79	0.87	1.07
	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.42)
Bachelor's Deg	0.29**	0.34*	0.41	0.43	0.26**	0.36*	0.61
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.29)
Graduate Deg	0.11***	0.14***	0.27*	0.19**	0.11***	0.18***	0.38
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Party Identification							
Ref: Democrat							
Republican	44.26***	58.95***	37.94***	30.04***	45.94***	41.12***	33.28***
	(18.50)	(30.59)	(17.96)	(13.71)	(20.54)	(18.83)	(16.15)
Independent	6.99***	8.60***	10.43***	6.18***	7.66***	9.13***	8.70***
	(2.21)	(2.74)	(3.68)	(1.91)	(2.33)	(2.71)	(3.01)
Other Party	4.10	10.27**	5.91**	8.39*	5.44**	7.03**	10.45*
	(3.55)	(8.43)	(4.00)	(7.18)	(3.50)	(4.70)	(11.95)
Economic Insecurity	5.43***						3.61***
	(1.59)						(1.35)
Misogyny		6.14***					3.28***
		(1.67)					(0.96)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment			13.13***				6.66***
			(3.73)				(2.39)
Racial Resentment				8.71***			2.26*
				(2.51)			(0.87)
Religiosity					2.73*		1.69
					(1.12)		(0.94)
Authoritarianism						3.04***	1.13
						(0.62)	(0.32)
Observations	1039	1039	1039	1039	1039	1039	1039

As for the logistic regression, each of the variables achieved significance in its own individual model. Model 1 displays the effect of economic insecurity on voting trajectory, controlling for the individual-level demographic variables and holding the sample constant. In this model, economic insecurity significantly increases the likelihood of voting for Obama and Trump (OR=5.43,  $p<.001$ ). Affiliation as Republican or Independent significantly increases the likelihood of this trajectory, as compared to Democratic affiliation. This model fits the data much better than random chance ( $c=0.88$ ). Model 2 displays the effect of misogyny on voting Obama-to-Trump. In this model, misogyny significantly increases the likelihood of this trajectory (OR=6.14,  $p<.001$ ). Republican and Independent identification continue to increase the likelihood of this trajectory as well, along with identification as an ‘other’ political party, in reference to Democrats. Model 2 fits the data much better than random chance ( $c=0.89$ ).


Further, Model 3 includes the individual effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on voting Obama-to-Trump. This model illustrates that anti-immigrant sentiment significantly increases the likelihood of voting for Obama and Trump (OR=13.13,  $p<.001$ ). Significance of Republican and Independent political party identification persists at the 0.001 level, while ‘other’ identification is significant at 0.01. Model 3 does much better at fitting the data than random chance ( $c=0.93$ ). The fourth model describes the effect of racial resentment on the Obama-Trump trajectory. In this model, I find that racial resentment significantly increases the likelihood of voting for both Obama and Trump (OR=8.71,  $p<.001$ ). Significance of Republican and Independent political party identification persists at the 0.001 level, while ‘other’ identification is significant at 0.05. This model fits the data much better than random chance ( $c=0.90$ ).

The final two individual models explore the effects of religiosity and authoritarianism on voting for Obama and Trump. In Model 5, religiosity has a moderate significant effect on the likelihood of Obama-to-Trump vote (OR=2.73,  $p<.05$ ). Significance of Republican and Independent political party identification continues to persist at the 0.001 level, while ‘other’ identification is significant at 0.01. This individual model does moderately better at fitting the data than random chance ( $c=0.87$ ). Finally, the effect of authoritarianism is addressed in Model

6. Authoritarianism significantly increases the likelihood of voting for both Obama and Trump (OR=3.04,  $p<.001$ ). Again, Republican, Independent, and ‘other’ identifications have a significant effect. This model does much better at fitting the data than random chance ( $c=0.88$ ).

The final model, Model 7, takes into account all of the aforementioned primary independent variables, along with the control independent variables, and the dependent variable measuring 2012-2016 voting trajectory. In this model, four variables have persistent significance when voting Obama-to-Trump: economic insecurity, misogyny, racial resentment, and anti-immigrant sentiment. The percentage reported for all following interval independent variables is the percent change in odds of an Obama-to-Trump trajectory for a standard deviation change in the independent variable; these percentages are also visually represented in Figure 2 below.

Economic insecurity significantly increases the likelihood of the Obama-Trump trajectory by



**Figure 2**

87.9% (OR=3.61,  $p<0.001$ ). Misogyny continues to have an effect on vote choice, as it increases the likelihood of an Obama-to-Trump path by 113.6% (OR=3.28,  $p<0.001$ ). Anti-immigrant sentiment has a large effect on voting trajectory, significantly increasing the likelihood of voting Obama-to-Trump by 208.6% (OR=6.66,  $p<0.001$ ). Finally, racial resentment increases the likelihood of voting Obama and Trump by 57.2% (OR=2.26,  $p<.05$ ). Of the primary independent



variables, anti-immigrant sentiment has the largest effect size, followed by misogyny, and this is illustrated in Figure 2 below. Further, identification as Republican significantly increases the likelihood of Obama-to-Trump by 3227.9% (OR=33.28,  $p<.001$ ), as well as Independent identification increasing the likelihood by 769.7% (OR=8.70,  $p<.001$ ) and 'other' by 945.3% (OR=10.24,  $p<.05$ ), as compared to their Democratic counterparts. The percentage reported for the categorical variable measuring political party is the percent change in odds of Obama-to-Trump for a unit change in party identification. Together, the variables in this model fit the data very well compared to random chance ( $c=0.94$ ).

The six individual models each included one of the primary independent variables. Figure 3 illustrates the predicted probability of voting Obama-to-Trump using each of the independent variables that achieved significance in the final model. Overall, the four models and their associated primary variables show that as the effect of the variable increases, the predicted probability of voting for both Obama and for Trump also increases. For instance, as the anti-immigrant scale moves from support to opposition, the predicted probability of this voting trajectory increases from 0.00 to 0.44; those who are most opposed to immigrants had a 44% predicted probability of voting Obama-to-Trump. This is also evident in the misogyny scale; as




Figure 3

attitude transitions from less sexist to more sexist, the predicted probability of voting Obama and Trump increases from 0.00 to 0.19. Those who were the most sexist on this study's misogyny scale had a 19% predicted probability of voting Obama-to-Trump.

This regression model suggests that these four variables can provide an explanation for the Obama-to-Trump voting trajectory between 2012 and 2016. In the individual models, the variables that were significant may have been otherwise accounted for within the variables that achieved significance in the end. This is evidenced in the correlation coefficients of the primary independent variables; though authoritarianism showed significance on its own, it is also moderately correlated with misogyny, anti-immigrant sentiment, and religiosity ( $r=0.5, p<0.001$  for all three variables mentioned; see Appendix C for full table of Pearson's  $r$  correlation coefficients). Overall, misogyny, anti-immigrant sentiment, racial resentment, and economic insecurity were all significant predictors for an Obama-to-Trump voting trajectory; these variables provide the beginning of a picture of this group of voters.

## **DISCUSSION**

This study sought to explore a unique voting trajectory in the context of the 2016 US presidential election. The group voting for both Barack Obama in 2012 and Donald Trump in 2016 made up nearly 13% of the 2016 actively voting electorate, a surprisingly large percentage of 2016 voters. This study adds nuance to the growing body of research on the 2016 election by specifying a proportion of the electorate that has not yet been studied in great depth. Further, this study adds to the greater global body of research on the factors contributing to the rise of conservative and populist movements, as well as far-right political parties, without specifically focusing on political party identification.

The study takes into account a variety of attitudinal and dispositional variables, the six primaries of which include economic insecurity, misogyny, anti-immigrant sentiment, racial resentment, religiosity, and authoritarian worldview. The greater context of Trump voters and these populist movements informed the use of these six primary independent variables. These

variables are studied in complement to standard control variables such as age, gender, race, educational attainment, income, and political party identification. The results of this study demonstrate that each variable has a significant effect on the Obama-Trump voting trajectory in individualized models, but four in particular are persistently significant in a model controlling for all other factors. Economic insecurity, misogyny, anti-immigrant sentiment, and racial resentment had a significant effect on voting Obama-to-Trump. The variance in these four factors can account for the variance in Obama-to-Trump voting between 2012 and 2016.

Overall, these findings support a portion of the election literature in its emphasis on sexism. The study reflects similar tendencies in the attitudinal variables as the literature has already suggested for the general Trump voting populous. Sexism did play a notable role in the 2016 election, influencing the Obama-to-Trump voting group to choose that trajectory. Trump employed misogyny as a rhetorical tactic during the campaign and, now, the presidency. It was indeed influential for voters. In particular, the fact that Trump's opponent was a woman in the 2016 presidential race was a crucial piece to the election puzzle, especially as it factored alongside this misogynist rhetoric. As Francis suggests (2018), aversion to Hillary Clinton played an important role in the decision-making process of many Trump voters. However, the question remains regarding the sexism and anti-Clinton stance of these Obama voters. Though Obama did not campaign on such overtly sexist claims, this general aversion to Clinton and/or a female president in general could have pushed 2012 voters who supported liberal agendas, but not those put forth by a woman, to vote for Obama in the primaries and in the general election in 2012. This might provide an area of further research. Many Americans would not call Obama sexist, so the sexism, latent or otherwise, that influenced some of his voting populous to vote for Trump in 2016 is important to explore in greater depth.

Interestingly, much of the recent research on the Trump voting group has focused on disproving the popular economic insecurity narrative, originally put forth by news media and political pundits close after the election. In fact, this study supports that narrative, as economic insecurity was a significant predictor of an Obama-to-Trump voting trajectory even while

controlling for other factors. This finding supports the ‘left-behind’ thesis, which is the focus of much of the theory on the economically insecure, Rust Belt voters; this thesis is also the focus of recent ethnographic research in the Deep South (Hochschild 2016). Hochschild’s book considers that many voters, not just some of those in the Rust Belt but also many in the South, found themselves feeling left behind by the economic elites as well as perceiving competition with workers of color in their region. She discusses the perception of threat as one of the most important factors in voting behavior (Hochschild 2016; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2017). Though some of the Obama-Trump voters may not have actually been economically insecure, the perceived threat posed by immigrants and people of color moving to and working in the region may have pushed some of this group to *feel* economically insecure. Perception of insecurity is arguably just as important as any quantifiable measure of financial instability, at least in terms of voting behavior (Inglehart and Norris 2017). This is an important distinction; it poses a limitation for this study, because the income and financial stability questions are self-reported, yet also provides an opportunity for future research into quantifying the perception and reality of the economic insecurity of the white working class in America and how those two sides to the story influence voting trajectory.

Importantly, anti-immigrant sentiment and racial resentment played a role in transforming the feeling of economic insecurity into a perception of reality, and perhaps actual reality, and then further transform that into a vote for Obama and Trump. Though Hochschild’s work does just focus on Trump voters, and truly on Tea Partiers in general, her research translates well to the group of voters who voted Obama-Trump because of their historic flexibility between political parties. The working class was once the cornerstone of the Democratic party, as the party advocated for the people and the white working class felt heard by leaders who promised to advocate for them (Morgan and Lee 2017b). Obama had promised in 2008 and 2012 to lift up the voices of these constituents, but they felt left behind by his administration, instead perceiving the raising of minority voices. Thus, even though some of the specific policy considerations of Trump’s party may have conflicted with the interests of blue

collar, Obama-voting citizens, his prejudices were crucial in their voting trajectory as it stretched into 2016. Instead of promising rights and benefits to all, Trump specifically promised them to the white working-class, paired with overt discriminatory comments against people of color and immigrants, which justified whites' fears and hopes.

To conclude, this study finds that the Obama-to-Trump switchers were primarily influenced by shared sexist, racist, and anti-immigrant viewpoints, as well as a feeling of economic insecurity. They disproportionately identified as Independents, though Democrats and Republicans also each made up about a quarter of the Obama-Trump voters. Further, the Obama-Trump voters were overwhelmingly white. The confluence of race, party identification, and shared prejudices and experiences forms the beginning of explanation for the motivations behind the Obama-to-Trump voting trajectory between 2012 and 2016. The findings of this study hold great consequences for the upcoming 2020 presidential election in the United States. Racially resentful, sexist, and anti-immigrant voters mobilized around a Democrat in 2012 and a Republican in 2016; this group of voters could be influenced to vote for either party in the next election, and their votes will be influential.

In addition to the topics mentioned above, future research can be done on the demographics and class status of Obama-to-Trump switchers, as well as potentially centering on location-based study of the counties and states that went for both Obama and Trump. A place-based focus might allow for a more nuanced study of the economic insecurity narrative, allowing the researcher to move from perceived insecurity to factual insecurity, as well as the racial resentment and anti-immigrant narratives, using demographic mapping. In addition, research might expand the Obama-to-Trump voting trajectory into a larger study of all voting trajectories between 2012 and 2016, including Romney-to-Clinton and non-voting trajectories. A secondary data set with a larger quantity of respondents would be necessary for this study to succeed. To complement a study of Obama voters' latent sexism, studies might create two measures of misogyny, with separate variables for hostile sexism and benevolent sexism to observe whether or not those measures had different effects on Obama-to-Trump voters. Further qualitative

studies to complement this quantitative analysis would also provide increased nuance to this voting trajectory.

**APPENDIX**

**Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables (N=1039)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Percent (N)</b>			
2012-2016 Voting Trajectory				
Obama to Clinton (Reference)	87.1 (905)			
Obama to Trump	12.9 (134)			
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Percent (N)</b>			
Gender				
Male (Reference)	42.2 (438)			
Female	57.8 (601)			
Race				
White Non-Hispanic (Reference)	67.3 (699)			
Black Non-Hispanic	17.3 (180)			
Hispanic	8.8 (91)			
Other Non-Hispanic	6.6 (69)			
Income				
Less than \$25,000 (Reference)	16.4 (170)			
\$25,000 – \$49,999	21.2 (220)			
\$50,000 – \$74,999	20.5 (213)			
\$75,000 – \$124,999	22.9 (238)			
\$125,000 and above	19.1 (198)			
Educational Attainment				
Less than High School or High School	17.6 (183)			
Grad (Reference)				
Some College / Associate Degree	29.6 (308)			
Bachelor's Degree	26.4 (274)			
Graduate Degree	26.4 (274)			
Party Identification				
Democrat (Reference)	68.4 (711)			
Republican	5.2 (54)			
Independent	24.3 (252)			
Other	2.1 (22)			
	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
Age	52.7	15.8	24	90
Economic Insecurity	-.18	.49	-1.58	1.55
Misogyny	-.29	.63	-1.57	2.07
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	-.37	.59	-1.26	1.75
Racial Resentment	-.34	.55	-1.69	1.62
Religiosity	.46	.36	0	1.20
Authoritarianism	-.22	.75	-1.34	.97

**Appendix B: Description of Composite Variable Measures**

*Misogyny* *Cronbach's alpha:* 0.78 *Minimum:* 6

**Variable Description**

'Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat,

neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
'Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
'Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she tries to put him on a tight leash.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve? Always, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time, or never?	
'Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
Do you think it is better, worse, or makes no difference for the family as a whole if the man works outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family?	
When women seek equality these days, how often are they actually seeking special favors? Always, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time, or never?	
How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Women. A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all?	

*Racial Resentment and Attitudes*

*Cronbach's alpha:*  
0.82

*Minimum: 9*

Variable Description	
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing universities to increase the number of black students studying at their schools by considering race along with other factors when choosing students?	
'Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
'Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?	
'Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree	



somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?
'It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this statement?
In general, does the federal government treat whites better than blacks, treat them both the same, or treat blacks better than whites?
Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale? Peaceful: 1, Violent: 7.
Where would you rate Blacks in general on this scale? Hard-working: 1, Lazy: 7.
Where would you rate Hispanic-Americans in general on this scale? Peaceful: 1, Violent: 7.
Where would you rate Hispanic-Americans in general on this scale? Hard-working: 1, Lazy: 7.
How much discrimination is there in the United States today against the following groups? Blacks. A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all?
How much discrimination is there in the United States today against the following groups? Hispanics. A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all?

*Anti-Immigrant Sentiment*

*Cronbach's alpha:*  
0.84

*Minimum: 6*

Variable Description
Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country, or have a guest worker program in order to work, or allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, if they meet, or allow to remain and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship without penalties.
Some people have proposed that the U.S. Constitution should be changed so that the children of unauthorized immigrants do not automatically get citizenship if they are born in this country. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal?
What should happen to immigrants who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children and have lived here for at least 10 years and graduated high school here? Should they be sent back where they came from, or should they be allowed to live and work in the United States?
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose building a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico?
How likely is it that recent immigration levels will

take jobs away from people already here? Extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?
Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement? 'America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants.'
Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement? 'Immigrants increase crime rates in the United States.'
How would you rate: Illegal immigrants.

*Religiosity*

*Cronbach's alpha:*  
0.72

*Minimum: 3*

Variable Description

Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?
If R is Christian: Do you consider yourself to be a born-again Christian, that is, have you personally had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ?
Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; or the Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally; or the Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.
Lots of things come up that keep people from attending religious services even if they want to. Thinking about your life these days, do you ever attend religious services, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, or funerals?
Which of the following terms describe your religious beliefs? Selected evangelical.

*Economic Insecurity*

*Cronbach's alpha:*  
0.69

*Minimum: 7*

Variable Description

We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you/you and your family living here are much better off financially, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off, or much worse off than you were a year ago?
Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you/you and your family living here will be much better off financially, somewhat better off, about the same, somewhat worse off, or much worse off than now?
When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is now easier,

harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?
So far as you and your family are concerned, how worried are you about your current financial situation? Extremely worried, very worried, moderately worried, a little worried, or not at all worried?
During the next 12 months, how likely is it that you will be able to make all of your rent/mortgage payments on time? Extremely likely, very likely, moderately likely, slightly likely, or not likely at all?
During the past 12 months, has anyone in your family or a close personal friend lost a job, or has no one in your family and no close personal friend lost a job in the past 12 months?
How much opportunity is there in America today for the average person to get ahead? A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all?
What do you think about the state of the economy these days in the United States? Would you say the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?
Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?
During the next 12 months, how likely is it that you will be able to pay for all of your health care costs? Extremely likely, very likely, moderately likely, slightly likely, or not likely at all?

*Authoritarian Worldview*

*Cronbach's alpha:*  
0.72

*Minimum: 3*

Variable Description
Which one is more important for a child to have: Curiosity or good manners
Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for elders
Which one is more important for a child to have: Obedience or self-reliance
Which one is more important for a child to have: Being considerate or well behaved

### Appendix C: Pearson's *r* Correlations between Primary Variables

Variable	Obama to Trump	Economic Insecurity	Misogyny	Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	Racial Resentment	Religiosity	Authoritarianism
Obama to Trump	1.0***						
Economic Insecurity	0.3***	1.0***					
Misogyny	0.3***	0.2***	1.0***				

Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	0.5***	0.4***	0.5***	1.0***			
Racial Resentment	0.4***	0.2***	0.5***	0.6***	1.0***		
Religiosity	0.1***	0.1***	0.3***	0.3***	0.2***	1.0***	
Authoritarianism	0.2***	0.2***	0.5***	0.5***	0.3***	0.5***	1.0***

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

**Appendix D: T-Test Comparing Voting Trajectory and Means of Attitudinal Variables**

Variable	Obama-to-Clinton (N=905)	Obama-to-Trump (N=134)	Difference	<i>t</i> -statistic	Cohen's <i>d</i> (corrected for uneven groups)
Economic Insecurity	-.2 (.5)	.2 (.5)	-.4	-8.9***	-.8
Misogyny	-.1 (.6)	.2 (.5)	-.6	-10.2***	-.9
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	-.4 (.5)	.4 (.6)	-.8	-17.5***	-1.6
Racial Resentment	-.4 (.5)	.3 (.5)	-.7	-14.6***	-1.4
Religiosity	.4 (.4)	.6 (.3)	-.1	-4.1***	-.4
Authoritarianism	-.3 (.8)	.2 (.6)	-.4	-6.3***	-.6

Two-tailed test of significance; standard deviations in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$   
Wilcoxon rank sum tests conformed to the results displayed here.

**Appendix E: Cross-Tabulation of Party Identification and Voting Trajectory**

	Obama-to-Clinton		Obama-to-Trump		Totals	
	Column Percent	N	Column Percent	N	Percent	N
<b>Democrat</b>	74.8	677	25.4	34	68.4	711
<b>Republican</b>	2.3	21	24.6	33	5.2	54
<b>Independent</b>	21.0	190	46.3	62	24.3	252
<b>Other</b>	1.9	17	3.7	5	2.1	22
<b>Totals</b>	100.0	905	100.0	134	100.0	1039

$X^2 = 186.1$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Cramer's  $V = 0.42$

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