WORKING PAPER

The Economic Determinants of the Brazilian Nominal Term Structure of Interest Rates

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Colorado College Working Paper 2006-06 October, 2006



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THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE BRAZILIAN NOMINAL TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES

Rodrigo Sekkel* DenisardAlves**

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to identif y the effects of m onetary policy and macroeconomic shocks on the dynam ics of the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. We estimate a near-VAR m odel under the identification schem e proposed by Christiano *et al.* (1996, 1999). The results resem ble those of the US economy: monetary p olicy shocks f latten th e term structure of interest rates. We fi nd t hat monetary policy shocks in Brazil explain a significantly larger share of the dyna mics of the term structure than in the USA. Fi nally, we analyze the importance of standard macroeconomic variables (e.g., GDP, inflati on, and m easure of country risk) to the dynamics of the term structure in Brazil.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Dates of meetings of the Brazilian Monetary P olicy Committee (COPOM) and the announcements of targets for the overnight interest rate Selic¹ are special days in the calendar of Brazilian financial m arket play ers. Decisions about a new target for the Selic rate frequently cause strong reactions regarding financial assets, especially the term structure of interest rates. Flem ing and Re molona (1997) found that days of announcements of decisions about m onetary policy and relevant m acroeconomic aggregates coincid e with increased volatility of all m arkets' interest rates in the U S financial market.

One important reason to study the factors that i mpact the dyna mics of the term structure lies in its signif icance as a m echanism of monetary policy transmission. The capacity of a central bank to conduct a successful monetary policy is intrinsically linked to its power to influence--through the overn ight interest rate as w ell as through indications of future movem ents of this s ame ra te--the market's term structure of interest rate s, which in turn inf luence real economic activity. The Centra 1 Bank of Brazil's Inflation Report (Dec. 2002) acknowle dges that the market's interest rates influence the aggregate demand channel, which is one of the most important channels of monetary transmission.

¹ The Selic Rat e is the overnight interest rate used by the Brazilian Central Bank for the conduct of its monetary policy. See the Appendix for a graphic of this rate during the period of analysis.

Simultaneously, one of the m ost important fields of research in finance is to determine what factors are responsible for m ovements of the term structure of interest rates. Neve rtheless, the liter ature that relates those move ments to observable macroeconomic variables is still incipient. The majority of the literature assumes that movements of the term structure of interest rates are related to non-observable factors.² Of all the possible de terminants of the term structure, monetary policy seems to be the natural starting point to bridge the gap between finance and macroeconomics.

The main objective of this paper is to analyze how observable m acroeconomic variables, e specially monetary policy, af fect the market's interest rates, as well a s factors that compose the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. For that purpose, we use an approximation of the monetary policy reaction function within a near-vector autoregressive model, in a spirit close to that of Evans and Marshall (1998, 2001).

Brazilian interest rates have ranked among the world's highest since the Real Plan successfully brought inflation to single di gits in June 1994. Between January 1995 and January 1999, during the crawling peg exchange rate regiment, interest rates reacted heavily to external shocks (e.g., during the Mexican tequila crisis and the Asian and Russian crises), resulting in highly volatile over might interest rates, as well as longner maturity rates, as the one-year fixed rate swap. Figure 1 in the Appendix [1]presents the behavior of those two rates during the period of analysis. Since the abandonment of the crawling peg exchange rate in January 1999 and the subsequent adoption of an inflation targeting regime, interest rates have been lower and less v olatile. Even so, Braz ilian

² For example, see Litterman and Scheinkman (1991); Knez, Litterman, and Scheinkman (1994); Dai and Singleton (2000).

interest rates are still one of the highest am ong developing countries.³ The study of the market's responses to a variety of macroec onomic shocks constitutes an important step towards a better understanding of the dynamics of interest rates in Brazil.

The organization of the paper is as f ollows. The next section briefly describes the literature that relates macroeconomic variables to the dyn amics of the term structure. The third section describes the em pirical methodology and discusses the identification of the model. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.

2. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature that relates the dynam ics of market rates to macroeconomic factors is relatively recent. Evans and Marshall (1998) studied the extent to which movements of the term structure can be explained by exogenous impulses of monetary policy and other macroeconomic variables (e.g., product and inflation). They used a VAR model under different id entification schemes, such as those popularized by Christiano *et al*. (1996, 1999) and Galí (1992). No twithstanding the different identification schemes, this study revealed that impulsive reactions to monetary policy have a significant impact on short-term rates. However, monetary policy shocks do not cause a parallel shift of the term structure; instead, they are followed by a flattening of the term structure. Based on that observati on, the res earchers ex tracted a qu adratic approximation from the term structure to obtain measures of level, declivity, and curvature of the term structure. Including those measures on the estimated models, they

³ See Muinhos and Nakane (2006) for a comparison between Brazilian equilibrium real interest rate and international ones.

verified that monetary policy shocks are responsible, to a great extent, for the variance of the declivity factor of the term structure in the US.

Wu (2001, 2003) used a VAR model sim ilar to that of Evans and Marshall (1998) under the identification scheme of Sims and Zha (1995) to extract the exogenous components of monetary policy and link them to the term structure. He also estimated a Taylor rule by the generalized method of moments (GMM) and used its residuals as a second measure of non-system atic monetary policy. After relating those measures to the term structure, W u corroborated the results of Evans a nd Marshall (1998), and concluded that monetary policy is the major force behind move ments of the declivity factor of the term structure.

Ang and Piazzesi (200 3) introduced two observable m acroeconomic factors in an affine model of the term structure. The first factor is the first principal component extracted from a large set of econom ic ac tivity m easures, and the second one is similarly extracted from a set of price i ndexes. These researchers found that those macroeconomic factors are responsible for almost 85% of the long-term variance of short-term yields, but have a m uch less signi ficant effect on long-term interest rates. Consequently, they shift the declivity of the term structure, but not its level.

Evans and Marshall (2001) sought to id entify the effects of m acroeconomic shocks on the term structure. For that purpose, they estim ated a vecto r-autogression with short- and long-run restrictions (Galí, 1992). These researchers also made use of theoretic model measures of shocks, such as the ones proposed by Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001 a, b) for technology shocks and Blanchard and Perotti (2000) for fiscal

shocks, and a measure of marginal rate of substitution shocks, similar to that proposed by Hall (1997).

Diebold *et al.* (2005) estim ated a m odel in state-space for m for the ter m structure of interest rate, where the dynam ics of the term structure is form ulated in terms of non-observable factors (i.e., level, declivity, and curvat ure), as well as observable macroeconomic factors (i.e., econo mic activity, stance of monetary policy, and inflation.). Unlike the others, this model allows a bi-causal relationship between the term structure and m acroeconomic variables. Hence, the authors were able to test whether the relation flows from the term structure to m acroeconomic factors, or vice versa. Interestingly, their research revealed evidence of a strong effect of macroeconomic variables on the dynamics of the term structure but a weak effect of the term structure on macroeconomic variables.

A number of other studies have focused on the relation of monetary policy and long-term interest rates within a regression-based approach, initiated by Cook and Hahn (1989) and further developed by Kuttner (2001). The findings of these studies were similar: unanticipated mone tary policy m ovements have minimal effects on long-ter m interest rates. Larr aín (2005) applied the m ethodology proposed by Kuttner to Chile's long-term inflation-linked bond rates (2001) and found that long-term rates had little effect on expected and unexpected moneta ry policy actions, although he did find a deeper effect for unpredicted monetary policy movements.

Seeking to quantify the effects of sy stematic monetary policy, Leeper, Sim s, and Zha (1996) and Bernanke, Gertler, a nd Watson (1997) also included long-term interest rates in their models. Although they used different m ethodologies, these

researchers' results were qualitatively similar to those of other works and to the present study.

3. IDENTIFICATION

First, we as sume that the m onetary policy in strument is the overnight interest rate, Selic (S_t), determined by the COPOM. We assume that S_t is determined by a rule of the following form:

$$S_t = \psi(\Omega_t) + \sigma \varepsilon_t , \qquad (1)$$

where Ω_t denotes the set of information available to the monetary authority in period t, ψ is a linear function that describes the reaction of the monetary policy to the estate of the economy, ε_t is an exogenous shock to the monetary policy with unit variance, and σ is a scalar parameter. The monetary policy reaction function incorporates the preferences of the monetary authority regard ing stabilization polic ies and infection aversion. The residual, ε_t , reflects random nonsystem atic factors that affect policy decisions (e.g., the personalities and view of central b ank governors, and political factors), as well as technical factors (e.g., measurement errors in macroeconomic time series) (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1996). By decomposing the overnight Selic rate between components explained by economic factors and another random one, we may use the latter to identify the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables and on the term structure of interest rates.

We consider the effects of m onetary policy shocks on nom inal interest rates of different maturities. Let Z_t be a vector of macroeconomic variables at period t and R_t^j be

a nominal interest rate of maturity *j*. The monetary policy rule (1) can be estim ated as one of the equations of the following near–VAR:

$$\begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Z_t \\ R_t^j \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A(L) & B(L) \\ C(L) & D(L) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Z_{t-1} \\ R_{t-1}^j \end{bmatrix} + \sigma \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t^z \\ \varepsilon_t^j \end{bmatrix}$$
(2)

In this equation, *a* is a square m atrix with 1 on the diagonal; *b* is a scalar; *c* is a line vector; A(L) is a polynom ial matrix on the lag operator *L*; C(L) is a line polynomial vector; and D(L) and C(L) are polynomial scalars. The error terms are *i.i.d.* processes of shocks m utually non -autocorrelated; the v ariance is an identity m atrix; and σ is a diagonal matrix.

Throughout this paper, we assume that b = 0 and B(L) = 0, such that contemporaneous and past values of the term structure are not allowed to im pact the macroeconomic block Z_t of the model. In this way, we assure that the id entified monetary policy shocks are invariant to the maturity *j* of the different rates included in the model, as in Marshall and Evans (1998, 2001) and Wu (2001, 2003).

The data vector, as well as its ordering, is given by $Z_t = (IP_b, P_b, CBOND_b, S_b, M_l)$, where *IP* denotes industrial production, *P* denotes the price level m easure by the $IPCA^4$ index, *CBOND* denotes the sp read of the *CBOND*⁵ to the US bond of the sam e maturity as a m easure of country risk, *S* denotes the overnight Selic rate, and *M1* denotes the monetary aggregate M1.

⁴ The consumer price index IPCA released by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics is the official price index pursued by the Central Bank of Brazil in its inflation-targeting framework.

⁵ The CBOND was the most-traded Brazilian external debt bond during the period of analysis.

Minella (2003) argues in favor of the inclusion of a m easure of country risk when estimating the channels of monetary policy in Brazil, given the fact that monetary policy has had to react strongly to external s hocks in the recent past. Also, the country risk is a forward-looking variable that seems to play the same role as commodity price indexes do on the transm ission mechanism of monetary policy in developed countries. The omission of this variable often leads to the so-called price puzzle (i.e., a positive reaction of inflation after a monetary policy shock).

Therefore, the reaction function identified is given by:

$$S_{t} = A_{4}(L)Z_{t-1} - a_{41}PI_{t} - a_{42}INF_{t} - a_{43}CBond_{t} + \sigma_{44}\varepsilon_{t}^{Z}, \qquad (3)$$

where $A_4(L)$ is the fourth line of the polynom ial A(L) and a_{ji} denotes o $(i,j)^{th}$ element of the *a* matrix. The monetary policy shock ε_t is the fourth element of ε_t^Z . We assume that it is orthogonal to all variables on the right-hand side of the equation.

In ord er to investigate more deeply the effect of m acroeconomic variables-especially that of m onetary policy--on the dynamics of the term structure, we obtain approximations of the lev el, d eclivity, and curvature factors , following the methodology of Ang a nd Piazzesi (2001). As a measure of the lev el of the ter m structure, the authors us e the arithmetic m ean of the one-, twelve-, and sixty-m onth rates. Adapting the structure to our datase t, we use the mean of the one-, six -, and twelve-month rates. Our m easure of declivit y is given by the spread of the twelvemonth rate to the one-month rate. Lastly, the curvature measure is given by the su m of the one-month and twelve-month rates, less the six-month rate. In the following section, we m ake use of those factors to infer how monetary policy and other macroeconomic variables influence the dynamics of the Brazilian term structure of interest rates.

4 RESULTS

The VARs are estim ated with m onthly data for the period of January 1995 to December 2003. Six lags are used in each equation, in o rder to obtain white no ise residuals and to allow a lag structure rich enough to take into account all the dyn amics between the variables.

4.1 Response of Macro Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock

Figure 2 plots the effects of a one-sta ndard-deviation monetary policy shock on macro variables.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The effects of a m onetary policy-tightening are the expected ones: a m onetary policy shock has a significant negative eff ect on industrial productio n. It reaches its maximum effect five to six months after the shock. Eleven months later, point estimates are once more equal to zero. Following a m onetary policy shock, the price level slowly declines after the two first m onths. After ni ne months, this fall reach es its m aximum. After this period, the monetar y policy shock is no longer statistically significant. A s one would also expect, a positive monetary policy shock raises the over night interest

rate, Selic. It is noteworthy that this ef fect is s ignificant even five m onths after th e shock, revealing a high degree of persistence of the Braz ilian overnight interest rate. Lastly, a monetary policy-tightening decreases the stock of money in the economy.

Also noteworthy is the fact that a tight ening of monetary policy causes the socalled liquidity effect, since money and interest rates respond in opposite ways after the shock (Christiano *et al.*, 1999).

4.2 The Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on the Term Structure

This section traces the response of the term structure of interest rate to the monetary policy shocks identified above. For that purpose, we use one-month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-month nominal fixed swap rates.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

A decrease in the im pact of m onetary policy shocks is apparent with rates of longer maturities (Fig. 3). But the larger difference between the estimates lies in their statistical significance. Monetary policy shocks have a statistically significant impact on the one-month interest rate for more than five months. In contrast, the significance of the impact on the twelve-month interest rate barely lasts two months.

In sum mary, no para llel shift in the term structure follows a monetary policy shock. On the contrary, shocks have a stronger, more significant impact on short-term interest rates, making the term structure flatter. Marshall and Edelberg (1996), Evans and Marshall (1998, 2001), and Wu (2001, 2003) found qualitatively similar results for the term structure of interest rates in the USA.

In order to measure the importance of the overnight interest rate in the dynamics of the Brazilian term structure, we present in Table 1 the results of the forecast error variance decomposition.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

As Table 1 indicates, mone tary policy shocks are responsible for almost threequarters of the conditional variance of the one-month intere st rate one month after its initial impact. If we interpret the two-year s-ahead conditional variance as a proxy for the unconditional variance, we see that m onetary policy shocks are responsible for nearly half of the long-term variance of the one-m onth rate. Those num bers are considerably larger than t hose for the US economy. Evan s and Marshall (1998) found that monetary shocks are responsible for only 7% of the unconditional variance of onemonth rates in the USA.

The rela tive importance of monetary polic y shocks declines as we consider longer-term rates, as indicated by the impulse response functions. But those shocks are still responsible for a noteworthy share of the unconditional variance even for the twelve-month inter est r ate. For that maturity, we f ind an initial p ercentage of 35%, which falls to 12% after two years. In gene ral, monetary policy shocks seem to be relatively more important in the dynamics of the term structure in Brazil than in the U.S.

The impulse response functions an d the varian ce decompositions suggest, as noted by Evans and Marshall (1998) and W u (2001), that the m onetary policy shocks

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resemble the slope factor iden tified by Litterman and Scheinkm an (1991). Sin ce monetary policy shocks do not cau se a parallel shift in the term structure, they should be responsible for a change in its declivity.

For a clearer understanding of the effects of moneta ry policy shocks on the dynamics of the Brazilian term structure of interest rates, we estimate impulse response functions as well as variance decompositions of the three factors, as presented by Ang and Piazzesi (2001).

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

As Fig. 4 reveals, the response of the le vel factor to an exogenous im pulse in monetary policy is sim ilar to that of the one-m onth interest rate. That is, a m onetary policy shoc k has a positiv e effect on the level of the term structure that las ts approximately six months.

The impulse response functions indicate that a monetary policy shock does not have a symmetric impact on the term structure, since the s hock to lon g-term interest rates is less significant than the shock to short-term interest rates. Thus, it is expected that monetary policy shocks flatten the term structure. Figure 5 plots the response of the declivity factor to an impulse in monetary policy. As anticipated, a shock to monetary policy reduces the declivity of the term structure. This effect seems to last f our to six months--approximately the sam e ext ent of the monetary policy effect on short-term maturity rates, such as the one-month rate.

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, we present the impulse response functions of the curvature to the monetary policy shocks identified (Fig. 5[.2]). A small increase in the curvature of the term structure follows a monetary policy shock, as Evans and Marshall (1998) and Wu (2003) found.

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

We examine more precisely the relative importance of monetary impulses to the dynamics of the three factors, through the analysis of the variance decomposition of the term structure. Table 2 reveals the share of the conditional variance of the term structure that can be attributed to monetary policy shocks.

[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]

Monetary policy shocks are the most im portant shocks behind the unconditional variance of the declivity factor, being responsible for m ore than half of its variance. Monetary policy shocks also explain a sign ificant share of the level and curvature variance, in particular.

4.3 The Importance of other Macroeconomic Variables

This section analyzes the contribution of other macroeconomic variables to the dynamics of the term structure.

4.3.1 The Impact of Country Risk

We use the m odel described in Sec tion 2 to study the effects of other macroeconomic shocks that may influence the dynamics of the term structure. Figure 7 indicates the impact of a country risk shock, measured by the spread of the C-Bond.

[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]

The relative im portance of country risk shocks increases m onotonically along with term structure maturity. Again, the m ain difference between the re sponses of the term structure seems to be in their s tatistical significance. While the response of the o ne-month interest rate is significant for only four months, that of the twelve-month interest rate is significant for eight months.

Table 3 illu strates the p ercentage of the forecast error variance decomposition due to the country risk shock. The relative e importance of country risk shock to the dynamics of interest rates grows monotonically as the monotonically as the interest rate increases. While country risk shocks explore a in approximately 10% of the unconditional variance of one-month rates, this percentage reaches 40% with the twelve-month rate. Hence, country risk shocks seem to be the most important determinant of twelve-month rates in Brazil.

[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]

For a m ore detailed understanding of th e importance of such shocks to the dynamics of interest rates in Brazil, we veri fy their effects on each of the factors that compose the term structure.

Country risk shocks seem to be an important feature for the determ ination of the level of interest rates in Brazil (Table 4). [.3]The two other factors, declivity and curvature, do not seem to be significantly explained by shocks to the country risk. Interestingly, country risk shocks have exactly the opposite effect as monetary policy shocks on the term structure: they make the term structure more inclined. An initial explanation of this fact m ay be found in the response of in flation to each of the tw o shocks. Whereas monetary policy shocks are associated with a fall of future inflation, country risk shocks are expected to have a positiv e shock on inflation through devaluation of the exchange rate.

4.4.2 The Impact of Product and Inflation

Evans and Marshall (1998, 2001) and Wu (2001, 2004) found that a noteworthy share of long-term interest rates can be explained by product shocks. Approxim ately 20% of the unconditional variance of the twelve-month interest rate can be attributed to product shocks. As Table 5 reveals, this share is similar to that of the Brazilian case. It is interesting to note that the proportion of variance due to the product shock is similar across the term structure.

[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]

Another similarity between the re sults of this p aper and the studies of the US economy lies in the low predictive power of (past) inflation for the movem ents of the term structure. Evans and Marshall (1998, 2001) and Wu (2001, 2003) determined that

approximately 3% to 5% of the variance of the term structure may be explained by inflation shocks; for our case, the estimated proportion is not statistically significant.

Considering these results, it would be in teresting to determine the share of the unconditional variance of the twelve-month interest rate of Brazil that means any be explained by macroeconomic shocks. Table 6 compares the results for the Brazilian and US economies, as found by Evans and Marshall (2001) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003).

[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

The contribution of m acroeconomic shocks for the variance of the twelvemonth interest rate is sim ilar for both economies. The importance of macroeconom ic shocks increases with rates of longer m aturities. Table 7 reveals the variance attributed to macroeconomic variables for the Brazilian term structure.

[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]

While macroeconomic shocks are responsible for about 55% of the variance of the one-m onth rate, th is share increases to almost 85% for the twelve-m onth rate. Hence, we may conclude that as the term structure of interest rates in Brazil in creases its maturity, the importance of macroeconomic factors to its dynamics will increase.

5. CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper is to discuss the economic determinants of the Brazilian term structure of interest rates. For that purpose, we have estimated a near–VAR model in which the macroeconomic block has an effect on the term structure, but the latter is not allowed to im pact the form er. Thus, we assure that the monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks are invari ant to the maturity and factors of the term structure. We have found that monetary policy shocks are responsible for an important share of the Brazilian term structure dynamics. Those shares are, in general, significantly larger than those of the US economy. In accordance with the international literature, we have confirmed that monetary policy shocks are especially important for the dynamics of the declivity factor of the term structure. Consequently, monetary policy shocks flatten the term structure.

Additionally, the importance of other standard m acroeconomic variables (e.g., country risk and industrial production) was investigated. Among the standard macroeconomic variables responsible for the dynam ics of the Brazilian term structure, industrial production shocks seem to be the m ost important. This paper analyzes the dynamics of interest rate m arkets, focusing on shocks that typica lly affect em erging market economies (e.g., country risk shocks).

Future extensions of the current pape r m ay opt for different id entification structures, such as that proposed by Galí (1992). By using a v ector autoregression approach, we have aimed to identify the st ylized facts of the dynamic relation between macroeconomic variables and the term struct ure of interest rates, with a special emphasis on m onetary policy. It is not our objective to derive a pricing model of the

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term structure. Based on the stylized facts discussed in this paper, future research may focus on a term structure m odel with observa ble macroeconomic factors, in o rder to investigate the dynamics of the Brazilian term structure.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank Fabiana Rocha, Paulo Picchetti, Ro drigo Bueno, Ana Luisa Abras, Bruno Rocha, and an anonymous referee for comments on previous drafts of the current paper, as well as participants of the 2005 Meeting of the Brazilian Economic Association. The remaining e rrors are ou r sole responsibility. F inancial assistance by Capes/Brazil is kindly acknowledged by the first author.

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
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FIGURE 1: The Selic Rate and th

e Tw elve-Month Fixed Interest



Rate





FIGURE 2: Response of Macro Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock






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


FIGURE 4: Response of Level Factor to a Monetary Policy Shock

FIGURE 5: Response of Declivity Factor to a Monetary Policy Shock







FIGURE 6: Response of Curvature Factor to a Monetarv Policy Shock







APPENDIX 2 - TABLES

	1-Month	3-Month	6-Month	12-Month
1	67.67	55.97	45.74	38.29
1	(6.35)	(6.93)	(6.96)	(6.77)
2	58.60	44.73	30.99	23.81
2	(8.49)	(8.23)	(7.07)	(6.11)
3	52.54	36.93	21.67	15.93
3	(9.90)	(9.25)	(7.10)	(5.31)
4	52.46	37.81	20.08	14.04
4	(10.81)	(10.33)	(8.07)	(5.85)
5	54.28	41.45	21.51	14.43
3	(11.51)	(11.25)	(9.14)	(6.81)
6	53.67	41.74	22.17	15.26
0	(12.06)	(11.79)	(9.66)	(7.46)
7	51.93	40.36	21.59	15.17
/	(12.32)	(11.82)	(9.63)	(7.51)
8	50.77	39.33	20.92	14.74
8	(12.33)	(11.64)	(9.48)	(7.30)
9	50.28	38.92	20.70	14.69
9	(12.17)	(11.44)	(9.42)	(7.25)
10	49.66	38.50	20.72	14.88
10	(11.96)	(11.26)	(9.41)	(7.28)
1.1	48.59	38.06	20.85	15.21
11	(11.85)	(11.16)	(9.42)	(7.31)
10	47.50	37.83	21.07	15.62
12	(11.77)	(11.07)	(9.42)	(7.32)
24	45.34	37.65	21.07	15.75
24	(11.51)	(11.85)	(9.33)	(7.51)

Table 1: Proportion of Variance Explained by the Selic Rate

	Level	Declivity	Curvature
1	51.82	36.92	14.01
1	(6.92)	(7.27)	(5.97)
2	35.49	49.62	31.76
2	(7.47)	(9.04)	(8.86)
2	24.92	55.93	41.77
3	(7.66)	(10.29)	(9.89)
4	22.70	57.14	41.89
4	(8.48)	(11.00)	(10.17)
5	23.50	58.61	39.96
3	(9.45)	(11.18)	(10.18)
(23.72	57.86	38.28
6	(9.84)	(10.85)	(9.94)
7	22.80	57.09	37.27
7	(9.62)	(10.55)	(9.74)
8	22.00	56.41	36.29
8	(9.37)	(10.30)	(9.49)
0	21.73	56.23	35.63
9	(9.24)	(10.25)	(9.35)
10	21.69	56.03	35.47
10	(9.18)	(10.28)	(9.32)
11	21.78	55.82	35.48
11	(9.14)	(10.30)	(9.29)
12	21.96	55.63	35.45
12	(9.13)	(10.26)	(9.27)
24	21.82	52.81	35.35
24	(9.03)	(10.50)	(9.60)

Table 2: Proportion of Variance of Factors
Explained by Monetary Policy Shocks

to a Country Kisk Shock				
	1-Month	3-Month	6-Month	12-Month
1	4.37	7.56	14.43	21.06
	(4.84)	(5.63)	(6.61)	(7.00)
•	7.16	12.32	22.90	31.83
2	(6.18)	(7.10)	(8.52)	(8.77)
2	10.28	16.42	28.30	37.56
3	(7.73)	(8.71)	(9.92)	(10.34)
4	9.27	14.83	27.49	36.97
4	(8.25)	(9.03)	(10.37)	(10.98)
5	8.15	12.97	26.72	36.54
5	(8.39)	(8.97)	(10.38)	(11.28)
6	8.53	13.34	27.73	37.46
0	(8.93)	(9.46)	(10.76)	(11.58)
7	9.52	14.98	29.27	38.35
/	(9.76)	(10.23)	(11.18)	(11.64)
8	10.29	16.10	30.34	38.95
0	(10.10)	(10.50)	(11.28)	(11.52)
9	10.91	16.71	30.85	39.12
9	(10.07)	(10.39)	(11.16)	(11.25)
10	11.16	16.82	30.79	38.77
10	(9.89)	(10.14)	(10.89)	(10.95)
11	10.98	16.67	30.50	38.31
11	(9.72)	(9.91)	(10.60)	(10.68)
12	10.71	16.55	30.30	38.12
12	(9.55)	(9.70)	(10.33)	(10.48)
24	9.42	16.30	21.07	39.24
24	(9.67)	(9.63)	(10.24)	(10.71)

Table 3: Proportion of Variance due to a Country Risk Shock

LevelDeclivityCurvature1 13.73 10.85 1.53 2 (6.74) (4.66) (1.37) 2 21.92 12.13 2.87 2 (8.35) (5.48) (2.00) 3 27.16 13.05 3.32 (9.91) (6.54) (2.61) 4 26.15 12.61 2.76 ($10.36)$ (6.73) (3.44) 5 25.29 12.00 2.62 (10.34) (6.68) (4.69) 6 (10.73) (6.69) (5.42) 7 27.51 12.04 2.48 (11.27) (6.62) (5.84) 8 28.61 11.98 2.60 (11.45) (6.50) (5.99) 9 29.15 11.95 2.66 (11.36) (6.45) (5.95) 10 28.90 13.15 2.68 (10.80) (6.73) (6.25) 12 28.73 13.86 2.71 (10.52) (6.93) (6.40) 24 29.02 17.63 2.80	Ang and Piazzesi (2003)					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$						
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$						
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1	13.73	10.85	1.53		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	I		(4.66)			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2		(5.48)	(2.00)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2					
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	3		(6.54)	(2.61)		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	4		· /			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	4	(10.36)	(6.73)	(3.44)		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	5	25.29	12.00	2.62		
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	3	(10.34)	(6.68)	(4.69)		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	6	26.06	12.18			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0	(10.73)	(6.69)	(5.42)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	7	27.51	12.04	2.48		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	/	(11.27)	(6.62)	(5.84)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0	28.61	11.98	2.60		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0	(11.45)	(6.50)	(5.99)		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0	29.15	11.95	2.66		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	9	(11.36)	(6.45)	(5.95)		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10	29.15	12.47	2.69		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	10	(11.08)	(6.57)	(6.07)		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	11		13.15			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	11					
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	12					
	12					
$^{2-7}$ (10.50) (8.32) (7.87)	24					
	24	(10.50)	(8.32)	(7.87)		

TABLE 4: Proportion of Factors Variance due to Country Risk Shocks

to a Product Shock				
	1-Month	3-Month	6-Month	12-Month
1	10.90	11.12	9.54	7.80
1	(4.91)	(4.91)	(4.23)	(4.06)
2	17.45	17.39	13.29	11.33
2	(6.08)	(6.04)	(4.75)	(4.74)
3	21.95	23.91	17.98	16.48
3	(7.24)	(7.55)	(6.07)	(6.05)
4	24.22	26.98	19.80	19.00
4	(7.74)	(7.83)	(6.18)	(6.30)
5	24.00	26.39	19.74	19.14
3	(7.71)	(7.42)	(5.84)	(6.02)
6	23.32	26.10	20.12	19.15
0	(7.71)	(7.27)	(5.79)	(5.97)
7	22.68	25.51	20.27	18.95
/	(7.68)	(7.16)	(5.77)	(5.85)
8	22.20	25.02	20.29	18.85
0	(7.61)	(7.13)	(5.90)	(5.90)
9	22.01	24.79	20.13	18.69
,	(7.64)	(7.24)	(6.09)	(6.08)
10	22.00	24.81	19.97	18.52
10	(7.82)	(7.50)	(6.38)	(6.34)
11	21.85	24.81	19.85	18.38
11	(9.34)	(7.73)	(6.62)	(6.54)
12	21.54	24.75	19.80	18.27
14	(8.27)	(7.89)	(6.79)	(6.61)
24	20.04	24.50	20.42	18.98
	(8.21)	(8.05)	(7.22)	(6.99)

Table 5: Proportion of Variance dueto a Product Shock

Due to Macro Shocks				
Brazil USA USA (Evans and Marshall) (Ang and Piazz				
84.25%	92%	85%		

TABLE 6: Proportion of Variance of Twelve-Month Rate

TABLE 7: Proportion of Variance of the Brazilian Term Structure due to Macro Shocks

1-Month	3-Month	6-Month	12-Month
54.66	62.35	78.93	84.25