A Tale of Two Tactics:
Palestinian uses of
violent and nonviolent action
during the intifadas

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As this paper is being finalized, what looks to be a new iteration of the Palestinian

intifada appears to be on the verge in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip. Mass protests are taking place in response to the deaths of well-known

Palestinian prisoners being held in Israeli prisons.[1] Other prisoners are responding to what

they claim is unfair treatment and sentencing, and have gone on hunger strikes, drawing

hundreds of Palestinians to the streets in support.[2] Dozens of protesters have been

arrested as a result, and the Israeli military has attempted to break up the solidarity

marches with rubber bullets and tear gas, as young protesters pelt them with stones.[3] The

scene looks very much like the beginnings of two other intifadas, the first of which ran from

1987 to 1993 and the second from 2000 to 2005. What will be of particular importance as

the days and months unveil what will place, is what kind of uprising the Palestinian

population and leadership choose, if in fact a new intifada commences – which remains to

be seen.

This is of such great import, because the first two intifadas had such radically

different tactics and strategies, with incredibly different results. Most scholars understand

the first intifada to have been a primarily nonviolent effort, waged with the tools of civil

disobedience, such as general strikes, boycotts on Israeli products, and public marches and

protests. In contrast, the second intifada was marked by Palestinian terrorism and

widespread violence, claiming the lives of thousands of Palestinians and hundreds of

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[1] Kareem Khadder, "Palestinian prisoner's death sparks protests in Israel, West Bank," *CNN.com,* 3 April 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/02/world/meast/palestinian-prisoner-cancer-death.
[2] Ali Sawafta and Noah Browning, "Israel seeks to end Palestinian prisoner's hunger strike," *Reuters.com*, 17 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/17/us-israel-palestinians-prisoner-idUSBRE93G0C820130417.
[3] Khadder, "Palestinian prisoner's death…"

Israelis.[4] Each of these produced different results for the Palestinian struggle towards

freedom from Israeli military occupation. This paper will show that the results produced by

Palestinian nonviolent tactics are more productive towards long-term goals and strategies

than violent tactics. By proving this, it will become apparent that for a third Palestinian

intifada to be deemed successful, it would be in the Palestinian's best interest to adopt a

model of nonviolent resistance.

Clarification of Terms

In order to make sense of the evidence gathered here, it is necessary to have a

working definition of the term "nonviolent resistance." This conjures up different

connotations for different people, and as such, must be properly defined before moving

ahead. One of the most well known advocates of, and prolific writers on, nonviolent

resistance is Gene Sharp. He understands nonviolent action, or struggle, to be a mass

movement of noncooperation to "disrupt the operation of the established system."[5] Sharp

makes a clear distinction between the moral and ethical decision for nonviolence and the

pragmatic, tactical choice of nonviolent techniques. For him, other terminologies confuse

the action of nonviolence with the motivations for such actions. In order to make the

actions and techniques that he describes universally applicable, he finds it necessary to

make clear distinctions between the pragmatic and moral applications of nonviolent action.

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[4] "Intifada toll 2000-2005," *BBC News*, 8 February 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 3694350.
[5] Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*
(Boston: Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 19.

While Sharp prefers the term "nonviolent action, or struggle," recent scholarship by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan does use the term "nonviolent resistance," as they understand that "the term *resistance* implies that the campaigns of interest are noninstitutional (sic) and generally confrontational in nature."[6] They view nonviolent resistance as the counterpart to violent resistance by non-state actors, such as guerrilla groups and private militias. For them, both forms of resistance happen outside of typical institutional structures such as political lobbying and voting.

In line with Sharp's distinction between practical and moral nonviolent action, Mary Elizabeth King writes that, "The behavior of participants defines nonviolent action, not their convictions or adherence to a creed."[7] She goes on to give a practical definition of what the "nonviolent" aspect actually entails:

> Nonviolent action does not entail or condone violence against persons or the threat of physical assault. Rather, it implies an active response in which the taking of action is not violent…nonviolent struggle employs strategies for applying sanctions to bring about results; it does not seek to accomplish its goals through physical harm, injury, killing, or bloodshed.[8]

Her definition follows Sharp's, who understands violence to be, "Physical violence against other human beings that results in injury or death, or threatens to cause injury or death, or any act dependent on such infliction or threat."[9]

As such, the terms that will be used in this paper will follow these definitions. Violence will be equated with the threat or actual harm of human beings. Nonviolent action,

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[6] Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 12.
[7] Mary Elizabeth King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), viii.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Sharp, 552.

resistance, and struggle will be used interchangeably to mark the use of tools of resistance that do not include the threat to human life, and which are outside the typical structures of human political interaction such as votes or political negotiations. This is not to say that political goals cannot be included within larger aims of a population, but that the tools used to get to such goals are outside of the standard political realm.

Another term that must be defined is "success," and with that, "failure." If the claim here is that the first intifada was more successful than the second intifada because of the types of actions used, then there must be a working understanding of what a success would entail. Sharp defines success and failure within the context of what the goals of such actions were. For him, failure is, "The situation in a nonviolent struggle when the conflict has ended without achieving the resisters' objectives,"[10] and success is, "The achievement by a party to a conflict of its substantive objectives."[11] Chenoweth and Stephan take a similar tack, as their research focuses on the specific goals of resistance movements, such as "regime change, the expulsion of foreign occupiers, or secession."[12] For the purposes of this paper, it will be understood that the aim of both of the intifadas was the expulsion of the Israeli occupying forces from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the levels to which this goal was met during each of the intifadas will determine success and failure.

Historic Tactics of Palestinians

It is important to understand that historically Palestinians have been just as apt to adopt nonviolent tactics as violent ones. There tends to be a myth within modern society

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[10] Ibid, 545.
[11] Ibid, 552.
[12] Chenoweth and Stephan, 17.

that Palestinian resistance to Zionism has always been of a violent nature, but that is just not the case. While a full history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not possible for this paper, what is possible is a brief look at the history of the conflict through the lens of various forms of resistance used by the Arab population when faced with the growing Zionist movement.

Before the first waves of Jewish immigrants arrived from Europe in the late 1800s, life in Palestine was relatively normalized under Ottoman control. The Arab population, of which there were Muslims, Christians, and Jews, dealt with the presence of Ottoman soldiers and European traders. Agriculture and family life were central to the Palestinian way of being, and clan leaders and Ottoman authorities dominated their social and political lives.[13] This agrarian lifestyle was at the center of the first dispute between Arab peasants and Jewish settlers, over a disagreement about the sale of a piece of land in Petah Tiqvah in 1886.[14] The Arab farmers believed that their farmland, which they farmed as tenants, had been unfairly sold to Jewish settlers. The Arabs attacked the settlers and one Jew was killed and several others injured.[15]

During the early 1900s, there was a great deal of communication amongst the Palestinian population about the rising Jewish population and what it meant for the Arabs who lived in the land. Historian Khalid Rashidi notes that in a study of the dialogue around this subject in Arab newspapers between 1908 and 1914, "In no article among the more than 650 examined for this analysis of the press and Zionism was there a call for armed

[13] Ilan Pappe, *A History of Modern Palestine: Second Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2006), 14.
[14] King, 25.
[15] Khalid Rashidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 99.

resistance to the colonizers, although…in a few areas the peasants had already spontaneously engaged in such resistance."[16] While this does not take into account public speeches or the like, it is significant that at the beginning of the burgeoning Zionist movement, the Palestinian rhetoric towards the newcomers was at least focused on nonviolent ways of dealing with the situation. This seemed to change when it became more apparent that the Zionist organizations had more in mind than just a small group of immigrants.

 As the numbers of Jews in Palestine began to grow, and the Ottoman Empire was dismantled at the end of World War I, Britain and France took control of the vast majority of the Ottoman lands and partitioned it up into mandate areas. The newly formed League of Nations gave authority over the lands of Palestine to the British, in what is known as the British Mandate for Palestine. Mandatory areas were to be slowly developed into modern nation states, within the national interests and self-determination of the native population, and then given their freedom. However, in what is known as the Balfour Declaration, the British government declared its intention to support the building of a Jewish home in the land of Palestine, with the distinction that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."[17] Mass protests formed in response to the letter, even before it was formally published, including six Palestinian congresses between 1919 and 1923 that were convened to oppose the idea of a Zionist state being established in Mandatory Palestine.[18] During that time though, there

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[16] Ibid, 141.
[17] James L. Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81.
[18] King, 30.

were nonviolent events that became violent. One such occasion came in the days leading up to the week of Easter in 1920. Hundreds of Palestinians gathered in protests against the Balfour Declaration on February 27, 1920, in what was a peaceful demonstration. A little more than a week later, on March 8, another demonstration took place, "this time with speeches of a 'violently political character,' and stones were thrown."[19] When Easter Week had passed, "such modest protests boiled over into a violent clash between Arabs and Jews in which nine persons were killed.[20]

In the wake of the Second World War and the disaster of the Holocaust, the United Nations, having taken over the Palestine issue from the war torn Brits, proposed a partition plan that would separate Palestine into two states, one for the Jews and one for the Arab population. The plan would have given 56.47% the land to the Jews, who were at that time a significant minority of the population of the area, consisting of only 32.95% of the population.[21] The Arab leadership rejected this plan as unequivocally unfair. Seeing an opportunity, the Jewish population embarked on a war of independence and the State of Israel was born in May 1948. They took control of most of Mandate Palestine, with the exception of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in an event the Arabs call *al-Nakba*, or "the catastrophe." 700,000 Arabs fled their homes and became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries, while thousands were killed and Palestinian villages were destroyed.[22] Another

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[19] Ibid, with quotation from Palin Report, or the Report of the Court of Inquiry convened by order of H. E. the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, Dated the 12th Day of April 1920, Foreign Office (FO) 371/5121/E120/6.31, July 1, 1920, 56, 57.
[20] Ibid, 30.
[21] "UN Partition Plan," *BBCNews.com*, 29 November 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681322.stm.
[22] Pappe, 128-38.

significant effect of the establishment of the Israeli state was the division that occurred

within the Palestinian community, as those who were not forced from their homes during

the Nakba and resided within the newly established state, were placed under Israeli

military rule,[23] while those who lived in the area of the West Bank became Jordanian

citizens and those in Gaza were under Egyptian rule. This effectively created three

significantly different groupings of Palestinians, which has continued to make political and

social organization one of the main problems in the contemporary situation.

After the devastation to Palestinian society following the Nakba, groups of

frustrated youth began to rise up from the refugee camps in movements of violence and

guerrilla warfare against the Israeli outsiders.[24] One of the most famous and influential of

these groups that emerged during that time was *FATAH*, an acronym from the Arabic

letters of "the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine."[25] This nationalist group was

founded by Yasser Arafat in the 1950s, "with the help of close friends he had made in

Egypt" while studying at King Fuad University.[26] Arafat and his compatriots believed that

they would be responsible for freeing their land from the Zionist forces, which they felt had

occupied Palestine illegitimately. This attitude was embodied in "mini sabotage attacks" on

Israel, as they were convinced that liberation would come only through armed struggle.[27]

Wars were fought between the Israeli state and its Arab neighbors after its

founding, but none like the 1967 war, or Six-Day War. During this incredibly short conflict,

Israel militarily occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel took control of economic

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[23] Ibid, 154.
[24] Ibid, 147.
[25] Ibid, 148.
[26] Gelvin, 199 and 203.
[27] Pappe, 148.

and political decisions for these regions, exacerbating Palestinian negativity towards the

Jewish state. In response, the United Nations issued Resolution 242, which declared that

national territory could not be gained through war and that Israel must withdraw its forces

from those areas.[28] A withdrawal did not happen, however, and Palestinian outrage at the

situation took various forms. There were mass protests and general strikes called in the

wake of the 1967 occupation, such as "teacher's association strikes to contest Israeli-

imposed curriculum changes," and "public demonstrations protested the demolition of

homes in Hebron and Nablus."[29] Palestinians also took up arms during this time, with

Arafat's Fatah coming into prominence after a successful attack and victory over a large

Israeli contingent near the Palestinian refugee camp of Karameh in the Jordan Valley.[30]

From the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, the Israeli government

adopted a harsh policy of repression towards anything they considered to be a move of

resistance against the occupation. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe notes:

> Any show of opposition to the occupation, such as a rally, a strike,
> distribution of petitions or the waving of the Palestinian flag, was met with
> severe brutality. The Israeli campaign against political activity began in July
> 1967 with the expulsion from East Jerusalem [which was also captured
> during the Six-Day War] of four notables who called on the population to
> adopt Mahatma Gandhi's tactic of civil disobedience.[31]

Even harsher techniques were used against Palestinian armed resistance, as half the West

Bank town of Qalqilya's homes were destroyed in 1967 after the Israeli minister of defense

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[28] "Resolution 242," *UN.org*, 22 November 1967, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement.
[29] King, 67.
[30] Pappe, 191.
[31] Ibid, 195.

was told of an armed resistance movement coming from that village.[32] At this time, "Israel forbade avowedly political activities by Palestinian organizations. Officials dismantled the guerrilla organizations and disarmed the populace."[33]

It has become clear that from the earliest interactions between these two peoples, Palestinians have used violent and nonviolent forms of resistance. In light of harsh repression of resistance by the Israeli government, tactics of both sorts have been used to advance goals of liberation from Israeli rule and there have been phases of nonviolent and violent action. Because Israel has put down both nonviolent and violent actions, it is understandable why both have been continuously used. However, it is within the context of the two intifadas, which are the largest and longest movements against the Israeli occupation, that differences in outcomes between violent and nonviolent techniques can be analyzed.

Violent and Nonviolent Prototypes

Within Palestinian society there have been two groups that have effectively embodied the distinctions between violent and nonviolent action. Fatah, Yasser Arafat's political and military organization, was founded on the principle of armed struggle against the Zionist movement. The Awad family of the Bethlehem area has served as a model of nonviolent action, through Mubarak Awad's Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence (PCSN), which functioned during the first intifada, and his nephew Sami Awad's group the Holy Land Trust (HLT), which was created just prior to the second. By

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[32] Ibid.
[33] King, 66.

using these two groups as microcosms of the violent and nonviolent action groups, it will

be possible to analyze certain reasons for the development of a primarily nonviolent first

intifada and a primarily violent second intifada. It will also be possible to see how various

tactics were used at certain times with specific goals in mind.

Fatah

First, the violent strategy of Fatah will be looked at. The initial constitution of the

Fatah movement, drafted in 1964, makes clear that violent resistance was the foundation

for the organization. Its first stated principle starts with the phrase, "The armed struggle

we are waging," clearly assuming by its wording that the movement was one of armed

resistance.[34] Article 17 of the Constitution, under the subheading of "Methods," states,

"Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine."[35] The

Constitution goes on to reiterate its position and clarify that violent resistance is not just a

part of the movement, but the means by which the movement was defined, by stating in

Article 19, "Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's

armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist

existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and

Palestine is completely liberated."[36]

Fatah gained power and legitimacy in Palestinian society and went on to become

one of the major players in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the political

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[34] "The Fatah Constitution (1964)," *Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information,* accessed 11 March 2013, www.ipcri.org/files/fatah1964.html.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

organization that would serve as a functioning state entity on which the Palestinians formed their governmental structures. Fatah's leader Arafat served as chairman of the PLO from 1969 till his death in 2004.[37] By being drawn into the core of Palestinian politics, Fatah's reliance on armed struggle was institutionalized into Palestinian policies.

Violence against Israeli structures and institutions was understood as legitimate self-defense against the occupying force. Zionism was seen as a form of Western colonialism, and Fatah and the PLO saw themselves as freedom fighters against an imperialist force. As such, one the stated goals of Fatah was the "[c]omplete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence."[38] While this position would be challenged and critiqued by many outside forces in the coming decades, Fatah constructed its nationalist position on the establishment of a Palestinian nation-state in all of mandatory Palestine, as it understood the Palestinian people to be the rightful inhabitants of the land.[39] This stated goal complicates the perceived goals of the intifadas as solely focused on ending only the Israeli occupation. It might be understood that Fatah believed that an end to the occupation would be the only first step towards liberating the whole of mandatory Palestine from Israeli control. With that in mind, it is seen that Fatah's inclination to violence was the foundation of the movement from the beginning and later acts and policies must be interpreted and understood with that backdrop.

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[37] Gelvin, 199.
[38] "The Fatah Constitution," Article 12.
[39] Ibid, Articles 13 and 2.

The Awad Family

In contrast to the foundation of Fatah in armed struggle, the Awad family heritage

started a movement based on nonviolent action. In the fall of 1983, four years before the

start of the intifada, an American-educated Palestinian named Mubarak Awad started

conducting training sessions in Arab East Jerusalem focused on teaching Palestinians about

nonviolent techniques, with the first session billed with the topic, "How to Get Your Rights

without a Single Bullet."[40] Reactions to these sessions were mixed, with some rejecting

Awad as "another one of those American Palestinians with their imported ideas."[41] Awad's

nephew, Sami Awad, recalls that at that time his uncle was seen as an outsider, and not as a

member of the political institutions.[42] Awad had to work hard to gain the trust and respect

of his community, eventually publishing a kind of manifesto heralding the benefits of

nonviolence for the Palestinians' struggle against the Israeli military occupation. This work,

entitled "Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," was published

first as a booklet that was distributed by Awad's organization, the Palestinian Centre for

the Study of Nonviolence,[43] and then formally published in the Journal of Palestine Studies

in 1984.[44]

Outlining the ways in which nonviolent resistance would benefit and serve

Palestinians' purposes, this work highlighted the reasons that armed struggle was not

[40] Mubarak Awad, interview, as quoted in King, 132.
[41] David Richardson, "Confrontation Quest," *Jerusalem Post*, 25 November 1983, as quoted in King, 132.
[42] Sami Awad, interview with the author, 6 March 2013.
[43] Mubarak Awad and Jonathan Kuttab, "Palestinian Resistance and Nonviolent Ways," program for workshops (East Jerusalem, October 13-15, 1983), as quoted in King, appendix 2, 350.
[44] Mubarak Awad, "Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 4 (Summer 1984): 22-36.

possible or beneficial for Palestinians at that time. Awad noted that the Palestinians were an unarmed people, without the proper training or equipment necessary to undertake an armed struggle. He goes on to mention that the Palestinian leadership was removed from the regular citizens, making it difficult for them to authentically represent their needs or bring about real change.[45] As a consequence of these and other factors, Awad argued that it would be a better option for the struggle against Israeli occupation for Palestinians to fight with nonviolent weapons. He noted the difficulties involved in nonviolent struggle, saying, "non-violent struggle is a total and serious struggle, nothing short of a real war. There is no assurance that the enemy will be non-violent. On the contrary, there are great sacrifices we should expect in the non-violent struggle."[46] By addressing the fact that nonviolence was not an easier option than armed struggle, Awad presented his ideas in a way that aligned nonviolent struggle with strength and discipline, which made it more palatable to the Palestinian public. Instead of being seen as a weak position, he made it clear that nonviolence was an active movement, by saying:

> Non-violent struggle is not negative or passive. It is an active, affirmative operation, a form of mobile warfare. It will require the enlistment of all resources and capabilities. It requires special training and a high degree of organization and discipline. Secrecy must be maintained in planning, organizing, and coordinating the different operations and campaigns. Most non-violent activities will be illegal according to the laws and military orders presently imposed on the population.[47]

By framing nonviolence in a way that allowed for the empowerment of the community and making clear that nonviolence was not just a moral decision, but a pragmatic one, Awad

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[45] M. Awad, "Non-Violent Resistance," 23. The leadership of the PLO and Fatah were exiled at this point in Tunis, making true representation difficult.
[46] Ibid, 25.
[47] Ibid.

contextualized nonviolence in a way that made it possible for more Palestinians to understand the concept and adopt it as a tool.

Although he believed that nonviolence was a more effective way of advancing the cause of the Palestinian movement, some of the language he used in his manifesto was open to the possibility of future, armed struggle. He says:

> For the Palestinians who are living in the West Bank and Gaza during this period, the most effective strategy is one of non-violence. This does not determine the methods open to Palestinians on the outside; nor does it constitute a rejection of the concept of armed struggle. It does not rule out the possibility that the struggle on the inside may turn into an armed struggle at a later stage.[48]

This stance was problematic for Awad, as it allowed some Israelis to interpret his work as being only a precursor to armed struggle.[49] Awad's nephew Sami understands this language to have been a strategic choice for his uncle at the time, as he was seen as an outsider and had to use language that would "connect him with the rest of the Palestinians and the emotion that was at that time and the struggle that was taking place."[50] Whether the use of that language was necessary or not cannot be known, but the Israeli skepticism of such language and the reaction that it caused in the international media was tangible. Letters to various editors were written by concerned American Jews, including one to the *New York Times*, claiming that Mr. Awad, "legitimates Palestinian violence and radicalism," while citing the previously mentioned paragraph from Awad's work.[51] These works, and the perceptions within them, undermined the influence of Awad's work in the international

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[48] Ibid, 24.
[49] King, 139.
[50] S. Awad, interview.
[51] Phil Baum and Raphael Danziger, "The Limits of Mubarak Awad's Moderation," *New York Times*, 18 May 1988.

scene.[52] In spite of that, Awad's theories had a profound impact.

Beginnings of Strategic Compromise

Awad's work also had a hard time gaining traction in the Palestinian community. While initially dismissed by Palestinian political leadership, Awad's ideas began to spread, as copies of his booklets were distributed and passed around in the West Bank. Along with Awad's original work, pieces of Gene Sharp's nonviolent theories were translated into Arabic and distributed, with some estimates saying that 4,000 to 7,000 copies were in circulation.[53] He was able to gain real support and legitimacy as his organization began to see victories as a result of direct action campaigns against the occupation. The first of these wins took place in 1986, in the village of Tqu (Tekoa), as an elderly man from the town came to Awad asking for *la-unf* (no violence)[54] to combat the loss of land that had been seized by Israeli settlers. Awad and the man organized a group of over three hundred people to disassemble the fence that had been put around the seized land. Facing live ammunition from the settlers that wounded seven youths, the villagers continued nonviolently tearing down the fence, without seeking violent retribution. A military governor arrived and agreed to the removal of the stakes and set up a meeting for two days later. The settlers ultimately removed the fence on their own, and the villagers re-appropriated their land and planted olive tree seedlings on it. As the first time that Palestinians had successfully recovered land that had been seized, Awad's techniques and

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[52] King, 139.
[53] Ibid, 137.
[54] This is the term that Awad's organization had adopted to describe nonviolent resistance in the Arabic language. King, 144.

methods gained attention and legitimacy in the eyes of the people.[55]

Even before Awad's organizing and educating Palestinians on nonviolent techniques, some of Fatah's members started seeing the benefits of mobilizing mass amounts of people in protest of policies and situations. As the organization was drawn into the political realm, Fatah's leaders began to realize that "focusing solely on military activities could cause it to lose politically."[56] It started to focus on organizing within communities, by "establishing new entities and reinvigorating existing ones."[57] It even forbade the use of arms in certain contexts. In October of 1983, Fatah issued a call for the Palestinian refugees in the al-Baddawi camp in Lebanon to rise up in "unarmed participation in the popular demonstration that will commence tomorrow after the Friday prayers from the yard of the big mosque in the camp."[58] According to a radio report about the call, the demonstration was organized to show support for the leadership of the PLO during a situation in which Syrian propaganda was being used to try to split the leadership of the PLO.[59] It went on to say: "the Al-Baddawi branch of the Fatah movement has urged that no armed men appear in the demonstration to preserve the security of the masses and the safety of the goal."[60]

It is possible to see how the framework for a primarily nonviolent struggle was being laid in the few years before the first intifada broke out. What is surprising is the way

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[55] Story adapted and condensed from the full story as told by King, 146-8.
[56] King, 77.
[57] Ibid.
[58] "Fatah Calls for Al-Baddawi Unarmed Demonstration," *North Lebanon Voice of Palestine in Arabic*, 20 October 1983, printed in Foreign Broadcast Information Services (Middle East and Africa), 21 October 1983, A6.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.

in which Fatah was experimenting with nonviolent action as a legitimate tool in certain

contexts, in spite of their stated commitment to armed resistance as the only way to

liberate Palestine. This helps to explain how the leadership of Fatah (and by extension, the

PLO) could promote nonviolent techniques in order to achieve their goals during the first

intifada. As a pragmatic choice, however, it begins to show the possibility for fracture

within core leadership of the intifada over what techniques and tactics would be the most

beneficial for gaining Palestinian objectives. It is this fracture that will prove to be the

disintegration of the first intifada.

The First Intifada

Background

      "An entire community, rising up in unity…to end the occupation, which this

community was suffering under."[61] This is how one Palestinian remembers the beginning

of the movement that would come to be known as the intifada. Daoud Kuttab, a Palestinian

journalist, said that the feeling in the Occupied Territories prior to the start of the uprising

"was a mix of frustration of the fact that the occupation has gone on for so long, anger that

the settlers were digging in more and more into Palestinian territory, and a feeling of the

need to do something about our situation by ourselves because the rest of the world was

basically silent and unable to do anything."[62] It was certainly a time when mass frustration

was palpably felt in the Territories. Historian James Gelvin describes the situation by

saying:

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[61] S. Awad, interview.
[62] Daoud Kuttab, interview with the author, 2 March 2013.

> By 1987, there was no aspect of life in the occupied territories, no sector of the Palestinian economy, no part of the Palestinian landscape that had remained untouched by the occupation. Over the course of twenty years, the Israelis had buried the Palestinian population beneath a mound of regulations that not only were irksome but intruded into all aspects of life in the territories, from land use to employment to travel.[63]

As Palestinians were so restricted from expressing cultural and societal freedom, the ways that they protested during the first intifada were incredibly rich with cultural meaning and significance. Kuttab noted that the intifada produced great joy and pride in Palestinian society, which he saw as an effort for Palestinians to pull themselves up by their bootstraps.[64] Sami Awad echoed this sentiment; "The way it started was the Palestinian community made a decision on their own…I link it with the word empowerment. Until that point, the Palestinians were dependent on and waiting for the Palestinians who were living outside to come and do the liberation work."[65]

What is seen as the immediate impetus for the intifada occurred on December 8, 1987, when four Palestinian workers were killed when an Israeli military vehicle struck their two cars as they were crossing from Israel into the Gaza Strip after a day of laboring.[66] After this collective tragedy, four thousand mourners showed up at the funeral for three of the dead. The energy and angst of that crowd turned into mass demonstrations in Gaza, as barricades of burning tires were erected and youth threw stones at the Israeli troops that came to dispel the crowds. [67] Within days the crowds grew into the tens of thousands all over the West Bank and Gaza. Leaders began to see the possibilities for change that the

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[63] Gelvin, 215.
[64] Kuttab, interview.
[65] S. Awad, interview.
[66] King 5.
[67] Ibid, 203.

mass protests held, and started organizing and focusing "the energies of the populace."[68]

Organization

It was not long before it became clear that this movement was not going away soon. For the first few weeks the burden of organization and communication was placed on local committees that had been in place since the 1970s, mobilizing grassroots participation and support for intifada participants.[69] The successes of these small groups initiated the organizing of a larger coalition that would be responsible for sustaining the movement as it moved forward. Chenoweth and Stephan note, "Within a month after the launch of the intifada the clandestine branches of the PLO's four main factions inside the occupied territories came together and formed the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU)."[70] This group was responsible for " 'supervis(ing) donations and distributions,' (and) not only to formulate strategy, but to manage the situation so that no outside force could take control."[71] Much has been written about the organization of the Command (as it is also referred to), but for the purposes of this paper it is enough to know that this group was the organizational head of the intifada. This group always included a member of Fatah, which is significant when looking at the types of actions for which the Command called.

The most visible action of the UNLU was the issuing of regular pamphlets that organized and standardized the protests. One Palestinian remarked, "the leaflets were followed word for word by everyone in the West Bank and Gaza – they were like a sacred

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[68] Ibid, 205.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Chenoweth and Stephan, 125.
[71] King, 205, with partial quote from Daoud Kuttab."

text."[72] Sami Awad was a teenager at the time and remembers:

> It was an organized…itinerary of events and activities that the Palestinian community was asked to do by the Unified Leadership. And the beautiful thing is that people were committed. I mean we would wait for these leaflets to come every week, or whenever they came, and just to see, okay, what are the activities we're going to do this week.[73]

He described the various directions that were given to the people, such as making loud noise on rooftops with pots and pans at a certain time of a certain day, or refusing to change their clocks when the Israelis did, and being on their own time, just an hour difference, for a whole week. In an interview, Daoud Kuttab said, "it was a source of pride and joy that people were able to organize in a secret way, even though they were under occupation, and use the simple tools of…reflecting on the aspirations of people through simple leaflets that people took in a very disciplined way and followed its commands."[74] These leaflets were the most effective form of communication during the early days of the intifada, and form much of the evidence for what was said by leaders throughout the movement.

Also crafted in the early days of the uprising were documents that outlined the goals and tactics of the movement. These were primarily written by the prominent Palestinian thinker Sari Nusseibeh, who obtained his doctorate in philosophy from Harvard. One of the main theoretical and practical documents is referred to as the "Jerusalem Paper," which outlined the objectives of the intifada. "Ending the occupation necessitates [our] national will to break off all of the relationship's ties to the occupation system, whose existence

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[72] Ahmad Hanoun, ex-political prisoner form Balata Camp, Nablus, interview by Maria Stephan, Ramallah, September 4, 2004. As quoted in Chenoweth and Stephan, 125.
[73] S. Awad, interview.
[74] Kuttab, interview.

depends on our tacit consent, so that nothing remains of the occupation except the part only relying on coercion and violence by the other side."[75] This statement of objective was followed by a detailed list of the nonviolent tactics that would be undertaken to achieve their goal: "Continuing demonstrations…Boycotting bureaus which connect authorities with the Palestinian people…Refusing to comply with house-arrest orders."[76] Taken in conjunction with the tactics outlined in the leaflets distributed by the UNLU, it is apparent that the foundation of the intifada was one based on a strategy of nonviolent action.

While the UNLU was unified in its strategy of nonviolent action at the outset of the intifada, it is clear that this quickly disintegrated. The younger Awad understands this slow process of disunity to be a result of the removal of the first line of UNLU leadership: "The challenge was when that first level was either arrested, detained, or deported, including people like my uncle, then you had a second level that came that was, in my opinion…not as committed to the vision that the first level had or were not as experienced in non-violence or understanding."[77] This helps to explain the discrepancies that were seen in the leaflets as early as March of 1988. King says that, "Fissures began to show on the question of arms, during a period said by human rights monitoring groups to have been characterized by a particularly brutal response from the occupying forces."[78] She mentions that among the leaflets, "Disagreements about strategies and methods are frequent. Not only do the leaflets' calls appear in various permutations…but paragraphs coexist in the same leaflet calling for knives or Molotov cocktails alongside others calling explicitly for nonviolent

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[75] Sari Nusseibeh, tr. Comm.. Mohssen Esseesy. As quoted in King, appendix 5, 355.
[76] Ibid.
[77] S. Awad, interview.
[78] King, footnote 56, 412.

means."[79] Some intifada participants are recorded as telling interviewers "that they considered nonviolent means to have led to their greatest successes, and they expressed unwillingness to abandon nonviolent methods as the directive recommended."[80]

Early Success

Even with the lack of unity moving into the future, it was becoming clear that Palestinian tactics of nonviolent action were an effective strategic choice. The use of nonviolent techniques confused and disrupted the status quo of the Israeli occupation. International Relations expert Ruth Margolies Beitler notes, "The Palestinians were cautious not to resort to firearms for they understood their limitations and recognized clearly the boundaries of their adversary."[81] She goes on to quote a news article from the *Jerusalem Post* from early 1988: "The PLO chiefs know that Israel could handle such a revolt efficiently since the IDF is trained to fight armed soldiers and not unarmed civilians. The fact that IDF soldiers have had to face old women and children had caused immense embarrassment to the Israelis and damaged their image abroad."[82] An earlier article from the same Israeli newspaper talked about the army encountering a different Palestinian than they had ever before:

> The Palestinians we are now fighting are not the same as the Palestinians we met 20 years ago. They have not been cowered by two decades as refugees under Egyptian and Jordanian rule, or humiliated by the defeat inflicted on the combined Arab armies by Israel in 1967…They are a different "enemy" from the clearly defined terrorist of 20 years ago, who hurled grenades at

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[79] Ibid, 210.
[80] Chenoweth and Stephan, 126.
[81] Ruth Margolies Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 97.
[82] *Jerusalem Post*, 26 February 1988, as quoted in Beitler, 97.

passing cars…Today's "enemy" has used no weapon more sophisticated than a Molotov cocktail. Their fury has not been directed against Israeli civilian populations.[83]

The IDF was facing a strange new iteration of a Palestinian freedom fighter. The challenges of controlling and subduing a demonstration of women, children and seniors were different than those 20-year-old soldiers were prepared for.

As the Israeli army was faced with a new kind of enemy, the reaction among the international community was increasing positive toward the Palestinian cause. Kuttab remarked that he believed they were not sure what to do with the kinds of things they were seeing in the intifada. "It threw off a lot of the…stereotypes that they had about Palestinians wanting to destroy Israel, because the intifada was very clear about being against the occupation and not against Israel…I think it did shock them in a positive way."[84] Sami Awad believed that the nonviolent action of the Palestinians made it possible for Israeli citizens to sympathize with the protestors and made a way for the Israeli peace movement to begin. "In my opinion, the biggest trigger for the Israeli peace movement to arise at that time was the nonviolence of the first intifada and how the Israeli government and military were reacting to Palestinians."[85] These positive sympathies within the Israeli and international community were vastly important as the Palestinian community was working towards the overthrow of their occupiers. They understood that only with international support would they be able to create the context where an independent Palestinian state was to be formed.

The successes were seen in a tangible, political way as soon as the winter of 1988,

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[83] Hirsch Goodman, "Army Meets a New Palestinian," *Jerusalem Post,* 15 January 1988.
[84] Kuttab, interview.
[85] S. Awad, interview.

when the leadership of the Palestine National Council convened in Algiers and Arafat, "read

a Palestinian declaration of independence. Within three weeks more than fifty countries

had recognized Palestinian independence."[86] This had the effect of Arafat making an

appearance at a session of the General Assembly of the UN to recognize Israel's right to

exist and endorse a two-state solution.[87] The early successes of the intifada through

nonviolent means were enough to change the foundational beliefs of Fatah, which required

the destruction of Israel.

Disintegration and Final Successes

As mentioned earlier, Palestinian unity was a key factor to the successes described

above. The mass of the Palestinian population was functioning as a unified whole, and, as

such, was able to leverage international support for their movement towards liberation.

The UNLU began to face more and more challenges presenting a clear, collective voice as

the years went on however. Communiqués became more divided in nature, and various

factions began publishing and distributing their own leaflets.[88] Arguments were held about

whether or not stone throwing was compatible with nonviolent action.[89] As time went on,

violent tactics became more a part of the intifada, therefore creating a less participatory

movement.[90] Sami Awad understood the second, more violent phase of the intifada to be a

result of the rhetorical changes happening in the leaflets. He describes an environment

where disciplined nonviolent action was difficult as Palestinian losses became more

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[86] Chenoweth and Stephan, 132.
[87] Ibid.
[88] King, 210.
[89] King, 257.
[90] Chenoweth and Stephan, 134.

intense. "The rhetoric…became very violent towards Israelis because now it was just

rhetoric – not just about resistance, but also a rhetorical revenge and retaliation for what

happened to us, because till that point many Palestinians were killed."[91] Diplomacy was

stalling as a result of the international community being focused on the Gulf War. In

addition, intra-Palestinian violence was becoming more prevalent, with the routine killing

of those seen as collaborating with Israel, and factional debates taking the spotlight.[92]

Violence towards the occupied forces remained relatively low, however, through the

end of the intifada in the early '90s. Chenoweth and Stephan record the number of shooting

incidents in comparison with the number of unarmed protest incidents for each year of the

intifada. While the violent incidents did increase in sheer number as well as proportionally

each year, the percentage only changed from .16% in 1988 to 1.36% in 1992.[93] Therefore,

even in its most violent iteration, the first intifada was nonviolent almost 99% of the time.

The intifada came to a close when exiled PLO officials, who had not been involved in

the organization of the intifada, made secret negotiations with the Israelis in a set of

agreements in 1993 known as the Oslo Accords.[94] The Accords made arrangements for the

phased transfer of power over the Occupied Territories from Israeli control to the

administration of the Palestinian Authority, which was "dominated by PLO leadership from

Tunis."[95] The Oslo years will be discussed shortly, but it is important to note that the

intifada's objectives were partially addressed in the Oslo Accords. While the leadership that

was put in place after the Accords were signed was made up of those who had not led the

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[91] S. Awad, interview.
[92] Chenoweth and Stephan, 134.
[93] Ibid, Table 5.1, 120.
[94] Ibid, 136.
[95] Ibid.

intifada movement, the intifada had succeeded in creating an environment where Palestinians were given an international platform from which to negotiate a peace settlement. Whether the settlement that was agreed upon or not was a success is another matter, but the first intifada did succeed in getting Palestinian society to that place of international support for a solution.

Between the Intifadas

Sami Awad's organization, the Holy Land Trust, started right before the second intifada, as the Oslo process was showing signs of failure. He said, "A group of us were feeling and sensing that the peace process was going to collapse. It was doomed to failure. It was not achieving any results for the Palestinian community, for the Israeli community, or for the peace between the two communities."[96] The agreements were very difficult to implement because the vague wording used created a way for each party to interpret everything quite differently.[97] In addition to this, Palestinians and some scholars believed that the Accords and their addendums "perpetuated Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians."[98] Awad put it this way, "The peace process was just about politicians who were negotiating between them; and politicians sometimes have different agendas than the interests of the people."[99]

As the Palestinian Authority was not meeting the needs of the people, other groups came into power that were more egalitarian and grassroots oriented than the authoritarian

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[96] S. Awad, interview.
[97] Beitler, 137.
[98] Ibid.
[99] S. Awad, interview.

PLO. Surprising to many, these groups were based in Islamic thinking and included the

Muslim Brotherhood group in Gaza known as Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad. These groups

provided a number of welfare programs for the community that were reminiscent of the

community groups that marked the first intifada. In order to combat the political power

that Hamas was gaining, the PLO and the PA centralized power and shut down a number of

the grassroots organizations that made the first intifada successful, as they saw them as a

challenge to their claims of sole leadership over the Palestinian areas.[100]

Economic decline took place after the signing of the Accords. Whereas borders had

once been open for trade and personal movement, "frequent boundary closures led to

declining standards of living in the West Bank and Gaza and rising poverty."[101] In addition,

Palestinian land continued to be appropriated by the Israeli government as settlement

building was not only not stopped, but also expanded, during the Oslo years. The Oslo

procedure was supposed to include a gradual, but quick release of the Occupied Territories

into full Palestinian control, but by the year 2000 only 18 percent of the West Bank was

under the sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority.[102] The failure of the Oslo Accord to

make significant strides in the peace process was an immense frustration to the Palestinian

people.[103]

The Second Intifada

Information and data is widespread for the second intifada, therefore, for the

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[100] Ibid.
[101] King, 326.
[102] Gelvin, 240.
[103] Ibid.

purposes of this paper, focus will be made on the goals and tactics of the intifada, and the

success or failure of such objectives, so that a comparison can be made with the first

intifada.

The second intifada was sparked on September 28, 2000, when Israel political

leader Ariel Sharon led a throng of a thousand security guards and border police into the

area known by Jews as the Temple Mount, but is under the control of the Muslims and

known as the Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary).[104] Palestinians considered this act a

desecration and deliberate act of provocation, especially the majority Muslim population.

The next day, Palestinians took to the streets in protest and were immediately challenged

by Israeli police, who used live ammunition and killed four young demonstrators.[105] King

mentions that the first few weeks of the al-Aqsa intifada "were essentially another popular

nonviolent upsurge,"[106] until the Palestinians reacted to the severe Israeli use of force, with

some observers putting the count of Israeli bullets used in the first few days of the intifada

at around a million.[107]

Explaining the rationale for the violence of the second intifada, King observes that

those Palestinian youths who had participated in the first intifada had seen the failure of

their movement to produce any substantial change in their situation as a people. She notes:

> [They] were unable to see tangible changes in return for the rigors of
> nonviolent discipline in the first instance and the penalties extracted by their
> noncooperation in the second. They were now vulnerable to reverberating

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[104] King, 328.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ben Kaspit, "Israel is Not a Country With an Army, but an Army With an Attached Country," *Ma'ariv* (Tel Aviv, Israel), 6 Sept. 2002, World News Connection, cited in King, 328.

retaliatory arguments from those who had never fully disaffirmed armed
struggle and the emboldened claims of the Islamic revivalists.[108]

Awad disagrees with King's analysis of the failure of the first intifada, as he places the

failure of the Oslo process clearly on the heads of the Palestinian leadership, while the

intifada led to the success of getting to the negotiating table. He does note, however, that

the misunderstanding between the nonviolent action and negotiations was a factor in the

decision of Palestinians to try a different strategic tack during the second intifada.[109]

Gelvin describes the very different nature of the second intifada by highlighting

what became the main remembrance for most of the world of what was also known as the

al-Aqsa intifada: the suicide bombing. While these had been a part of the conflict during the

Oslo years, the suicide bombing campaign took off in earnest after the onset of the second

intifada.

> In March 2001, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed three Israeli women in
> Netanya, a small city between Tel Aviv and Haifa. In May, a suicide bomber
> killed ten Israelis and wounded another hundred at a shopping mall. In
> August, a suicide bomber blew himself up along with eighteen Israelis in a
> pizza parlor in Jerusalem. Six of the eighteen Israelis were children. Five
> bombs went off in Jerusalem on 5 September.[110]

These tactics dramatically charged the conflict, which some commentators believe was the

goal for the radical factions of Palestinian society. This is known as the "strategy of

provocation," and is used "for the purposes of provoking a reaction worse than the original

grievance."[111] The radical factions of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and even some PLO militias,

were controlled by various goals, which were never in unity with one another. For

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[108] King, 329.
[109] S. Awad, interview.
[110] Gelvin, 244.
[111] King, 331.

comparison purposes, it can be assumed that at the least an end to the occupation was again the goal of the second intifada.

The violent tactics of the intifada overshadowed the committed groups within Palestinian society still working with the tools of nonviolent action. Sami Awad's group, Holy Land Trust, organized a number of events to engage the whole community in nonviolent tactics during the second intifada. There were demonstrations and protests, as well as memorial services for the children that were killed in the early months of the conflict. They realized there was a need to retrain citizens in the techniques of nonviolent resistance, since a whole generation had grown up in the Oslo years without any experience in civil action. After the 2002 Israeli raids of Jenin, Nablus, and Bethlehem, Awad noticed a shift within even the militias, as they "began to understand that engaging in armed resistance was not achieving any goals for us."[112] They then began training Palestinian militia groups in theories of nonviolent action. Despite these actions by the nonviolent community, the terrorist aspects of the intifada were the focus of the media and popular culture.

The consequences of the suicide bombings were fierce and extensive from the Israeli forces. The government "ordered extra-judicial assassinations of those they considered culpable, launched reprisals raids, bulldozed homes and orchards of families of presumed suicide bombers, imposed checkpoints next to every population center or refugee camp throughout the territories, and levied crushing economic blockades."[113] Everyday Palestinians felt the full weight of the Israeli reprisals, even though just a fraction

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[112] S. Awad, interview.
[113] King, 331.

of the population was involved in the intifada. For every Israeli casualty during the second

intifada, about three Palestinians died. Gelvin states, "Of the approximately four thousand

deaths that occurred between 2000 and 2005, three thousand were Palestinian and over

five hundred of these were Palestinian children under the age of eighteen."[114] The loss of

life was horrific and widespread.

Unlike the first iteration, primarily young men who had access to weapons waged

the second uprising, men Sami Awad likened to "Rambo style men." He also noted that the

violent nature of the second uprising "created a real sense of isolation of the rest of the

community from engaging in resisting the occupation."[115] This isolation created a large gap

between the Palestinian population and those fighting the occupation. As such, the goals

and interests of the people were largely not taken into consideration during the second

intifada.

One of the most lasting effects of the second intifada was the building of the

separation wall, also known as the security barrier. This wall was created by the Israeli

government as a reaction to the suicide bombings and was to prevent further attacks from

happening.[116] This barrier, however, has exacerbated Israeli-Palestinian relations, as it

follows a circuitous route that essentially annexes parts of the West Bank. Gelvin describes

the problem: "Instead of adhering to the 1949 armistice lines that had served as Israel's

unofficial border for over half a century, the barrier…sometimes cuts deeply into the

occupied areas and incorporates the largest of the West Bank settlement blocs as well as

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[114] Gelvin, 245.
[115] S. Awad, interview.
[116] Gelvin, 247.

Jerusalem."[117] At points the barrier runs down the road of a town, separating Palestinian families and communities from one another. The long-term effects of the wall are varied and great. Israeli human rights group B'Tselem produced a document in 2012 studying the various effects of the wall on Palestinian life. It found that 10.2 percent of the cultivated Palestinian farmland fell on the Israeli side of the wall, losing an estimated agricultural production value of $38 million annually.[118] The barrier has made the movement of people and goods very costly and time consuming. Some of the effects on the land and the people will not be fully known for a number of years.

While the building of the separation barrier may have had other motivations within the Israeli political scene, it is best seen as a direct reaction to the violent tactics used by Palestinian suicide bombers during the second intifada. Another outcome of the second uprising was a stalling of the peace process, as it created a political struggle within the Palestinian factions, primarily Fatah and Hamas. Without a strong political entity in the Palestinian territories, negotiations with the Israelis became impossible. In addition, Israeli and international support for the Palestinian cause was greatly diminished as a result of the violent tactics used.[119] Sami Awad observed, "[the] Israeli peace movement was silenced within Israeli society. They had no voice anymore."[120] As he saw it, the Israeli activists could no longer justify standing with the Palestinians in light of such horrendous attacks against civilian targets. Any help that the Palestinian movement could gain from the

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[117] Ibid, 248.
[118] "Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank," B'Tselem, October 2012, 43, http://www.btselem.org/download/201210_arrested_development_eng.pdf.
[119] S. Awad, interview.
[120] Ibid.

support of Israeli allies would have to be rebuilt.

Conclusions

As stated at the outset of this essay, a comparison of the two Palestinian intifadas, their techniques and tactics, and their outcomes, would allow an analysis of what tactics worked better than others, in an attempt to show that nonviolent action has been considerably more effective in producing positive outcomes for Palestinian society than violent action has. The evidence given here has supported that goal.

The primarily nonviolent tactics of the first intifada produced increased support from the Israeli and international community, effected positive social benefits by engaging all members of society, and, in the end, created an environment where the Israeli government was forced to negotiate with Palestinian leaders. The stated goals of the intifada were to end the Israeli occupation and create an independent Palestinian state. While, in the long view, these goals were not achieved by the intifada, it can be argued that the outcomes produced by the intifada were steps towards such aims, if not the fulfillment of them. Chenoweth and Stephan conclude their study of the first intifada with a comparison of the nonviolent and violent campaigns within the early movement. They find that the nonviolent campaign produced a partial success, while the violent campaign can be understood as a failure to reach goals.[121]

The violent campaign of the suicide bombers during the second intifada created the exact opposite outcomes from the first intifada. It decreased Israeli and international support, isolated everyday Palestinians from the struggle towards liberation, and produced

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[121] Chenoweth and Stephan, Table 5.2, 145.

such a severe reaction from the Israeli government as the separation barrier, which continues to have dramatic effects on Palestinian life. In addition, the violent tactics of the PLO, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad destroyed Palestinian unity and created a political struggle for power within Palestinian society that has halted the peace process. These outcomes can be seen as a definitive failure when the goals were Palestinian liberation. The two-state solution is barely a viable option now and a solution to the conflict is as distant as ever.

In light of these conclusions, it must be argued that if a third intifada is to take place, and the goal of an end to the Israeli occupation is still the main objective, a strategy of disciplined nonviolent action must be adhered to at all levels of Palestinian society. If the rational actor model is correct, Palestinians will be able to see that nonviolent action has, in the past, produced better outcomes than violent action, and therefore make the logical decision to choose to wage a nonviolent struggle. They can learn from the mistakes and successes of their past two uprisings, do away with the mixed tactic method that created trouble in the first intifada, and pursue an end to their occupation through nonviolent means. As Sami Awad has said, "Our strength is in our people and in our unity…it's not in our military, it's not in the weapons we have…and that's why we need more to focus on nonviolence."[122] If Palestinians can see the wisdom and logic of Awad's words, they will find a path towards their liberation.

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[122] S. Awad, interview.

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